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RESISTANCE FACTORS
AND SPECIAL FORCES AREAS
BULGARIA (U)

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**RESISTANCE FACTORS
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


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PART I

RESISTANCE

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1. Introduction

Bulgaria, a small and relatively under-developed state of Eastern Europe, is generally regarded as the satellite nation most successfully incorporated into the Soviet system and, by natural consequence, as the satellite nation least favorable to Special Forces activity. It has the highest proportion of collectivized agriculture of any satellite, the tightest regimentation of industry and culture, and apparently also the most loyal armed forces and security police. It has developed under the Communist aegis a remarkably stable political system. Bulgaria's rulers have weathered the shifting course of Soviet events since the death of Stalin with surprising ease, and there have been no popular manifestations within the country in any way comparable to the East Berlin uprising of June 1953, the Poznan riots of June 1956, and the Hungarian revolution of the following November.

Several factors rooted deep in the history of Bulgaria help to explain the comparative quiescence of the country under Soviet domination. First and perhaps paramount, the strong cultural affinity of the Bulgarian and Russian peoples may be cited. This affinity is in no sense artificial but springs from basic similarities in race, language, and religion. Second, and in striking contrast to other peoples of Eastern Europe, the Bulgarians have always looked towards Russia as protector, inspiration, and guide. Whereas the Poles, Hungarians, and Rumanians have in large part built their distinctive nationality on a tradition of resistance to Russian rule, the Bulgarians have always welcomed Russian intervention in the Balkans and have leaned on Moscow for support in their perennial quarrels with Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia. Finally, as another major factor conditioning Bulgaria towards acceptance of the Communist system, the absence of a truly democratic Bulgarian political tradition should be noted. Had such a tradition developed during Bulgaria's sixty-odd years of troubled independence (1878-1944), its people might better have resisted the encroachments of Soviet totalitarianism. As it is, the failure to

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develop true traditions of democracy has deprived the Bulgarians of many of those ideological roots from which resistance factors take their strength in other satellite countries.

The present chapter, dealing primarily with known Bulgarian resistance activity in recent years, attempts a realistic evaluation of this activity in terms of Special Warfare needs and in the light of the generally unfavorable factors enumerated above. In the discussion which follows, emphasis is placed almost entirely on those overt aspects of Bulgarian resistance most pertinent to Special Warfare planning--i.e., partisan warfare, rural clandestine organization, and rural and industrial sabotage. General information of a political and sociological character is introduced only where necessary to clarify the course of overt resistance. Readers who require detailed treatment of passive resistance and resistance backgrounds should consult NIS and other standard intelligence manuals.

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2. Historical Background

The modern Bulgarian tradition of overt resistance had its origin in the closing decades of the 19th century. During the years 1863-1867, when present-day Bulgaria was still a province of the Ottoman Turkish empire, groups of Bulgarian exiles began to meet in Rumania and plot the armed liberation of their homeland. These intrigues culminated in abortive Bulgarian rebellions of 1875 and 1876 which were suppressed by the Turks with such ferocity that other nations of Europe felt compelled to adopt the Bulgarian cause. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, most of Bulgaria was detached from Turkish control and given virtual independence. The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 completed the rounding out of Bulgaria at Turkish expense and also gave the country an outlet to the Aegean Sea which it retained until the close of World War I.

Like all Balkan states emancipated during the 19th century, Bulgaria was embroiled from the start in territorial disputes with its neighbors and in serious internal discords. Prime agent in Bulgaria's international quarrels was the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) organized at Sofia in 1896. IMRO, specializing in clandestine, terrorist, and guerilla activities of every kind, sought to achieve the independence of historic Macedonia--a territory embracing southwestern Bulgaria, northeastern Greece, and southeastern Serbia (now part of Yugoslavia). To one faction in IMRO "independence" of Macedonia was a cloak for Bulgarian annexation, to another faction it was a genuine national ideal, but in practice both factions were fully agreed on the necessity of support from Sofia. From 1896 to 1934 IMRO remained a faithful servant of Bulgarian expansionism, with headquarters in the Petrich province of extreme southwestern Bulgaria. From this vantage point it conducted unofficial war in Greek and Serbian Macedonia, terrorized the surrounding Bulgarian countryside, and assassinated its opponents with impunity even in the streets of metropolitan Sofia. By 1934, when it was finally suppressed by the Bulgarian authorities, IMRO had abandoned most of its

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early idealism and was little better than an international criminal gang. The extent of IMRO powers, even in decline, is indicated by the Bulgarian government's admission in 1934 that it had confiscated no less than 10,938 rifles, 701,388 rounds of ammunition, 7,767 hand grenades, 47 machine guns, and corresponding quantities of other military supplies.¹

Apart from specifically IMRO activities, the sequence of events in Bulgaria after 1878 is further indication that, as a nation, the Bulgarians are far more accustomed to violence in their politics than to orderly democratic procedures. Stephen Stambulov, a powerful premier who ruled Bulgaria from 1887 to 1894, was assassinated by his opponents in 1895. The reins of power then passed into the hands of Tsar Ferdinand I who abrogated constitutional restraints, played off contending politicians with considerable skill, and gave his support both to IMRO and to expansionist circles in the Bulgarian Army. After the assassination of another Bulgarian premier in 1907, Ferdinand embarked on an imperialist policy which embroiled Bulgaria in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 and brought it into World War I on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. This latter move ran directly counter to the traditional pro-Russian sentiment of the Bulgarian people and was so unpopular that almost one-half the membership of the Bulgarian parliament voted against it.

In September 1918 Bulgaria surrendered to the Allies. The Agrarian leader Alexander Stamboliski took over the government, forced Tsar Ferdinand to abdicate in favor of his son Boris, and signed the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919 which stripped Bulgaria of most of the territories it had gained in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. Stamboliski's action in signing the treaty and in promoting internal reforms at the expense of imperial ambitions antagonized Bulgarian nationalists of every stripe. In 1923 Stamboliski was ousted from power by a coup d'état and assassinated along with many of his principal followers. He was succeeded by a military junta composed of high army officers and IMRO supporters which, in its turn, had to beat back a Communist-inspired rebellion in September 1923. Many of Stamboliski's

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supporters in the Agrarian Party joined in the Communist revolt, and the fighting spread to many parts of the Bulgarian countryside and cost the lives of several thousand persons before it was crushed. Hostilities had barely subsided when a time-bomb explosion in Sofia cathedral on 14 April 1925, aimed at the Tsar and leading members of the government, killed 128 persons and touched off a new wave of terror.

From 1923 until 1934 Bulgaria was governed by a series of military and right-wing autocracies. True democratic activity was greatly obstructed, and no Bulgarian politician who valued his life dared to oppose the terrorist machinations of IMRO. In May 1934 a coalition of army officers and intellectuals, generally known by the title of their newspaper Zveno (The Link), overthrew the government in a bloodless coup d'état. The Zvenari proved to be autocrats on their own account, for they promptly closed the Bulgarian parliament, abolished political parties and labor unions, made effective use of the army to crush IMRO, and established a virtual dictatorship. This state of affairs continued only until 1935 when the Zveno partnership fell apart. The government now came into the hands of successive right-wing shadow cabinets which, from 1935 to 1943, formed a screen for the personal rule of Tsar Boris. Boris reopened the Bulgarian parliament but, inasmuch as he had no more liking for democracy than any of his predecessors, he continued the Zveno ban on organized political activity. Faced with these conditions the leading political parties in Bulgaria, particularly the left-wing Agrarians and Social Democrats, had to resort increasingly to clandestine organization in order to survive. The Communists, although numerically very few, also managed to preserve their conspiratorial apparatus and to keep in contact with Cominform headquarters in Moscow.

By the time Bulgaria entered into the period of World War II, a condition of almost unparalleled domestic tranquillity appeared to have settled over the country. The government was under the skillful and relatively popular dictatorship of Tsar Boris; the leading figures of the

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opposition were shorn of their powers or silenced; and there was a virtual cessation of the IMRO-type terrorism which had haunted Bulgarian politics for so many decades. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to discern in the Bulgaria of 1939 three distinctive traits which had more or less established themselves as permanent features of the country's resistance tradition. These may be briefly summarized as follows:

(i) Resistance Spirit. From the foundation of their country in 1878, the Bulgarian people had rarely experienced democratic rule in any accepted Western sense of the term. Too often the road to power had lain through assassination, coup d'état, and dictatorship. Armed violence, therefore, was a political instrument to which the Bulgarian people by 1939 were well habituated.

(ii) Underground Organization. The absence of true democratic process in Bulgaria before 1939 strengthened and encouraged the Bulgarian penchant for underground organization first developed as a means of nationalist struggle against the Turks. All the major parties of pre-war Bulgaria, whether right or left wing, developed clandestine apparatuses which enabled them to survive repression and to regain power whenever conditions were favorable.

(iii) Partisan Activity. The political struggles of pre-war Bulgaria were often translated into partisan activity over many areas of the countryside. The activities of IMRO, the rebellion of September 1923, and the intermittent terrorist activities indulged in by various political factions are ample proof that guerilla operations are a form of warfare to which the Bulgarian people as of 1939 were not strangers.

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3. Resistance and Partisan Activity in World War II (Map A)

The advent of World War II opened a new chapter in Bulgarian resistance history. After a brief interlude of unusual domestic peace and prosperity, largely consequent upon successful collaboration with the Axis, Bulgaria was drawn into the toils of the German war machine under conditions which allowed considerable scope for the development of resistance spirit, underground organization, and partisan warfare. Although this wartime resistance never achieved the proportions attained by resistance groups in other Balkan countries, notably Greece and Yugoslavia, it nevertheless provides information of value to Special Warfare planning in Bulgaria.

a. Growth of Resistance Spirit

True resistance spirit in the Bulgaria of World War II was slow to develop. In contrast to Greece and Yugoslavia, both of which suffered heavily in the German invasion of spring 1941, Bulgaria at first profited greatly from its association with the Axis. The Germans required of Tsar Boris only that he permit the transit of German troops through Bulgarian territory and allow the establishment of German garrisons along the major strategic routes in western Bulgaria. In return the Bulgarians were allowed to occupy Greek and Serbian Macedonia without firing a shot and were assured a steady market in Germany for their agricultural and industrial products. Under conditions so favorable as these, and with the belief in Axis invincibility still unshaken, few persons in the Bulgaria of early 1941 gave any serious thought to resistance.

The next German war move, the invasion of Russia in June 1941, placed Bulgaria in a much more awkward position. Tsar Boris and the principal right-wing politicians were strongly pro-German; they welcomed the German advance eastwards and were prepared to assist it. At the same time it was generally recognized, even by Hitler himself, that no Bulgarian regime could dare to flout the pro-Russian sentiments of the Bulgarian people by declaring war on the USSR. Accordingly, throughout World War II, Bulgaria

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remained officially neutral towards the USSR even though it later declared war on Great Britain and the United States. Unofficially, the Bulgarian government cooperated fully with the Germans, particularly in secret police operations, and continued to make large deliveries of foodstuffs and other products to Germany long after the Germans had ceased to make any payment. Several Fascist-inspired youth legions were formed with the blessing of the Bulgarian government and were used in the struggle against known and suspected resistance elements within the country.²

The contrast between official and unofficial Bulgarian policies was too great for either the USSR or the principal left-wing parties in Bulgaria to tolerate. In the summer and autumn of 1941 a number of Communist saboteurs were parachuted into northeastern Bulgaria or landed along the Black Sea coast in inflated rubber boats for the purpose of organizing sabotage and local resistance efforts.³ Late in 1941 or early in 1942 a pseudo-underground radio station, calling itself "Khristo Botev" after a famous Bulgarian revolutionist, went into action in the Crimea and broadcast repeated appeals to the Bulgarian people to unite against the regime.⁴ While it appears that these first resistance efforts met with little success, the action of the USSR gave heart to subversive elements within Bulgaria and helped to provide the necessary impetus towards the formation of a national resistance movement.

b. Organization of Resistance

Scattered and apparently spontaneous acts of armed resistance to the Bulgarian government made their appearance soon after the German declaration of war on the USSR. These early resisters, however, were so few and disorganized that the total effect of their activities was negligible. Matters took a different turn in the winter of 1941-1942 when representatives of the major opposition political parties--Agrarians, Communists, Social Democrats, and Zveno--opened secret negotiations in Sofia. Out of these meetings came a coalition known as the "Fatherland Front" which henceforth was to dominate all organized resistance activity within Bulgaria.

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The clandestine work of the Fatherland Front was divided into three departments: active resistance, employing tactics of partisan warfare; passive resistance, with emphasis placed upon organization of the peasantry in order to secure failures in agricultural deliveries; and infiltration of the government service, primarily through the establishment of secret anti-German cells within the Bulgarian Army. A clear demarcation of interests was achieved between the members of the Front. The control of the partisans was left for the most part to the Communists, since they had most experience in this type of operation and could most effectively command support from inside the USSR. The Agrarians, with a long tradition of grass-roots political organization in the countryside, worked principally with the peasants. Zveno, drawing upon its army associations, was most effective in establishing subversive cadres within the officer corps.⁵

Throughout 1942 and for much of 1943 the resistance efforts of the Fatherland Front met with an almost uninterrupted series of disasters. Probably the only form of activity in which it excelled was the assassination of several leading pro-German politicians in Sofia during 1942.⁶ The first partisan units put into the field by the Front were speedily isolated by the secret police and hunted down. In April 1942 the greater part of the central and local leadership of the Front was betrayed, with the result that only three members of the central military committee escaped capture. There was a similar disaster early in 1943 when more members of the central committee were apprehended. By the end of 1943 it was clear that resistance operations could no longer be directed from Sofia because of the danger of detection. The headquarters of the Front were shifted to Plovdiv, while at the same time negotiations were opened with partisans on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border in an effort to bring these resistance groups into operation inside Bulgaria.⁷

Other factors also served to limit the effectiveness of the Fatherland Front in its early years. It will be recalled that there was

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no thorough German occupation of Bulgaria and that the only German units actually in the country were on garrison duty in the west, where they maintained excellent relations with the local inhabitants. As a result the resistance movement over most of the country took on the character of a civil war between Bulgarians and Bulgarians. In a struggle of this type the Sofia government had all the advantages of superior equipment, police organization, and a highly developed system of intelligence. The principal concern of the Fatherland Front in 1942 and the first months of 1943 was survival. Its fortunes did not improve until the summer of 1943 when the death of Tsar Boris and German reverses on the Eastern Front opened the way for more extended resistance activity.

c. Resistance and Partisan Activity

Allied air attacks on Sofia in November 1943, followed by other raids in December and the first months of 1944, served notice to Bulgaria's government and people that the country could not long escape the ravages of war. About the same period German officials stationed in Bulgaria began to notice a significant increase in the tempo of resistance activity within the country. From 1 September 1943 to 1 March 1944, according to captured German documents, no less than 1,118 resistance incidents were recorded in Bulgaria and in the Bulgarian-occupied sections of Macedonia. In clashes with resistance elements during the same period, the losses in killed and wounded amounted to 131 German army personnel, 418 Bulgarian army and police personnel, 1,197 insurgents, and 355 civilians.⁸ The government and the German forces struck back vigorously, but it is noteworthy that the number of reported resistance incidents mounted to 687 during the month of June 1944 alone.⁹

German observers who studied the growth of resistance in Bulgaria make repeated mention of partisan bands which were beginning to establish themselves as a major factor in the internal unrest. The German military attache, summarizing developments in the first quarter of 1944, declared that the improved organization and numbers of the partisans could be felt in their

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repeated attacks on heavily-defended military establishments.¹⁰ In Sofia the government vainly attempted to allay the partisan menace by effecting a reshuffle of the cabinet, ousting obnoxious pro-Germans from the police force, and releasing from detention more than 15,000 political prisoners and relatives of persons in the underground. These measures were correctly interpreted by the Fatherland Front as a sign of weakness. By mid-August 1944 the estimated number of active partisans within Bulgaria had grown to between 3,000-5,000 persons, with an additional 6,000-8,000 partisans in Greek and Serbian Macedonia.¹¹

Map A, attached to this section, indicates the principal partisan concentrations and suitability areas in Bulgaria and surrounding territories as of mid-August 1944. It will be noted that two partisan brigades were located in the Sredna Gora Mountains, south-southeast and south-southwest of Karlovo. The Sredna Gora was the key to the whole partisan position in Bulgaria: the point from which the principal industrial, military, and communications targets in the country could be approached. Other partisan groups of greater size but of lesser strategic importance were active southwest of Varna, immediately southeast of Turnovo, and in the mountains south of Plovdiv.

Outside Bulgaria proper but within the Macedonian territories occupied by Bulgarian troops, Map A depicts several partisan concentrations in Greece and Yugoslavia. The partisans in Greek Macedonia were of relatively minor significance but the partisans in Serbian Macedonia, who were organized into regular divisions and brigades, stood athwart the major German lines of communication north and south. It was in this region that the partisan struggle was most intense, forcing repeated expenditures of men and material by the Bulgarian and German authorities. Earlier, in May 1944, the Plovdiv directorate of the Fatherland Front had tried to draw some of the Macedonian partisan strength into Bulgaria by ordering several units to march towards the Sredna Gora. The 1st Sofia Partisan Brigade, with headquarters immediately across the Yugoslav frontier, fought its way

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
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past the Bulgarian town of Kyustendil and then northwards towards Trŭn and the Iskŭr River before being hurled back. The 2nd Sofia Partisan Brigade, based in the area of Dobropole, Tsrna Trava, and Trŭn, managed to cross the Iskŭr River and penetrate as far eastward as Botevgrad before it was surrounded and annihilated by government forces.¹² The failure of these two missions suggests that the Bulgarian partisans, although sufficiently strong in August 1944 to control territory of secondary importance, were unable to extend their operations into strategic areas resolutely defended by German and Bulgarian troops.*

By the end of August 1944, with the German armies everywhere on the run and the Red Army poised upon the approaches to Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front decided to bring its full resources into the open. On 2 September 1944 a general insurrection was ordered. The partisans came down from their mountain hide-outs and joined forces with clandestine organizations in the villages and cities. By 3 September much of northeast Bulgaria was under partisan control; on 5 September Pleven fell; on 6 September Plovdiv was occupied; and on the night of 8 September the inevitable coup d'état occurred in Sofia. The new Fatherland Front government immediately opened armistice negotiations with the USSR, which had declared war on Bulgaria on 4 September, and sent the Bulgarian Army to fight with Russian and Yugoslav forces against the retreating Germans. Meanwhile the Bulgarian Communists, following the pattern so successfully employed in other Eastern European countries, secured for themselves the vital Ministries of Interior and Justice in the new government and, with the help of their armed partisans, prepared the way for future dictatorship.

* Further information of interest on the Bulgarian partisans during World War II can be obtained from a source not consulted in the preparation of this study: The Bulgarian Resistance (in Bulgarian), a massive publication issued at Sofia in 1945 by the Communist Party. (Cited in Michael Padev, Dimitrov Wastes No Bullets, London, 1948, pp. 25-27 (U).) It should be noted, however, that the Bulgarian Communists notoriously exaggerate both the strength of the partisan movement and their own participation in it. The Communist assertion that 110-130,000 men were "constantly engaged" in partisan activities throughout World War II is patently ridiculous. Cf. Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass: 1956), p. 244 (U).

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4. Post-War Resistance, 1945-1950

Conformable to resistance developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe immediately after World War II, there is little trace of overt anti-regime activity in Bulgaria during the years 1945-1950. The country was under Russian occupation until January 1948 and any show of serious resistance activity would have been ruthlessly crushed. Furthermore the apparently democratic composition of the Fatherland Front government served to mask the fact that a Communist dictatorship was in preparation. Until early 1947 some avenues for organized anti-Communist political activity remained open. A third important factor discouraging resistance was the anti-Fascist hysteria which swept Bulgaria after the war. The Communists, by first helping to create and then directing this hysteria, managed to rid themselves of virtually all their significant enemies on the political right. According to official Bulgarian statistics, the so-called "people's courts" established by Communist instigation in October 1944 tried no less than 11,677 persons as war criminals--a remarkably high percentage for a small country which had never been under effective German occupation. Of this number 2,850 persons (including two former prime ministers, 26 former cabinet ministers, and 68 parliamentary deputies) were sentenced to death, and the great majority of the remainder were sent to prisons or labor camps. In addition, it is reliably estimated that several thousand more war criminals never came to trial before the people's courts because they had already fallen victim to what the Communists blandly described as "revolutionary fury."¹³

Gradually, as they felt their control of the state apparatus strengthen, the Communists began to constrict the scope of possible opposition activity in Bulgaria. The first step was to drive the leaders of the most important rival party, the Agrarians, out of the cabinet. This was accomplished between January and August 1945. The next step was to hold the free elections required of Bulgaria under the terms of the Yalta agreements. Originally the Communists planned to railroad through

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the elections in August 1945, but vigorous protests from the United States and Great Britain over the hindrances placed on the political opposition delayed the balloting until November 1945. The opposition boycotted the election, and voting was restricted to a single list of government-sponsored candidates who (according to the government) received 88 per cent of all votes cast. Subsequent elections in October 1946 for deputies to the Bulgarian parliament were accompanied by blatant evidence of Communist intimidation and fraud, but the opposition (chiefly Agrarians) managed to gain 29 per cent of the total popular vote and 101 of the 465 seats in the assembly.¹⁴

The elections of October 1946 marked the last opportunity for what may be called "legal" resistance in post-war Bulgaria. Already in the early months of 1946 the Communists had begun the systematic liquidation of all professional, political, and economic groups within the country capable of organized opposition to the new regime. The Bulgarian Army was the first target. In August 1946 it was announced that several thousand officers had been purged from the service; this was followed in August 1946, December 1946, February 1947, and October 1947 by trials of various military groups accused of conspiratorial activities. In June 1947 the principal figure among the Agrarians, Nikola Petkov, was arrested by armed militia on the floor of the Bulgarian parliament; his subsequent trial and execution in August-September 1947 shocked world opinion and removed any doubts that a Communist dictatorship was in power. Trials of leading Catholic and Protestant clerics on charges of espionage were staged in 1949 and 1952. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, which commands the allegiance of the great majority of the nation, was brought under close control as early as 1945, and in the course of the next few years several hundred of its clergy were imprisoned, deported, or otherwise purged. The Communist liquidation cycle was rounded out in 1947 when the Communists announced the first of a series of economic plans designed to obliterate the peasant smallholder class and convert the nation into a Soviet state of heavy industry and collectivized agriculture. The

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Two-Year Plan of 1947-1948 struck most directly at the wealthier peasants (kulaks); the Five-Year Plan of 1949-1953 introduced an era of forcible collectivization, dislocation of population, and massive industrial development.

More than any other single factor in post-war Bulgaria, the Communist economic reorganization laid the foundations for the reappearance of resistance activity within the country. The average Bulgarian peasant of 1945-1950 was accustomed to the rigors of police state rule. He could view with comparative composure the extinction of free political activity, and he had little personal stake in the liquidation of political personages, army officers, church dignitaries, and kulaks. But the collectivization policy of the regime, accompanied by loss of lands, livestock, and an alarming descent in rural standards of living, directly affected the great majority of small peasantry which as of 1944 comprised nearly 80 per cent of Bulgaria's total population. Active and passive resistance sprang up in the Bulgarian countryside as soon as local authorities began to press the collectivization scheme. When recalcitrant peasants were forced to leave their homesteads and find employment in industrial centers, their hostility found new expression in terrorism and industrial sabotage.

The tempo of the new resistance within Bulgaria was apparently directly proportionate to the speed with which the Communist regime introduced its economic program. As of 31 December 1948 only 6.7 per cent of the total farm population and 16 per cent of the total acreage in Bulgaria was collectivized; and as of the same date except for scattered outbreaks in districts such as Bulgarian Macedonia and the Yugoslav border regions, there had been apparently little popular upheaval since 1944. The percentages of collectivization in Bulgaria were practically doubled by 31 December 1949 and sextupled by 31 December 1950, at which time fully 48 per cent of Bulgaria's farm population and 43 per cent of its arable land were gathered into collectives.¹⁵ These figures represented a triumph of Communist organization but were achieved only at the price of

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immense popular discontent. The summer and autumn of 1950, in which the collectivization campaign reached its height, were followed by the hard winter of 1950-1951, in which the peasantry increasingly felt the loss of its livestock and accustomed food supplies. By March 1951 the stage was set for a series of peasant outbreaks against collectivization which ushers in the contemporary period of Bulgarian resistance.

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5. Contemporary Resistance, 1951-1957 (Maps B and C)

Resistance in Bulgaria since 1 January 1951 has developed against a background of far-reaching alterations in the structure and composition of the entire Communist world. To the rigid repression which characterized the last years of Stalin (1951-March 1953) have succeeded, in turn, the brief interregnum of Malenkov and the uncertain liberalization of Khrushchev. In the same period the Stalinist security controls, once clamped tightly over every aspect of Communist life, have been partially relaxed in favor of greater individual initiative and useful contacts with the West. Meanwhile, and by a parallel process, the hollowness of the Communist position in Eastern Europe has grown increasingly apparent. The East Berlin uprising of June 1953, and more particularly the events in Poland and Hungary during the latter half of 1956, are forceful demonstrations of the massive discontent which seethes behind the Iron Curtain.

Within Bulgaria itself, the course of resistance in the years 1951-1957 has by no means been as spectacular as elsewhere in the satellite orbit. There have been no mass explosions on the scale of East Berlin, Poznan, or Budapest; no striking examples of discord within the Communist Party as revealed by recent events in Poland and Hungary; not even the threat of popular uprising so much apprehended by the Communist rulers of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Outwardly Bulgaria has remained the most loyal of the European satellites, and it is only when a detailed examination of available resistance materials on Bulgaria for the years 1951-1957 is made that a different picture begins to emerge--the picture of a contemporary Bulgaria in which there is considerable evidence of local resistance activity, never of a scale seriously to challenge the forces of the government but sufficient in itself to offer valuable potential support for U.S. military operations.

In view of the importance and timeliness of contemporary Bulgarian resistance to Special Warfare planning, the discussion in the present section will be more detailed and, in treatment, will be functional rather

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than historical. The text discusses, first, the available sources of information on resistance and then, within appropriate time periods, types of resistance, location of resistance, and resistance strength and potentials. Most of the raw intelligence materials on which this section is based are further collated in Appendix I and are presented cartographically on Maps B and C. Each individual resistance report catalogued in the appendix is assigned a number in order to facilitate map and text reference.

a. Sources of Information

Information on contemporary Bulgarian resistance is derived, in largest part, from the statements of Bulgarian nationals who fled from their homeland during the years 1951-1956. The testimony of several hundred of these refugees is embodied in detailed interrogation reports prepared by interested agencies of the United States and certain foreign governments. Additional information on Bulgarian resistance comes from the occasional reports of Western observers inside Bulgaria, intelligence provided by confidential sources outside the country, and scattered news items appearing in the Communist press and radio.

Certain other channels of information which appear to provide data on Bulgarian resistance have not been utilized in the preparation of this section on the grounds of general unreliability of source and content. Greek and Turkish newspapers, for example, often publish sensational accounts of conditions "inside" Bulgaria which are occasionally repeated in the European and American press. Upon investigation, most of these accounts are found to be hopelessly exaggerated or to have no discernible basis in fact.*

Independent reports of Bulgarian resistance which appear in the Italian,

* A recent instance of unreliable news reporting on Bulgarian resistance is provided by a story, originating in Athens, to the effect that 100 Bulgarian Army officers had risen against the regime and were leading a rebellion in northwest Bulgaria (Washington Post and Times Herald, 14 January 1957). U.S. intelligence officials took immediate steps to test the veracity of this report by addressing inquiries to all the appropriate field offices. None of the offices contacted had any information regarding the alleged revolt; some considered that the report was false; and one office commented that it rarely attempted to verify Greek newspaper accounts of conditions inside Bulgaria because, in the past, so many of these accounts had been proven erroneous.

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Austrian, German, and French press are probably more reliable, but once again positive substantiation is rarely possible and the danger of imposture is great. Information on Bulgarian resistance appearing in emigre publications has likewise been considered suspect if no further confirmation was available.

The over-all picture of contemporary Bulgarian resistance, as presented in this study, is probably as complete as can now be derived (March 1957) from relevant intelligence materials and within appropriate security classifications. However, certain limitations and deficiencies inherent in the nature of the subject should be emphasized:

(i) Scope of Information. The 228 incidents of overt resistance collected in Appendix I and forming the basis of discussion in the present section undoubtedly represent only a fraction of the total resistance in Bulgaria during the period 1951-February 1957. The reader should reckon with the probability that resistance in contemporary Bulgaria has occurred at different points and in different forms than can be cited in this report.

(ii) Veracity. Nearly all the resistance reports on which this section is based were evaluated by the collection agencies as "C-3," "C-6," "F-3," "F-6," "J-3," or "J-6". Their substantive truth cannot be conclusively established.

(iii) Accuracy. Most of the sources who describe resistance activity in contemporary Bulgaria learned of it only through hearsay or second-hand report. Accuracy in details is questionable.

b. Patterns of Resistance

Resistance activity in Bulgaria in the period 1951-1957 tends to favor classification within three separate and fairly distinct time periods. The first years, 1951-1952, coincide with the height of the "cold war" and efforts to force collectivization in the countryside. The second period, 1953-1955, follows roughly upon the death of Stalin and marks the inauguration of a "new course" in which the tempo of agrarian organization is slowed in favor of renewed emphasis on industrial development. In the

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final period, 1956-February 1957, the course of Bulgarian resistance is dominated by the effect of contemporary events in Poland and Hungary.

(1) The Struggle Over Collectivization, 1951-1952:

Overt resistance to Communist rule in contemporary Bulgaria first achieved significant proportions in the early months of 1951. Large segments of the peasant population began to demand return of land, foodstuffs, and livestock which had been taken from them during the collectivizations of the previous summer. At first restricted to impromptu demonstrations by peasant mobs, this resistance soon took on the aspect of partisan warfare as groups of rebellious farmers and other dissidents established themselves in mountain and forest regions. The peak of the resistance to collectivization was apparently reached sometime in 1951 or the winter of 1951-1952. By September 1952 a good harvest, tactical concessions by the government, and stern retaliation by the militia and secret police had succeeded in restoring order to most of the countryside.

(a) Types of Resistance:

Resistance activity in Bulgaria during 1951-1952 may be divided into four principal categories: unorganized peasant demonstrations; anti-regime activities fomented by rural clandestine organizations; partisan warfare; and industrial and urban resistance. Of these the first three types were by far the most prominent. There appears to have been only minor resistance in the urban and industrial areas.

The peasant demonstrations which broke out against collectivization took on, almost from the outset, the aspect of mass uprisings. Relatively few instances of isolated peasant outbreaks are recorded; instead, the pattern was usually one of coordinated disturbances over an entire agricultural district. The peasants would assemble in their villages, march on the barns and stockyards of the collectives, overwhelm the local police force, and take forcible possession of livestock and food supplies. This much achieved, the impetus of the peasant revolt weakened. Within a few days reinforcements of militia would arrive from provincial and district

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capitals. Livestock and food supplies would be confiscated once more, the leaders of the revolts would be arrested, and the local Communist chiefs would announce "amelioratory" measures designed to reduce the discontent. Only in a few cases would blood be shed on either side.

Activities by rural underground organizations constituted a more serious menace to the authorities. According to apparently credible reports, there were literally hundreds of these groups in existence in the Bulgaria of 1951-1952.¹⁶ Most groups numbered no more than five or ten persons, usually sympathizers of the old Agrarian Party which had been outlawed in 1947. Each group was allied with similar groups in nearby villages, but there was little effort to develop a more extensive network because of the danger of betrayal or police detection. A large number, perhaps the majority, of the underground groups existent in 1951-1952 seem to have avoided overt activity of any kind, preferring to wait until a war between the USSR and the West opened a firm prospect of liberation. Other groups engaged in active resistance and were responsible for acts of terrorism, sabotage, anti-regime propaganda, and popular disturbance.

Partisan resistance in Bulgaria during 1951-1952 was of necessity limited to areas whose natural features offered favorable conditions for refuge and subsistence. Such areas were found principally in northeast Bulgaria, the Black Sea hinterland, the mountain country around Sliven and Flodiv, Bulgarian Macedonia, and the entire vicinity of the Yugoslav frontier. The partisans were apparently composed in largest part of peasants fleeing from the tyranny of the collectives, but there was a good representation of military deserters and probably also of political suspects and ordinary criminals.¹⁷ In the western reaches of Bulgaria the partisans were able to draw upon foreign assistance because Yugoslavia, after its break with the Cominform in 1948, took an active interest in the partisans as a means of harassing the Bulgarian authorities and of obtaining intelligence on Bulgarian military movements. From Yugoslavia the partisans obtained arms, supplies, and propaganda materials; there is also

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a good probability that the clandestine radio station "Gorianin" (Forest), which began operations in 1951 and still affects to speak from partisan hideouts in the mountains of Bulgaria, is actually based in Yugoslavia.¹⁸ So determined were the Yugoslavs to push the opportunities of partisan warfare to the full that Bulgarian nationals fleeing into Yugoslavia were often forced or persuaded to recross the border on secret missions for the Yugoslav police.¹⁹

Urban and industrial resistance in Bulgaria during 1951-1952 was apparently restricted to scattered acts of industrial arson and sabotage.

(b) Location of Resistance:

Map B, annexed to this section, indicates the nine major areas of resistance activity in Bulgaria during 1951-1952. It will be noted that each of the nine areas delimited is separated from the other by considerable intervening distance or by pronounced geographic features. This is in line with the general pattern of all agrarian resistance which had no major center of operation but was localized and relatively disorganized. At no time in 1951-1952 is there any suggestion of a central resistance directorate which, after the manner of the World War II Fatherland Front, could have coordinated anti-regime activities on a national scale.

Resistance Area I embraces most of the territory comprised in the administrative districts of Vidin, Kula, Lom, and Belogradchik. This was apparently the first region in Bulgaria to break into widespread agrarian disturbance during 1951, for no less than nine peasant uprisings are recorded in the month of March alone (20, 32, 35, 64, 67, 87, 134, 137). Further revolts occurred in September 1951 at Bregovo (9) and in May 1952 at Vidin (136). In August 1952 partisan bands, based on the Yugoslav frontier, were reported extending their operations in the general area of Kula, Lom, and Belogradchik (51).

A more formidable center of anti-regime activity developed in Resistance Area II, which includes most of Pleven province. First a series of peasant outbreaks occurred at various villages during the spring of 1951 (4, 13, 22,

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55, 59, 61, 65, 103, 124, 139). About the same time partisans made their appearance, particularly in the regions east and west of Troyan and Teteven (6, 29, 58, 66). Some of these partisan groups are known to have destroyed railroad and highway bridges in the area (75, 78, 130); others engaged in clashes with the police (58, 66).

Resistance Area III, based upon a sparsely settled region of forest, wasteland, and pasture, differs notably in its resistance characteristics from Areas I and II. Here, where there were few peasants to rise in demonstration, developed what may have been the strongest partisan movement in all Bulgaria during the years 1951-1952. The total number of armed men active at any one time in the area is reported as between 100 and 500 men (21, 106)--a figure which popular imagination soon multiplied into the thousands. The activities of the partisans ranged from Yambol and Kazanluk in the south (39, 108) to Grabovo and Debela Mogila in the north (21, 27, 28). The partisan hand was probably evident in frequent raids on collective farms and other rural installations (27, 28, 39, 109), sabotage of rail lines (48, 106), and terrorism in such major towns as Gabrovo and Sliven (27, 105).

Set in an important agricultural district east and southeast of the Danube port of Ruse, Resistance Area IV became the scene of widespread rural resistance, most of it apparently stimulated by a loose network of village underground organizations in the area (19, 45, 84, 93, 123, 132, 133). The activities of the resistance groups included distribution of anti-Communist propaganda (84, 93, 132), attacks on collectives (24, 44), terrorism (49), and partisan warfare (88, 94, 141). Instances of industrial sabotage which are recorded at Ruse (95, 96, 97) and Zagrad (140) may also have had some connection with underground intrigues.

Somewhat similar conditions to Area IV prevailed in Resistance Areas V and VI. In Area V clandestine organizations are reported active at Tolbukhin, Bogdanovo, Boyana, Stalin, and Topolovo (7, 116, 117, 125, 126, 129); a lone partisan band is reported at Shtipko (101). The greatest center of anti-regime activity in Area VI was in Burgas and environs, where several instances of industrial and urban resistance are recorded (8, 14, 15,

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16, 92). Partisan bands (3, 38) and clandestine organizations (18, 33, 36) were active in the nearby hinterland. On at least one occasion a partisan group ventured into the outskirts of Burgas itself (17).

Resistance Area VII, considerably to the west, occupied the environs of Plovdiv and a large section of the fertile Maritsa Valley. In the Maritsa region unorganized peasant outbreaks are reported in the spring and autumn of 1951 and again in the spring of 1952 (1, 11, 31, 69, 70, 71, 83, 91, 102, 114). Further south there are reports of a large and stubborn partisan concentration in the hills around Kuklen and Purvenets which in the early months of 1951 staged a major encounter with the local militia (50, 86). Two instances of organized urban resistance are recorded in Plovdiv (80, 81).

In close proximity to the Yugoslav border, Resistance Area VIII envelops the central reaches of the strategic Struma Valley. The bulk of anti-regime activity stemmed from rural underground organizations (37, 85, 129, 143) and from partisan bands (53, 54, 56, 90, 99). One example of an unorganized demonstration against collectivization is known (148). Some of the partisans were reportedly in close contact with police agents in Yugoslavia who supplied them with needed manpower and material (5, 53, 99).

The last center of anti-regime activity, Resistance Area IX, was located in the heart of historic Macedonia and in the former stronghold of IMRO. As befits a territory with long traditions of resistance, a wide variety of opposition activity was evident. Peasant demonstrations and sabotage were endemic in the lowlands along the Struma River (30, 52, 57, 60); clandestine organizations were at work in the larger towns (34, 72, 73); partisan units in the highlands clashed repeatedly with government forces (10, 25, 76, 77); and there were strong evidences of Yugoslav infiltration into the area (74, 98).

Outside the nine resistance areas enumerated above, some 19 other instances of overt anti-regime activity are recorded for Bulgaria in 1951-1952. Sofia was the scene of repeated industrial sabotage (110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115). Elsewhere in the country the evidence of resistance is too fragmentary to warrant further comment.

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(c) Resistance Strength and Potentials:

Despite its extent and diversity, Bulgarian resistance during 1951-1952 at no time represented a serious threat to the stability of the regime. The Communists quelled most of the peasant outbreaks with an easy show of force. The rural undergrounds, in largest part, shrank from overt activity. The partisans, according to the best refugee estimates, never number more than 800 men and were held effectively in check by the government forces despatched against them.

The chief importance of the resistance record for 1951-1952 is to indicate the presence of widespread rural discontent which, at the time, might have been utilized effectively by U.S. military forces. This discontent did not disappear as of the closing months of 1952 but was partially overshadowed by new resistance developments in Bulgaria during 1953-1955.

(2) The "New Course," 1953-1955:

Under the "new course" which followed in Bulgaria after the death of Stalin in March 1953, rural resistance appears to have lost much of its intensity. At the same time, there was a significant increase in anti-regime activity in urban settlements and industrial centers. Particular mention should be made also of the encouragement given to Bulgarian resistance after 1953 by mounting propaganda efforts of the West--specifically broadcasts over Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, balloon messages, and leaflet drops by airplane.* No particular tempo in the Bulgarian resistance of 1953-1955 is discernible. It appears instead to have adopted a settled aspect which converted it into a more or less continual menace to the regime.

* Testimony to the increasing urbanization of Bulgarian resistance and to the effectiveness of Western propaganda as a means of inciting this resistance was given in a speech of Bulgarian premier Vukko Chervenkov broadcast over Radio Sofia on 8 September 1953. "Class struggle is strong," Chervenkov asserted. "There are attempts at sabotage and hostile attitudes towards the measures of the party and government. The capitalists are supporting the hostile elements. The Americans are spending tremendous sums for diversionists. They are attempting to undermine our successes and to hinder our development. All sabotage is conducted from abroad."

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(a) Types of Resistance:

Three types of resistance activity can be identified in Bulgaria during 1953-1955: rural underground activity; partisan warfare; and industrial and urban resistance. The unorganized peasant uprisings which occupied so large a part of the 1951-1952 resistance effort have disappeared almost entirely.

Rural underground activity in Bulgaria during 1953-1955 seems to have entered a less overt phase of operations. This is in line with the testimony of several Bulgarian refugees who left the country during this period and reported a general relaxation of controls and tensions.²⁰ Some instances of rural underground terrorism and sabotage are recorded, but more frequently the clandestine groups gravitated towards such activities as the spreading of anti-regime propaganda and encouragement of passive resistance among the peasantry.

Partisan bands were also less active during 1953-1955 and at greatly reduced strengths. The entire area along the Yugoslav border formerly one of the best partisan breeding grounds, was removed from the effective sphere of operations as a result of the Yugoslav-USSR rapprochement of 1953.* In other districts it does not appear that the partisans were able to draw upon the same reserve of peasant manpower which was available to them in 1951-1952. The partisan movement after 1953 became increasingly the work of professional outlaws and saboteurs.

The principal resistance development for the years 1953-1955 is found in the urban areas and other centers of industrial development. Whereas in 1951-1952 urban and industrial resistance incidents accounted for only a small fraction of the over-all resistance, they account for almost two-thirds of the total resistance recorded for 1953-1955. This urban and industrial resistance was of many varieties: sabotage, arson, anti-regime propaganda, strikes, and

* In 1955 it was reported that small teams of 3 or 4 men were still being sent into Bulgaria from Yugoslavia in order to gather intelligence but not to engage in partisan activity. (CIA/CS (S/US Only)).

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riots. In particular there were signs of growing unrest among the urban youth: terrorism, anti-Communist propaganda, hooliganism, and receptivity to Western radio broadcasts.

(b) Location of Resistance:

In place of the nine resistance areas of 1951-1952, four major regions of anti-regime activity are discernible in Bulgaria during 1953-1955. The approximate size and extent of each of these areas is indicated in Map C, annexed to this section.

Resistance Area I, based on Sofia and its environs to the west, north, and northeast, mirrors an important upsurge of anti-regime activity at the strategic heart of Bulgaria. Much of the reported resistance was in the form of arson and sabotage at large industrial plants in Sofia, Eliseyna, and Kostinbrod (162, 177, 204, 206, 207, 208). Leaflets and posters attacking the regime were often seen in Sofia (202, 209, 210), and there may have been some connection between this activity and the reported arrest in spring 1954 of more than 400 persons in the Sofia area (203). Several reports mention partisan activity in the hills north of Sofia, resulting in clashes with the police and sabotage of the Sofia-Plaven rail line (148, 205, 212). A clandestine resistance organization was reportedly discovered in March 1954 among troops quartered at Breznik (150). Youth participation in resistance activities is indicated by a reputed bomb plot in Sofia (211) and an attack on the local police chief at Dimitrovo (159).

Much smaller in extent, Resistance Area II was limited to the areas of Troyan and Karlovo. Partisans were reported active in spring 1953 and February 1954 around both towns (168, 217). An underground organization was reportedly discovered by police in the Karlovo region during May 1954 (169).

Resistance Area III overlaps to a considerable extent with the Resistance Area III previously established for the years 1951-1952, thus indicating a continuity of anti-regime activity in the area. Once again partisan bands are the most important resistance element. They were

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reported particularly vigorous in the Trevna, Most-Perpere, Gabrovo, and Elena regions (161, 164, 186, 216). A train derailment at Krestets in March 1953 may have been part of their work (179). Urban resistance is reported at Turnovo, Gabrovo, and Kazanlik (163, 170, 218). Traces of extensive clandestine organization were evident in Gabrovo and environs (165).

Part of Resistance Area IV falls within the boundaries of Area VI of 1951-1952. Known anti-regime activity in 1953-1955 was restricted to partisan stragglers who appeared briefly in the regions during the summer of 1953 (145, 146, 148).

In the important region of Plovdiv and the central Maritsa Valley, Resistance Area V coincides in considerable measure with Area VII of 1951-1952. Partisan activity during 1955 was reported in the Batak-Peshtera-Kozarsko area (147, 174). Widespread clandestine organization in the countryside was indicated by the posting of anti-regime slogans in villages (187, 189, 196, 200), terrorism (166, 195), rural sabotage (155, 167, 199), and rural arson (214). Plovdiv city was the scene of strikes and riots protesting unemployment (191, 192), arson (193), and anti-regime propaganda (194).

Other than in the resistance areas outlined above, significant loci of partisan activity in Bulgaria during 1953-1955 were reported in the regions of Sliven (201), Burgas (153), and Ruse and Silistra (198). Urban or industrial resistance of noteworthy proportions is recorded at Kolarovgrad (178), Michurin (182), Yambol (219), Khaskovo (172, 178), Dimitrovgrad (157), Nova Zagora (183), and Pleven (190).

(c) Resistance Strength and Potentials:

Although diminished in intensity and areas of operation, resistance in Bulgaria during 1953-1955 continued to demonstrate the presence of anti-regime forces within the country capable of advantageous utilization in U.S. military operations. The chief decline in resistance activity was in the countryside, where overt peasant resistance largely ceased and partisan bands dwindled. This loss, however, was in large measure offset by the concomitant growth of resistance in the urban and industrial centers which form the

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keystone of modern Bulgarian economy. Inasmuch as many of these centers are located near rural areas favorable to partisan activity and also because much of the resistance element in the towns and new industrial plants hails from rural areas and maintains its local ties, it would appear that the increased urbanization of Bulgarian resistance during 1953-1955 represented a favorable rather than unfavorable development for Special Warfare planners.

(3) Current Developments, 1956-February 1957:

Information at present available (March 1957) on the course of Bulgarian resistance since 1 January 1956 is not sufficiently detailed to permit analysis of the type employed in discussing resistance in the earlier periods, 1951-1952 and 1953-1955. Nevertheless it is possible to present a general account of the most recent resistance events in Bulgaria, as known to Western intelligence, stressing particularly those aspects of interest to Special Warfare.

All accounts agree that as of the closing months of 1955, the tempo of resistance activity in Bulgaria had appreciably slackened. This was in keeping with the relaxed international atmosphere following upon the Geneva Conference (June 1955) and with the gradual abandonment by the Sofia regime of many of the Draconian policies inherited from the Stalin era. Refugees passing through Western interrogation centers in the early months of 1956 testified to the unusual tranquillity and seeming popular content within Bulgaria.²¹ From January through June 1956 there are only two recorded instances of active resistance within the country, both involving industrial arson (221, 222).

The situation first began to alter radically after the reports of the Poznan rioting of June 1956. A refugee source describes how Bulgarians spent hours listening to foreign broadcasts on their radio sets and discussing the news with friends.²² Possibly connected with this ferment in popular opinion is a report of partisan activity in the Kyustendil area of western Bulgaria during August 1956 (223).

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After the Warsaw and Budapest demonstrations of October 1956, followed by the full-scale Hungarian insurrection of November, conditions became even more favorable for Bulgarian resistance activity. The Sofia regime betrayed its anxiety by establishing tighter security controls, including the summary arrest of 2,000 political suspects, and by issuing appeals for popular vigilance against counter-revolutionary attempts.²³ In a speech on 28 November 1956 the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov, made a clear reference to the existence of resistance elements within Bulgaria. "We should never forget," he declared, "that there are still people in our country who have never given up their hopes and diabolic plans to restore the black reign repudiated by the people: the reign of capitalists, bankers, manufacturers, and rural bosses. Instigated by the foreign radio stations and acting upon instructions of the imperialist intelligence and counter-revolutionary centers abroad, some of our enemies think, in connection with the events in Hungary, that their time has come [and] they attempt to play with fire again. Such stubborn people's enemies. . . . think they can attempt once more to restore fascism and capitalism. To them we must state clearly: Bulgaria is not a country without a Government!"²⁴ By way of an attempt to quiet the popular unrest, the regime announced on 6 December that beginning in 1957 there would be a major reduction in compulsory agricultural quotas, pay increases of 10-20 per cent for Bulgarian workers, and trebled allowances for children.²⁵

The few reliable resistance reports which have come out of Bulgaria since November 1956 are concerned almost entirely with student activity in the larger cities. At Sofia it is reported that a number of agricultural students were arrested on 2 November 1956 during the course of a "semi-riot" (227). This was followed on 20 December by the ouster of at least 300 students at the University of Sofia on charges of "anti-proletarian attitudes" and "hostile utterances against the regime" (226). On 25 December a security police officer was murdered on the streets of Sofia by two students (228).


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
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Another center of university agitation was the central Bulgarian city of Plovdiv. An undisclosed number of students were arrested in November 1956 on charges of attempting to organize a political demonstration (225). At Pleven, in north central Bulgaria, it was said that 40 students were arrested during the closing weeks of 1956 on charges of conspiracy against the regime (224). The sole instance of non-student resistance is recorded at the industrial city of Dimitrovgrad where soon after the Hungarian revolt, according to the local Communist newspaper, groups of people "gathered in the streets shouting nonsense which they had picked up from Western radio stations" (220).

The failure of the Hungarian revolution and in particular the ruthless subjugation of the country by Russian troops, undoubtedly placed a check on the nascent Bulgarian resistance spirit. A Bulgarian national who left the country towards the end of 1956 has described how the Party propagandists were industriously using Hungary as an example of the fate which would befall Bulgaria if it ever attempted to revolt.²⁶ No firm information is at present available (March 1957) on the development of Bulgarian resistance since 1 January 1957, except for an unsubstantiated newspaper report of 5 February claiming that upwards of 1,500 students have been expelled from Sofia University for having shown sympathy with the Hungarian revolutionaries.²⁷

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6. Conclusions

Overt resistance seen in the perspective of the near-century of Bulgarian history digested in this chapter, may be described as a technique of political expression to which the Bulgarian people are well habituated. The instruments of anti-regime activity first developed under Turkish rule--partisan warfare, clandestine organization, terrorism, etc.--have remained to plague all successive Bulgarian regimes, including the Communist.

Contemporary Bulgarian resistance of the period 1951-1957 has been distinguished by its ability to survive and acquire new forms in the midst of a changing Soviet society. In the period 1951-1952 Bulgarian resistance was primarily agrarian and partisan, as befitted a country in the throes of full-scale collectivization. In 1953-1955 the rural resistance continued, but there was a significant shift of anti-regime activity to the burgeoning urban and industrial complexes. Most recently, as part of the general course of events which in 1956 have shaken Communist hegemony in Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian resistance tradition has acquired new vigor among Bulgarian youth whose growing disaffection to the regime established by their fathers is one of the most pressing problems confronting the Communist Party.

Special Warfare planners, seeking effective utilization of Bulgarian resistance potentials, may reasonably expect to derive assistance from the following favorable factors: (a) well-developed resistance tradition; (b) active hostility to the Soviet regime as demonstrated by the resistance incidents collected in this report; and (c) the presence in the Western world of a large body of Bulgarian refugees of suitable military age, some of whom would probably be willing to assist Special Warfare operations in their homeland.* In addition, the tactical opportunities for Special Warfare infiltration into Bulgaria from neighboring Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia may be cited.

* The military potentials of the Bulgarian emigration are the subject of a forthcoming study by the Georgetown University Research Project.

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Against these favorable factors should be weighed the following circumstances which appear to bear adversely against any Special Warfare operation in Bulgaria: (a) the presence of a large and apparently loyal body of armed forces and security troops capable of crushing any sustained resistance movement; (b) the age-old political animosities within the country and among the emigration which may make formation of a truly national liberation movement extremely difficult; (c) the historic tendency of the Bulgarian people, apart from a relative handful of active resistance elements, to accept police-state oppression as a seemingly inevitable feature of political existence; and, (d) the international political position of Bulgaria which makes it dependent upon the USSR for support against its perennial rivals, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

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PART II

REGIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING RESISTANCE AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

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1. Geographic Factors

Bulgaria occupies a rectangular area of 42,796 square miles in the eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula just south of the middle latitude of the northern hemisphere. The country extends approximately 160 miles from north to south and 270 miles from east to west. Geographic limits of its boundaries are 4114N to 4413N and 2222E to 2837E.

The Danube River effectively separates Bulgaria from Rumania for 246.9 miles from the northwestern border to Silistra. Ordinarily the river cannot be forded. Its banks are swampy in Rumania and lined with towering cliffs in Bulgaria. From Silistra to the Black Sea the boundary runs through level to rolling terrain. Other land boundaries follow more effective obstacles of mountain ridges. In the west, the boundary runs along the west Balkan chain and the Yugoslav border ranges. In the south, between Bulgaria and Greece, it follows the Rhodope Mountains. Between Bulgaria and Turkey, it runs through the Strandzha Mountains. In both the west and south the only natural routes across the border are through the few passes and river valleys. In the east, Bulgaria is bounded by the Black Sea. Throughout most of Bulgaria's coastline of 150 miles, steep cliffs and moderately rugged terrain face the sea. Only a few beaches have been formed, mainly in protected bays.

The main route from Central Europe to the Near East passes through the Central Lowlands of Bulgaria. This route, like others, is governed by the configuration of landforms in Bulgaria. Main routes are channeled by the alternating belts of plains and mountains trending west to east. Although mountains cover one-half of the country, many of them do not constitute major obstacles to movement. The Balkan ranges can be crossed through many easy passes, and in the Southern Highlands only the Rila, Pirin, and Central Rhodope Mountains are barriers to movement.

The continuous chain of the Balkan Mountains exercises an ameliorating influence on the local climate of the basins to the south. Located at the same latitude as Iowa, Bulgaria has a continental climate throughout most.

of its area. However, the proximity to the Mediterranean Basin places Bulgaria in a climatic transition zone between the continental type of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean climate of the south. Therefore, in the north and west, Bulgaria has a climate similar to that in midwestern United States, while in southeastern Bulgaria the climate is much like that of southern California.

Forests, covering one-third of the total area, are found mainly in the mountains and along river banks. The few marshy sections of rivers are usually malarious. However, for the most part, lowlands and plains are fertile and are under cultivation. Agriculture occupies almost half of the total land area and a major proportion of the labor force.

Natural features such as relief and climate would offer only minor hindrance to operations in Bulgaria. The more rugged parts of the Rhodope and Balkan Mountains and the extremes of weather do not prohibit operation, though they may cause difficulty and discomfort.

a. Terrain

The alternating belts of mountains and plains divide Bulgaria into four clearly defined physiographic regions. These regions and their sub-divisions are shown on Map D, which follows this section.

The Balkan Mountains, stretching from the Yugoslav border to the Black Sea, are part of the alpine mountain system of Europe and a continuation of the Carpathian Mountains of Rumania. At the Iron Gate of the Danube River, the folded belt of the Carpathians abuts against the Rhodope Massive and swings abruptly eastward to form the arcuate chain of the Balkan Mountains and its associated ranges and longitudinal basins. The northern foothills of the Balkan Mountains slope gently onto the Danube Tableland, which parallels the mountains from the western border to the Black Sea. To the south, the Balkan Mountains system is separated from the Southern Highlands by the wide Central Lowlands, extending from the Upper Maritsa River to the coast. The Southern Highlands are part of the Rhodope Massive, an old uplifted crystalline block covering an area roughly

triangular in shape. Points of the triangle are located at Belgrade, Thessalonika, and Istanbul.

The drainage pattern is characterized by a dense network of streams. Slightly more than half of Bulgaria is in the Black Sea drainage basin, while rivers in the southern half of Bulgaria discharge their waters into the Aegean Sea. The Danube River and its tributaries drain 39 per cent of the total area. Shorter rivers of the Black Sea basin drain a strip 40 to 50 miles along the coast. This zone comprises 15 per cent of the total land area. Southern Bulgaria is drained by the Maritsa River system, whose basin accounts for 34 per cent of the country; the Struma River system, eight per cent; and the Mesta River and its tributaries, three per cent. A small portion of Bulgaria drains into internal basins.

Streams in the Balkan Mountains and Southern Highlands are swift-flowing and have cut steep valleys and gorges. They deposit great amounts of alluvium in the basins, where the meandering rivers develop islands and bars in their channels and flow through swampy sections. There is great seasonal fluctuation in the volume of water flowing through the rivers, especially those with headwaters in the Balkan Mountains. Snow fields and mountain lakes in the high southern ranges tend to equalize the flow to the Aegean Sea, though high summer temperatures and evaporation result in irregular run-off. The Struma River, for instance, drains an area of 3,327 square miles but is almost dry from June to September. Streams in the limestone area of Dobruja, in the northeast, are typical of those in karst topography, flowing only after downpours and disappearing into underground channels during most of the year.

(1) The Danube Tableland:

The land from the Balkan Mountains to the Danube River is an area of flat to rolling terrain. Its elevation is generally 300 to 1,000 feet above sea level, in contrast with the low, wide Rumanian flood plain. The Bulgarian flood plain is narrow, reaching a maximum width of four miles. Only in a few places is it similar to the flat

Rumanian flood plain with its characteristic swamps and lagoons. The river is braided in many places. Large floating islands are covered with vegetation which gives them the deceptive appearance of solid ground. In some places, where there is no flood plain, the tableland drops 500 to 600 feet into the river. The height of the bluffs is highest at Svishtov, where it is 790 feet, and declines towards the east.

The varying results of weathering and erosion differentiate the level plateau west of the Yantra River from the rolling uplands to the east. In the west, the loess-covered plateau is underlain with horizontal bedrock of limestone and sandstone dipping to the north and northeast. Thus, streams dissecting its surface flow in a north-northeasterly direction, undermining their right, or eastern, banks and depositing sediment on their left. The valleys of some of these rivers are as deep as 650 feet. Most of them have steep eastern banks and gentler western slopes. East of the Yantra River, streams are more numerous. The tableland has been weathered and eroded into a rolling hill country. The hills of Deli Orman, rising to 1,300 and 1,600 feet in elevation, are the most rugged part of the tableland.

The limestone surface of the Dobruja has many landforms of karst topography--funnel-shaped sinkholes, steep cliffs, intermittent streams, and caves. Caves in the Deli Orman are in the river valleys at two levels. The upper tier of caves are dry. The lower tier consists of caverns containing the beds of subsurface streams. However, the two largest caves in Bulgaria are found not in the Dobruja but near Turnovo.

The Black Sea coast is generally steep with cliffs from 300 to 700 feet high. For 12 miles south of Rumania, the coast is lined with beaches backed by sand dunes. Near Balchik, the shore has a terraced appearance, for large blocks of the plateau have broken off and slipped into the sea. Denudation of the coastal area, the incline of layers of slippery marl, unstable permeable limestone and sandstone, and the undermining action of waves all contribute to such landslides, which are frequent in this area. South of Stalin the Provadiya and Kamchiya Rivers flow in broad, marshy troughs one to two miles wide.

(2) The Balkan Ranges and Basins:

(a) The Balkan Mountains:

The narrow range of the Balkan Mountains parallels the Danube River for 373 miles. Its width averages 18.6 miles with the narrowest and highest point located in the central section, north of Plovdiv. The mountains, higher and more rugged in the western and central sections, decline in altitude to low hills east of Sliven. Many high passes between the rounded summits allow fairly easy traverse across the crest of the range. A wide zone of small basins and undulating foothills form the northern slopes of the range. Sharp down-faulting along the southern slopes have created a series of basins and bare, steep slopes gashed by torrential mountain streams. Several hot springs, giving rise to thermal bath resorts, mark the fault lines.

The West Balkan Mountains form the Yugoslav border for approximately 60 miles and trend southeasterly to the Iskŭr Gorge. Summits are generally 6,500 feet in elevation. In areas of limestone, which alternate with bands of crystalline schist, there are bare karst ridges, sinkholes, and caves. The gorge, marking the only place where the range has been cut through deeply, is 40 miles long and, in some places, 2,000 feet deep.

The Central Balkan Mountains trend in an easterly direction from the Iskŭr Gorge to a point north of Nova Zagora. Slopes are more rugged, and peaks rising over 7,000 feet, are higher in this section. The highest peak in the Balkan Mountains, the Yumrukchal, rises to an altitude of 7,796 feet north of Karlovo.

The East Balkan Mountains are a series of low, parallel east-west ridges. The elevation, approximately 3,000 feet near Sliven, declines to a maximum of 1,600 feet near the coast. From Stalin to Cape Emine, with the exception of the mouths of the Rivers Provadiya and Kamchiya, the coast is rocky and steep.

(b) The Sredna Gora:

The Sredna Gora, also known as the Anti-Balkans, parallels the Central Balkan Mountains for 120 miles to the south. In its western section, it is 15 miles wide and 5,000 feet high. In the east, north of Stara Zagora, it narrows to a width of five miles and declines to an elevation of 2,000 feet. South of Sliven, it becomes a range of low hills, disappearing near Yambol. Several routes across the range go over passes or follow northern tributaries of the Maritsa River where they have cut through the mountains connecting the Balkan basins with the Central Lowlands. One of the important north-south routes passes over the broad gap 1,500 feet high north of Stara Zagora. Another route follows the mile-wide valley of the Stryama River.

(c) The Balkan Basins:

A chain of small basins lie between the Balkan Mountains and the Sredna Gora. The flat or gently rolling floors are edged with low alluvial fans issuing from ravines of the steep slopes which enclose the basins. Rivers draining the basins flow through gaps cut across the Sredna and then southward to join the Maritsa River.

The Zlatitsa Basin, which is separated from the Sofia Basin by a ridge 1,000 feet above the floor, is approximately 19 miles long and two and one-half miles wide. It is drained by the Topolnitsa River. To the east lies the Karlovo Basin, which is 20 miles long by four and one-half miles wide. Drainage is provided by the Stryama River. The Kazanluk Basin, the largest of the chain, is 44 miles long and five to seven miles wide. Protected from inclement weather by its surrounding mountain ranges, it is intensely cultivated and well-settled. Large areas are irrigated with waters from the Tundzha River, which also flows through the easternmost basin. The Sliven Basin is triangular in shape and has a length of 35 miles and a maximum width of ten miles.

(3) The Central Lowlands:

The Central Lowlands are a chain of large basins extending from the Sofia Basin to the Black Sea. They are limited on the north by the folded Balkan Mountain system and on the south by a series of faults along the Southern Highlands. The latitudinal width of the basins varies from 20 to 60 miles. They have flat to rolling terrain, with occasional hills rising from the floor.

(a) The Sofia Basin:

The Sofia Basin lies between the west Balkan Mountains at the north and the Vitosha Mountains at the south. Steep mountains surrounding the basin rise 1,000 to 5,000 feet above the floor. The length of the basin from northwest to southeast is approximately 46 miles. It is well drained by the Iskŭr River system except in the flat, marshy area northeast of Sofia. Movement in dryer parts of the basin is easy. A major road and railroad enter the basin from Yugoslavia through the Nishava Valley and over the Dragoman Pass. It continues southeastward through the Central Lowlands to Greece and Turkey.

(b) The Plovdiv Basin:

Elliptical in shape, the Plovdiv Basin is approximately 100 by 30 miles. High mountains of the Sredna Gora, Rila Mountains and the Central Rhodope ranges border the basin on the north, west and south. Approaches to the basin must be made through defiles except in the northeast, where rolling hills separate the Plovdiv from the Zagora Basin. Movement in the center of the basin is restricted. There are marshes along the Maritsa River and its meandering and braided tributaries. Wide fields of rice with canals and irrigation ditches also restrict north-south movement.

(c) The Zagora Basin:

Torrential streams flow through the Zagora Basin into the Sazlika River, a tributary of the Maritsa River. The divides between the streams are rolling hills with steeper slopes near the Sazlika River.

However, the river valley and the northern part of the Zagora Basin are relatively flat.

(d) The Middle Tundzha Basin:

The terrain in the Middle Tundzha Basin is more rolling than that in the Plovdiv or the Zagora Basin. The highest of the scattered hills in the Central Lowlands rises to an elevation of 1,969 feet northwest of Elkhovo. The basin is divided by swampy stream valleys bordered by bluffs.

(e) The Burgas Basin:

The Burgas Basin is one of hills and marshy lowlands. Stream valleys are narrow troughs cut deeply into the uplands, thus impeding north-south movement. Steep, rocky slopes border the coast and some valleys. Near the Gulf of Burgas, rivers flow through long narrow marshes and estuaries. Large coastal lakes have been formed by the Black Sea currents which have built bars across the mouths of estuaries. Lakes in other parts of the eastern shore have been formed in this fashion.

(h) The Southern Highlands:

The Southern Highlands extend north of the border for 100 miles in western Bulgaria, 30 miles in the center and 15 miles in the east. Mountain ranges in this region continue into Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. Although many ranges trend in different directions, the general alignment of mountains parallels the border. Traverse through the Southern Highlands is somewhat restricted to the few major river valleys, most of which are corridors oriented in a north-south direction. The valleys of the Arda and Kharmanliyska Rivers provide for east-west movement from the Rhodope Mountains to the Maritsa Valley. The highest and most rugged mountains in Bulgaria are in the western part of the Southern Highlands, where the average elevation is over 5,000 feet. In the Rila and Pirin ranges, the mountains are generally over 7,000 feet, with some peaks over 9,000 feet high. In the Eastern Rhodope Mountains, the altitude is less than 3,000 feet. East of the Tundzha River, it diminishes to an average of 1,500 feet. Landforms are varied. There are round-crested mountains, serrated alpine

ranges, isolated blocks of high, rugged mountains rising abruptly from the surrounding lower mountainland, rugged plateaus, large intermontane basins rimmed with talus falling from steep, heavily eroded slopes, youthful valleys, and gorges.

(a) The Yugoslav Border Ranges:

Mountains forming the border south of the Nishava Valley have rounded summits over 5,000 feet high. From a point west of Kyustendil southward to the Strumeshnitsa River, near the Greek border, the elevation of summits decreases. However, the rugged range forms a continuous north-south ridge over 3,000 feet in elevation. Slopes dipping into Yugoslavia are moderate, but in Bulgaria there are numerous steep spurs extending almost to the banks of the Struma River. Movement along the west bank of the river and over the sharp-crested spurs alternating with narrow valleys is difficult.

(b) The Struma Basin:

The Struma Valley is a natural route from the Vitosha Mountains to the Aegean Sea. The Strumeshnitsa Valley joins the lower section of the Struma Valley with Yugoslavia. Tributaries of the Upper Struma River flow through rolling mountains and numerous basins with hilly floors enclosed by steep sides. The valley floor of the Struma River is flat and narrow, averaging one and one-half miles in width. The western wall of the valley is steep and close to the river. Eastern slopes rise more gently towards the Rila and Pirin Mountains. The Strumeshnitsa Valley is three miles wide and bordered on the north and south by high mountains.

(c) The Vitosha Mountains:

The Vitosha range trends northwestward between the Sofia and Struma Basins. Its ridges are rounded except for the cliffs on the northeastern slopes and the higher summits, reaching a peak of 7,498 feet. Its lower slopes are generally steep.

(d) The Rila Mountains:

Craggy alpine mountains of the Rila range form an east-west barrier 35 miles long. The serrated ridge is cut through by a few gaps, the widest of which is a narrow gorge south of Samokov. To the east of this gap is the highest mountain in Bulgaria, the Stalin (Musala) peak, which is 9,596 feet high. Many cirques and tarns are nestled in the mountain sides. Alpine meadows cover the gentler slopes.

(e) The Pirin Mountains:

South of the Rila Mountains the Pirin range forms the divide between the Mesta and Struma Rivers. As in the Rila Mountains, landforms here are typical of those in glaciated mountain areas. The steep mountains of the Pirin range, rising to heights of 5,000 to 9,000 feet, are interrupted by broad gaps west of Razlog and Nevrokop.

(f) The Central Rhodope Mountains:

The land between the Mesta River and the headwaters of the Arda River is a complex, deeply dissected mountain mass. Tributaries of the Mesta and Maritsa Rivers flow through gorges and a few tiny, isolated basins. Much of the region is uninhabited. There is no room in the valleys for settlement. The few flat basins can be reached mainly by goat paths leading through many defiles.


(g) The Eastern Rhodope Mountains:

The terrain becomes gentler in the Eastern Rhodope Mountains, where the rounded hills are 1,000 to 2,000 feet high. The mountains are higher in the south along the Greek border, sometimes reaching 3,000 feet in elevation. Some of the mountains are small dissected plateaus partly covered with moor. Valleys are broader than those in the west and open towards the east and northeast onto the Central Lowlands.

(h) The Sakar and Strandzha Highlands:

Rugged hills and low mountains with rounded or flat summits characterize the Sakar Mountains, located west of the Tundzha River and the Strandzha Mountains, which form the border from the Tundzha River

to the Black Sea coast. Numerous streams, forming a dense network, flow through shallow gorges in their upper courses and moderately wide valleys farther downstream. The eastern edge of the highlands is a steep and rocky coast from the Gulf of Burgas to the Turkish border. Many isolated coves and bays dot the irregular shoreline.



b. Climate (Maps E, F, G, and H)


Climate in Bulgaria, as in Eastern Europe, is determined primarily by the vast air mass hovering over the Asiatic continent. During the winter, the Siberian high pressure cell over northern Asia is the dominant climatic control. During the summer it is the low pressure cell which extends from Asia as far westward as North Africa. These air masses bring Bulgaria its predominantly continental climate.

Maritime influences from the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Black Sea are also present, though their effect is less pronounced. The influence of the Icelandic low pressure cell and the Azores high pressure cell weakens as it spreads across Europe from the Atlantic Ocean. During the summer maritime influences are stronger. The Azores high pressure cell extends over Central Europe, and high pressure cells which develop over the Mediterranean Sea affect the climate of southern Bulgaria.

Within Bulgaria, the interaction of the barrier-like mountain ranges with the continental and maritime air masses results in three major climatic zones. Differences in relief produce further variations of local climate in each zone. The three major zones, shown on Map E, are the humid continental, humid subtropical, and Mediterranean. The humid continental climate, prevailing over the mountains and northern plains, is the most rigorous of the three types. The humid subtropical climate, located in the Central Lowlands and along the Black Sea, is a milder climate resulting from the shielding effect of the Balkan Mountains against the continental influence. Also present is the ameliorating influence of the Mediterranean and Black Seas. The mildest climate is found in the Mediterranean zone, which lies in the southeast and along the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountain border. Because of the inland location of this zone, both temperature and precipitation regimes are somewhat more continental than those of other Mediterranean areas. Winters are mild; summers, hot. The precipitation pattern in most of the area shows a winter maximum and summer minimum, though there are no long

summer droughts, as is characteristic of the typical Mediterranean climate. For the most part, Mediterranean influences are barred from greater penetration into Bulgaria by the Dinaric ranges in Yugoslavia and Albania and by the Rhodope Mountains in southern Bulgaria.

Weather conditions for ground operations are generally best during the summer, though provisions must be made for cold storage of food and medicine. Protection from rain and winter snow is necessary throughout the year, for no month is completely dry. All weather stations have recorded an average monthly precipitation between one and five inches. In the humid continental zone suitable clothing and shelter are necessary for protection from cold winter winds, low temperatures, and occasional chilly weather during the summer. Snowshoes and skis are required for traverse through the mountainous areas during the winter.



(1) The Humid Continental Zone: '

The most severe weather conditions, the widest range of temperature variation, and the greatest amount of snow are found in the humid continental zone. The variation in mean annual temperatures is approximately 44°F. in the northern plain and 32°F. in the mountains.

Low winter temperatures, shown on Map F, are encountered everywhere. The mean daily minimum temperature is below freezing from December through February. The lowest extremes are found in enclosed mountain basins, where air drainage and temperature inversion sometimes damage crops and fruit trees. Low temperatures persist when fog cover, which is more frequent during the winter, intercepts the sun's rays for long periods of time. The lowest recorded absolute minimum temperature is -24°F., taken at Sofia. Therefore, shelter should be sought on warmer mountain slopes or on higher ground, above the layer of fog and cold air blanketing the basins.

Mean maximum summer temperatures in the plains and basins are between 70°F. and 85°F.; mean minimum temperatures are between 50°F. and 65°F. In the mountains, at 3,000 feet, the mean maximum temperature is in the low 60's; the mean minimum temperature is approximately 40°F. Absolute maximum temperatures are quite high, with the highest in the enclosed mountain basins. Throughout the zone, temperatures over 100°F. have been recorded.

Autumn and spring are short transition periods. Autumn begins in September and ends in late October or early November, when winter descends suddenly with a strong cold front. Cold air from the northeast brings fog, frost, and snow. The progression of spring into summer takes place more gradually in April and May.

Annual precipitation, portrayed in Map G, varies from less than 20 inches on the Danube Tableland to more than 44 inches on mountain slopes exposed to moisture-laden winds. The belt of lower annual precipitation in the northern part of the Danube Tableland is steppe-like in character. Annual precipitation increases in the Balkan foothills to 25 inches, the

average for the country. The highest annual precipitation falls in mountainous regions, where it is over 32 inches a year.

June is the wettest month. January and February are the driest, though no season is completely dry. A large per cent of rain falls as a result of condensation of moisture in air rising from intensely heated mountain basins, resulting in frequent thunderstorms over mountain plateaus and basins. The stormy season, lasting from May through August, reaches a peak in June when there are usually 11 or 12 thunderstorms. Thunderstorms, usually occurring in the afternoon and early evening, are sometimes violent and occasionally accompanied by heavy hail. There is danger of landslides and road washouts as a result of these downpours.

The duration and amount of snow cover, shown on Map H, is greatest in the humid continental zone. Snow covers the ground for at least a few days of each month from November through March. In the mountains, snow may be present from October through April. Snow covers the ground longest in January, lasting from one-half to two-thirds of the month in the Danube Valley, the lower hills, and mountain basins. In the high mountains, snow cover remains throughout the months of January and February.

The depth of snow cover varies from several inches on the plains to ten feet in the mountains. Usually there are only a few inches in the northern plains, foothills and basins. Occasionally, maximum depths of two or four feet may be present. The greatest depth of snow cover lies in the mountains, where it is usually one or two feet deep. Passes may be blocked for most of the winter.

Brief periods of thawing, which are most frequent in spring, create local flooding and muddy ground conditions. During such periods the roads in the loess and loam of the Danube Tableland are impassable for periods up to several weeks.

(2) The Humid Subtropical Zone:

The humid subtropical zone owes its milder climate primarily to the protection of the Balkan Mountains, which stretch across the northern edge of the zone like a wall. Blasts of severe continental weather from the USSR are usually stopped by the mountain range. When they succeed in scaling the mountain barrier into the Central Lowlands, their force is much weakened. Maritime influences from the Mediterranean Sea also reach the humid subtropical zone from time to time, and the presence of the Black Sea affects the climate in a coastal zone which extends inland for 15 to 20 miles.

The characteristic climate in the humid subtropical zone is one of short winters, warm summers, and mild, cool springs. Compared to the humid continental zone, winters here are warmer. Mean minimum temperatures fall below freezing only in January in the Maritsa Basin. The lowest absolute minimum temperature recorded near the coast is 0°F. and -5°F. at Plovdiv. Absolute maximum temperatures of 105°F. or more have been recorded at most lowland stations. In the coastal area, the effect of the Black Sea is mainly in the amelioration of both summer and winter temperatures, resulting in milder winters, cooler summers, and a smaller variation in annual temperatures. In contrast to winter temperatures of inland sites at the same latitude, the coastal region may be as much as 15 to 20 degrees warmer.

The Central Lowlands, in the rain shadow of the mountains, receive relatively little precipitation. Annual amounts of precipitation average 20 to 24 inches at most stations. The precipitation pattern is continental, with the larger portion falling during the warmer months. Summer thunderstorms are common, though less frequent near the coast, where there is an average of two to six in June. Because of heavy summer rains, camp sites should be located on well drained ground.

Very little snow falls in the humid subtropical zone. In January, the snow cover, usually less than two inches deep, seldom lingers longer than ten days. Snow falls more frequently on hilltops and remains on the ground for only brief periods. Near the Black Sea, snow falls on fewer than

20 days each year.

(3) The Mediterranean Zone:

The Mediterranean zone in the south enjoys the mildest, brightest climate in Bulgaria. Winters are mild. Summers are warm and fairly dry. In the northern part of the zone, the maximum temperature falls below freezing on only a few days of the year. Frosts occur occasionally, and snow is rare. Annual precipitation varies from 20 inches in the lowlands to over 40 inches on the mountain slopes. Much of the precipitation is due to cyclonic activity which is stronger during the winter months. Thus the greater part of the total precipitation occurs during November and December, and the least amount during August and September. At stations where the influence of the continental climate is somewhat stronger, the precipitation pattern shows a primary maximum in June and a secondary maximum in November.


(4) Winds:

Surface winds are usually light, and there are frequent calms. The few high winds or gales occur most frequently during the winter. A frequency of approximately 25 gales a year has been recorded at Petrokhanski Pass and at Samokov. Cold winter winds also whip across the flat Danube Plateau. Downslope or "foehn" winds blow most often in the Danube Tableland and the Maritsa Basin. Occasionally they occur in the Strandzha highlands. They are warm, local winds, flowing down the leeward slopes of mountains. The winds are dry, as they have lost their moisture in ascending the windward slopes. As they descend on the opposite side of the mountains, they reduce the relative humidity and warm the air by compression.


The "Cherni Veter" (Black Wind) blows from the south or southwest in eastern Bulgaria. Its velocity is 10 to 15 miles per hour, at times reaching 25 miles per hour. It is exceedingly hot and dry, sometimes increasing the spring and early summer temperatures by 27°F. Vegetation in its path is scorched, and the dust and sand that it stirs up from the dry soil restrict breathing and visibility.

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


SUMMER


BULGARIA
MAP F
TEMPERATURE (°F)

- Below 32°F
- 32°F - 48°F
- 48°F - 64°F
- Over 64°F

Source: JANIS, Meteorology and Climatology of Bulgaria, October 1953, pp. 3-5




AUTUMN




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
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
JANUARY




APRIL



JULY




OCTOBER




BULGARIA


MAP C
PRECIPITATION (IN)



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c. Vegetation (Maps J and K)*

Concealment, camouflage, fuel, and food can be found in areas indicated on Map J, which shows the distribution of natural vegetation, and on Map K, which depicts major crop areas. Forests and scrub growth cover 30 per cent of the total land area. Forty-seven per cent is agricultural land, most of which is arable. A small per cent of agricultural land is in permanent pasture. Of the total area with natural vegetation, 70 per cent is covered with deciduous trees. Coniferous forests grow on 11 per cent of the area, and scrub growth accounts for the remaining 19 per cent. Thus the usefulness of natural vegetation for concealment is largely limited to seasons when trees are in leaf. The following discussion of vegetation features is limited to factors of special interest to Special Forces planning.

(1) Forests:

The larger tracks of forests are in the mountains, especially the Southern Mountains. Near settlements the stands of timber are thinned out by cutting, burning, and grazing.

Deciduous forests are the most widespread. Beech stands thrive in the more humid zones from the northern foothills of the Balkan Mountains to the Southern Mountains of Bulgaria and Greece. The denser stands are at elevations of 2,500 to 5,000 feet, with stragglers above these heights. The sparse undergrowth resulting from the thick canopy permits easy foot travel but reduces the amount of ground concealment available. Forests of oak and associated species are located chiefly on hills and on the lower slopes of mountains. Above 2,500 feet, oaks become a secondary element in mixed forests. The undergrowth in oak forests is much denser

* As the characteristics of vegetation described in CIA/RR-GR-101, August 1956, Evasion Geography of Bulgaria, pp. 15-18 (C), are highly relevant to resistance and Special Forces operations, the major portion of the section is reproduced here with minor additions and revisions. Further details relating to altitudinal zoning of trees, species of trees and undergrowth, heights and densities of forests, and other characteristics of vegetation may be found in NIS 22-23, Sec. 24, pp. 23-27 (July 1952) (C).

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than that of the beech forests and consequently offers excellent concealment. At the same time, there are thorny bushes that hamper foot travel.

Coniferous forests, which consist of pines, fir, and spruce, are restricted mainly to the Rila and Rhodope Mountains and the central and western parts of the Balkan Mountains. In altitude the coniferous forests overlap the beech. Although zones of unmixed conifers may occur locally at elevations as low as 3,500 feet in the Southern Mountains, the usual range is 4,500 to 6,000 feet. On mountains above 6,000 feet, the summit is normally above the timber line, but lower mountains may be forested to the top. The coniferous forests offer concealment from both air and ground observation throughout the year. The lower parts of the coniferous zone generally have an admixture of deciduous trees and a dense deciduous undergrowth, which hampers movement on foot.

In the lowlands and basins the only woodlands are likely to be discontinuous belts of willow and poplar immediately adjacent to streams, or scattered patches of deciduous trees between cultivated fields and grasslands. The undergrowth is usually heavy, offering good concealment but making travel difficult.

In the Danube Tableland trees are found only as scattered woodland patches, mostly in the hilly southern section near the foothills of the Balkan Mountains. The tableland offers little natural concealment. From the northern foothills of the Balkan Mountains southward, some sort of forest or brushland is almost always in sight. Forest belts are being planted across the Dobruja to prevent further soil erosion.

Ample supplies of firewood will be available in any forested area of Bulgaria. In the tablelands, dried dung may be used for fuel. Fire should be handled with caution, however, since there is some danger of forest fires in the wooded regions, especially in the late summer and early fall.

(2) Scrub and Brush:

Two types of scrub and brush vegetation are fairly extensive in Bulgaria and consist of dwarf trees and a large variety of shrubs.

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Pseudomacchia, composed of both evergreen and deciduous growth, is more commonly found in southern Bulgaria and in the Struma Valley south of Kyustendil, where Mediterranean influences modify the climate. Shiblyak, a deciduous brushwood, grows in areas with a more continental type of climate. Although normally only six to ten feet high they may grow to 15 feet or more. Scrub forests generally occur at low elevations in the mountains and foothills, but they are also found high up the slopes in the zone above the conifers. Concealment possibilities presented by the scrub forest vary considerably, depending on the height, extent, and thickness of the growth. In some areas the cover is not adequate for evasion purposes. In other areas, however, there are dense, matted growths that provide innumerable opportunities for concealment, but at the expense of movement. Such areas in eastern Bulgaria are found southeast of Shumen, west of Burgas, and in the Strandzha along the Turkish border; and in southwestern Bulgaria, in parts of the Rila Mountains. At lower elevations the presence of thorny shrubs and vines makes some areas almost impassable. Fires are occasionally hazards in brushwood areas. Although some fires may be accidental, many districts are burned over periodically to provide pasture. Fire has also been used in the past as a military expedient to flush out an evader and presumably could be so used again. When traveling, it is advisable to skirt brushwood areas on the uphill or highland margins. If caught in burning brushwood, a foot traveler should move horizontally along the slopes above the fire, since tongues of fire are likely to spread rapidly uphill from a broad base without increasing much in width.

(3) Cultivated Fields and Grasslands:

Fields and grasslands generally offer poor concealment but a minimum of obstacles to movement on foot. When the corn, flax, and sunflowers have reached their maximum height in late summer and early autumn, they afford some concealment. On the other hand, practically no concealment is provided by wheat and other low-growing crops or by orchards.

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Agriculture is limited mainly to the valley basins, the Central Lowlands, and the Danube Tableland.

Grasslands are found throughout the country at all altitudes. In character, they vary from the steppes in the northeast to the valley pastures and mountain meadows. In such open areas possibilities for concealment are few, but scattered patches of forest, scrub, and brush can usually be found not far away.

(4) Marsh and Swamp Vegetation:

Marshes are found along lowland rivers and in basins where meandering rivers have left abandoned channels. The largest marsh areas are along the banks of the Danube, but most of them are on the north, or Rumanian side of the river. Other areas of marshland are located around Plovdiv on the Maritsa, along the Upper Tundzha, in the Sofia Basin, and along the rivers emptying into the Black Sea. The vegetation in these areas consists of sedges and reeds. The reeds are usually about three feet in height but occasionally reach as much as 16 feet. In the marshy areas, concealment is generally limited to places where the reeds are at least six feet high. The dense stands of willow sometimes found in the swampy areas also offer good concealment. It would be hard to start fires in the marshes, except during the dry season of the late summer and early fall. The land adjoining the large Danube marshes dries out almost completely in summer, but the dense growth of rushes, reeds, and willows would still provide concealment.

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
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d. Settlement Patterns (Map L)*

Despite strenuous Communist efforts to promote the increase of industry and modern technology in Bulgaria, the country remains largely a land of peasant agriculturalists. As indicated on Map L, only about 25 per cent of Bulgaria's total population is to be found in cities or surrounding urban areas. The remainder of the population is scattered over the rural areas of the country, at densities which in some areas are less than 25 persons per square mile and in other areas range as high as 260 or more persons per square mile. The population, whether urban or rural, is largely restricted to tablelands, lowlands, and valley basins. Regions of higher elevation are much less heavily settled and offer favorable opportunities for effective Special Forces operations.

(1) Rural Areas:

Over three-quarters of the population of Bulgaria lives in rural villages, only a few of which have as many as 5,000 people. This village system is an important aspect of Bulgarian life and differs markedly from the American system in which farmhouses are scattered about on the individual landholdings. A typical Bulgarian village generally consists of a few hundred houses clustered along a stream or along the periphery of a basin area, leaving the better land free for cultivation. Public buildings and service shops are usually in the center of the village.

In the Danube Tableland the population is concentrated in villages situated one to seven miles apart in sheltered valleys and depressions below the general surface level. The cultivated upland surface may at first give a false impression that the region is relatively uninhabited; on closer inspection it will be found that few points in the tableland are more than five miles away from some kind of permanent settlement. Seasonally, and particularly during the spring planting and autumn harvest,

* Except for minor alterations in style and data, the present section represents in essence a condensation of material on population settlement relevant to Special Forces which is contained in CIA/RR-GR-101, August 1956, Evasion Geography of Bulgaria, pp. 22-26 (C).

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large numbers of peasants may be encountered working in the upland fields in the tablelands. At such times the workers often live in lightly constructed temporary buildings on the upland surface.

In the relatively densely populated basins and plains of the Central Lowlands, villages are situated two to five miles apart and are seldom more than ten miles from wooded or brush-covered land or more than 20 miles from the mountains. The heaviest concentration of settlements is in the fertile Sofia, Maritsa, and Kazanlık Basins. Population along the Black Sea coast is sparse except along the Burgas and Stalin (Varna) embayments; elsewhere small fishing villages are located roughly ten miles apart.

Dispersed settlements are common in the mountains, particularly on the northern slopes of the Stara Planina and in the Eastern Rhodope and Yugoslav Border Ranges. These settlements usually consist of a number of hamlets (kolibi) separated from one another by inhospitable terrain but joined together administratively. An individual hamlet in one of these clusters may consist of from two to seven stone or wood buildings housing four to eight persons each. The central buildings of the settlement (administration, church, school, market, etc.) are generally located in the largest hamlet of the group. Population in the Rila, Pirin, and Western Rhodope Mountains is particularly sparse and is concentrated chiefly in villages located in small basin areas along the larger streams. Most mountain villages in Bulgaria are located at elevations of 2,000 feet or lower; only a few scattered settlements or former monasteries can be found as high as 2,500 or 3,000 feet.

An important aspect of rural settlement patterns in Bulgaria is the seasonal migration of peasant villagers and their animals into the surrounding countryside. From spring to autumn, sheep and goats are pastured in mountain meadows. In late summer and autumn, families scatter over the countryside to pick wild fruits and berries. In late autumn and winter the villagers cut firewood, sometimes at several miles distance from their homes, and women and children gather green branches which are stored as

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winter fodder for cattle.

(2) Urban Areas:

Bulgaria has only one large city, Sofia, which is the center for government, education, economy, and communications. Fully one-fourth of the country's urban population lives in metropolitan Sofia which has increased in size to upwards of 600,000 persons. Beyond the outskirts of Sofia proper a dense rural population lives in villages of one to three miles apart. Dimitrovo, an important mining center with an estimated 41,000 inhabitants, is the only large town within 50 miles of Sofia.

The relative size and importance of the national capital as compared to other cities in Bulgaria is indicated by the small size of the other urban centers. The second largest city, Plovdiv, has an estimated population of 135,000. Stalin on the Black Sea is third with 88,000; Ruse on the Danube River is fourth with 56,000; and no other city in the country has a population larger than 50,000. Some 22 towns with populations between 15,000 and 50,000 are distributed throughout all parts of the country except the extreme south and southwest. Towns of less than 15,000 are scarcely more than large marketing centers since the great majority of their population is usually rural in outlook and occupation.

With few exceptions, cities and towns in Bulgaria are situated on natural terraces or slopes adjacent to rivers. They consist mainly of one- and two-story houses lining irregular narrow streets which are usually paved. Stone and brick are the most widely used building materials. In a few of the larger cities, especially Sofia, some effort has been made to imitate Western ideas of design and layout.

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e. Cross-Country Movement (Map M)

(1) General:

The following discussion of cross-country movement factors is limited to the evaluation of such factors which apply to movement of foot troops, and in particular to the specific movement requirements of Special Forces units. The general factors applying to movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles will not be included in this discussion, although these factors frequently have at least indirect bearing on foot troop movements. Because this subject matter is fully explored and evaluated on pages 28-32 (paragraph C.1., Military Evaluation, Cross-Country Movement), of NIS 22-23, Rumania and Bulgaria, Section 24, "Topography," July 1952 (C), the user of this report is referred to the source. Nor will there be included in the discussion a general evaluation of seasonal factors limiting cross-country movement such as snow cover, cold winds, fog, spring floods, and dust conditions, because the NIS section referred to above includes a full treatment of these factors which permits conclusions for Special Forces planning; seasonal factors will, however, be discussed where they have specific regional significance to Special Forces movements.

Off-road movement of foot troops is possible almost everywhere in Bulgaria. Exceptions are rather limited as for instance in regard to some mountain slopes which are covered with thorny scrub and are impenetrable even for foot troops or in some of the swamps, existing in parts of the Danube valley and other river basins. In addition, ground conditions during the spring thaws, which in the south begin in early March and in the north in mid-March, render low-level regions and parts of the Danube Tableland temporarily impassible for foot troops or make movement difficult. In general, however, such obstacles, while interfering seriously in the cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles, are not, except for local conditions, in the nature of major obstacles to foot troop movements throughout Bulgaria.

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In the Danube Tableland, Central Lowlands, and mountain basins, terrain conditions are best for both vehicular and foot traffic. However, these are also the areas which are less suitable for Special Forces planning because they are densely or relatively densely populated, intensively cultivated, and therefore (with a possible exception of the areas of corn culture which offer possibilities of concealment during the summer before harvest time) are unfavorable for Special Forces operations because of their negative concealment characteristics. In contrast, the wooded areas which prove unfavorable for cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles offer the most favorable conditions for Special Forces cross-country movement. For this reason, cross-country movement conditions prevailing in the forested areas of northwestern and southern Bulgaria, which have been discussed in the Vegetation Section of this report (pages 57-60), will be further evaluated in the regional discussion below.

(2) Regional Variations:

(a) The Danube Tableland:

Movement is generally easy in this region which, however, is open and relatively densely populated. The chief obstacles to movement on the tableland tops are dust, mud (after spring thaws and heavy rainfalls in summer) and, in winter, heavy snowfalls which may render roads snowbound for short periods. The worst weather conditions hampering movement usually occur after the spring thaws. North-south movement is not difficult except in marshy areas, whereas east-west movement is occasionally difficult on the eastern slopes of some of the narrow valleys of the Danube tributaries. There is little or no natural cover on the heights, and in the valley bottoms only limited concealment is offered by discontinuous bands of trees and brush bordering the streams. In addition to offering meager concealment possibilities, the areas of grain culture are also unfavorable for Special Forces movement because large numbers of peasants are working in the valleys, except during winter. Muddy swamps, lagoons, and cliffs render access to the Danube difficult in parts. In the eastern parts of the Deli Orman, there

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are scrub and oak forests offering concealment possibilities and favorable conditions for Special Forces cross-country movement.

(b) The Balkan Ranges:

The Balkan Ranges, consisting of the main chain of the Balkan Mountains and the parallel range of the Sredna Gora to the south, are relatively favorable for concealment of troops and cross-country foot movement. In the higher western and central sections of the Balkan Mountains, movement is more difficult than in the section east of Sliven. Slopes in the Sredna Gora are moderate, becoming steep only locally. Foot movement is easy in most parts of the area, and the mountains can be crossed by several trails. Though passes are numerous, they are only slightly lower than the mountain summits and are subject to snow blocking during the winter. On roads crossing rocky slopes, landslides are a hazard after downpours, thaws, and during the winter.

1) The Balkan Mountains--In the Western and Central Balkan Mountains, movement over the broad terraces and rolling summits is easy, though it may be difficult to reach these areas because of their bordering cliffs and steep slopes. Rivers are partly dry in the summer, but there is danger from sudden flash floods following frequent thunderstorms. Many can be forded except during the spring thaws. Cover can be found in broken mountain terrain and in forests. Conditions are best in the forested upper and middle northern slopes where there is adequate cover, wild game, nuts, berries, and water from mountain streams. The northern slopes of the Balkan Mountains are rolling and easy to negotiate, but the southern slopes are precipitous. East-west movement along the southern slopes is retarded by the deeply incised valleys cut by torrential streams.

The mountains are forested except on steep slopes, cut-over areas, and the higher mountain peaks. Forests growing below 5,000 feet, being mainly deciduous, offer concealment only from spring through autumn. Sparse undergrowth in the beech forests, located between 2,500 and 5,000

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feet, permits easy movement. There is less concealment from ground observation here than there is in the dense undergrowth of the oak forests, located below 2,500 feet. Concealment features are better on the northern slopes, where some of the best hardwood forests in Bulgaria are located. The steep southern slopes are bare of vegetation cover. At lower elevations, large cut-over areas are barren or covered with secondary scrub growth. Small tracts of coniferous forests, scattered in the zone between 4,000 and 6,500 feet, provide concealment throughout the year. In the lower parts of the coniferous zone, there may be a dense deciduous undergrowth that would hamper foot movement considerably. Above 6,500 feet in the alpine meadows, concealment features are lacking.

Severe winters are the greatest natural hazard to survival at higher elevations. Deep snowdrifts, low temperatures, and cold, bitter winds are common. Snow covers the high peaks from winter through early spring. Though climatic conditions are better at lower altitudes, population factors there are unfavorable for cross-country movement. The sparse population of the Western and Central Balkan Mountains is concentrated in small settlements located in small valleys and on slopes below 2,000 feet. A few settlements are located near high mountain passes.

In the eastern section of the Balkan Mountains, terrain hampers foot movement only locally. Deep ravines and plateau escarpments are more common in the western part of this section. In the east, marshy ground in the Kamchiya and Provadiyska Valleys restrict movement. Deciduous forest and scrub cover are excellent for concealment, but in some places, the thick tangle of brush is impenetrable. In the northern part concealment is available only in patches of forest and brush, for extensive areas are under cultivation. Population density in the north reaches 160 persons per square mile, whereas it is 100 persons per square mile in the south. Except for the two main population centers, Shumen and Stalin, the settlement pattern consists mainly of peasants living in small, scattered villages.

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2) The Sredna Gora--The Sredna Gora with summits lower than the Balkan Mountains, is characteristically pastoral, with a scattering of small mountain villages and many open areas of barren land and scrubby meadows. There are also extensive deciduous forests and tall brush where cover and concealment features are excellent. The vegetation on lower slopes is mainly deciduous brush and low scrub oak with some wild fruit trees. Above the brush, oak is the predominant growth in the zone from 1,000 or 1,500 feet to 3,000 feet. Beech trees, increasing in number at higher elevations, become the characteristic forest growth above 3,000 feet. Some tall virgin stands of beech remain, but numerous cut-over areas are covered with grass and a tangled secondary growth of brushwoods.

(c) The Central Plains:

1) The Balkan Basins--Terrain presents no impediment to foot travel throughout the Balkan basins and over the hills separating them. Rivers can be forded except when their levels are heightened by spring thaws. Only a few swamps along streams, particularly in the east, restrict movement locally. Almost no cover is available on the basin floors which are open meadows and cultivated fields. Other than a few small towns, which are the focal points of their basins, the population, with an average density of 180 persons per square mile, is concentrated in scattered settlements of 500 to 1,000 people. Concealment features are best in the groves along streams and at the northern margins of basins. The Stryama and Tundzha Rivers are bordered in places by woods with thick undergrowth. Groves of low spruce and pine mixed with locust grow in the ravines on the slopes of the Balkan Mountains. Between the ravines, slopes are bare.

2) The Central Lowlands--The plains extending across central Bulgaria from the Sofia Basin to the Black Sea are unfavorable for Special Forces operations. As in the Balkan basins, ease of movement is coupled with the disadvantage of limited concealment features and dense settlement. Drainage presents the only significant obstacle to cross-

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country movement. The principal streams are broad and sluggish in their middle and lower courses and can be forded at only a few points during most of the year.

In the Sofia Basin, the highest of the Central Lowland basins, the cold winter of the harsh continental climate is an important factor limiting survival. Other obstacles within the basin are the marshes along the Iskŭr River and its major tributaries, large irrigated areas near Sofia, and the dense settlement pattern. Averaging 200 persons per square mile, the population is settled in small communities which are more numerous along the border of the basin. The best cover may be found in the gullied hills to the east and west of the basin.

In the Maritsa Basin, the principal obstacles are the two largest rivers, the Maritsa and its north-bank tributary, the Tundzha. Discontinuous bands of marshes and rice fields border both rivers. Sizeable areas under irrigation are located near Plovdiv on the north side of the Maritsa River, and in the vicinity of Stara Zagora. There are numerous rural villages in addition to many towns ranging in size from 500 to 5,000 people. Some cover may be found in the scattered groves and small state forests on the plains and in the gullies of the bordering slopes.

The low hills and plains of the Burgas Basin can be easily traversed. Marshes along lower courses of rivers on the coastal plain are serious obstacles only at high water or after heavy rains. The population, distributed in small and widely scattered villages, has a density of less than 100 persons per square mile. There are no large towns except Burgas.

The area has little forest cover. Lower slopes and open valley bottoms are largely cultivated. Hills and steeper slopes are mainly covered with brush or pastures. Small patches of deciduous trees grow chiefly near the margin of the area. Within the basin, the southeastern portion is moderately well wooded. Elsewhere there are only occasional clumps of trees and thickets of brush.

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(d) The Southern Highlands:

Mountains in southern Bulgaria, for the most part, possess favorable characteristics for Special Forces operations. However, their suitability for concealment and trafficability varies not only from range to range, but also locally within each mountain range. Main arteries of communication through the Southern Highlands follow the valleys of the Struma, Mesta, Maritsa, and Tundzha Rivers, and the narrow corridor between Khaskovo and Momchilgrad. Though these natural routes permit easy movement, unfavorable concealment and population factors decrease the value of such areas for cross-country movement.

1) The Yugoslav Border Ranges--The Bulgarian slopes of the border ranges west of the Struma River are steep. Sharp spurs and narrow valleys trend at right angles to the border. North-south movement would be very difficult for foot troops, but several trails lead westward over mountain passes into Yugoslavia. Except in parts of the highest mountains and on some of the steeper slopes, adequate cover and concealment can be found in the extensive brush and deciduous forests. Coniferous forests, growing at higher altitudes, are less extensive. Some of the summits are covered with low shrubs, meadows, and low junipers.

2) The Struma Basin--Though north-south movement throughout the length of the basin is easy, the valley floor is open and supports a fairly evenly distributed population. Gullies and forested slopes in the gentle foothills east of the basin provide local cover between expanses of open areas. Ravines and gullies on the western side also provide cover, but slopes near the Struma River are much steeper.

3) The Central Mountain Ranges--The most extensive forest cover and the most rugged terrain in Bulgaria are encountered in the region between the Struma Valley and the headwaters of the Arda River, in the ranges of the Vitosha, Rila, Pirin, and the Central Rhodopes. Forests, which are mainly coniferous, grow principally on mountain slopes. In some places they blanket the valley walls from the stream beds to the mountain

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summits. Although the density of the forests and their undergrowth varies according to the steepness of slope and the type of trees, the concealment value is generally good.

In the Vitosha Mountains, and in parts of the Rila and Pirin Mountains just east of the Mesta Valley, open alpine meadows cover the summits and slopes above the timber line, which lies at approximately 6,000 feet. Immediately below the timber line, dense pine forests cover the slopes of the Vitosha Mountains; in the Rila and Pirin Mountains, black pine and scrub juniper grow. Forest cover in the Central Mountain Ranges gradually changes with progressively lower elevations from the tall spruce and pine stands to a complex of fir, pine, and beech trees; then a mixture of beech and oak trees; and finally to a zone of oak and aspen trees. Large cut-over tracts, barren or covered with brush, frequently surround inhabited areas, where goats and other animals feed on the undergrowth.

Much of the region is uninhabited. The population density is less than 70 persons per square mile. There are only a few towns of moderate size, such as Nevrokop and Razlog in the Mesta Valley. Most of the people live in small log hut settlements on a few upland meadows, and in intermontane basins and valleys below 2,000 feet.

The best route through the region is provided by the Mesta Valley, which is a steep-walled valley, gorged in sections and bordered by dissected uplands. In rugged parts of the region, off-road movement is often difficult. Broad, gentle uplands and small intermontane basins permit easier movement, but such areas are usually inaccessible and can be reached only by scaling steep, forested slopes or bouldery ravines. In some places, off-road foot travel is impossible. Then cross-country movement is confined to winding mountain roads and trails that follow narrow, curving valleys. Most of these routes are blocked for long periods with winter snow, which falls from October through April. Usually, snow remains on the higher peaks until June or July. The cold mountain climate is a limiting factor on the over-all value of this region for Special Forces operations.

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4) The Eastern Rhodope Mountains--The Eastern Rhodope

Mountains are less favorable in terms of concealment features. Much of the region is open country with numerous small settlements of tobacco farmers and miners. Some concealment can be found in thin deciduous woods; in scrub growth, particularly in the higher mountains to the south; and in the low valleys, in large-walnut groves and occasional fields of corn on river flats.


Foot movement is relatively easy through the region, which is less than 3,000 feet in elevation. The swift-flowing Arda River is the main obstacle; it flows through a narrow, steep-sided valley and is too deep for fording at most points.

5) The Sakar and Strandzha Highlands--Lying along the

Turkish border, the lowest mountains in the Southern Highlands offer virtually no impediment to foot travel. Although the more rugged mountains just north of the border confine tracked and wheeled vehicles to established routes, foot movement is possible everywhere. Numerous trails and cart tracks run through the western half of the region. There are few in the eastern half, but slopes are moderate or slight, and foot troops would be retarded only locally by steep ravines. Most of the streams can be forded easily.

The best area for concealment is in the extensive and heavily wooded zone of large trees in the mountains near the Turkish border east of the headwaters of the Velika River which parallels the border and empties into the Black Sea. Elsewhere, concealment is available in discontinuous stands of deciduous trees and pseudomacchia. More than one-half of the area is in crop land, which is concentrated in the north and in the basins of the Tundzha and Maritsa Rivers. In the north, stands of brush and scrub growth on mountain and valley slopes are interspersed with cultivated fields. Much of the west and north is deforested, though some natural vegetation cover remains in deep ravines and in parts of large valleys. Mountains in the east are thinly covered with forests. The southern and central parts of the region are largely in forests, pastureland, and wasteland.

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f. List of Principal Sources

The evaluation of geographic factors pertinent to Special Forces operations in this report is based mainly on the following sources:

1. NIS 22-23, Rumania and Bulgaria, Ch. II, Sec. 24, "Topography," July 1952 (C).
2. Ibid., Sec. 23, "Weather and Climate," June 1951 (C).
3. CIA/RR-GR-101, Evasion Geography of Bulgaria, August 1956 (C).
4. Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Joint Intelligence Bureau, Bulgaria, Part I, # 3/195, 1956 (S).
5. U. S. Geological Survey, Section of Military Geology, Bulgaria, Terrain Intelligence, Strategic Engineering Study No. 83, Vol. 2, August 1943 (R).
6. Germany, Amt für Landeskunde, Terrain Study of Bulgaria, Campbell Project, July 1949 (U).
7. U. S. Army Map Service, Engineer Strategic Intelligence Division, Barrier Study of Greece and Yugoslavia, June 1956 (C).
8. JANIS No. 38, Military Geography of Bulgaria, October 1943 (R).
9. Ibid., Meteorology and Climatology of Bulgaria, October 1943 (R).

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2. Population Factors (Map N)

a. Ethnic Composition

The population of Bulgaria is estimated to total in round figures about 7,200,000 persons. In terms of ethnic composition, this estimate may be broken down as follows:

TABLE I

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE BULGARIAN POPULATION

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Total Number</u>	<u>% of Total Population</u>
Bulgarians	6,208,000	86.2
Turks	560,000	7.8
Gypsies	182,000	2.5
Pomaks	130,000	1.8
Rumanians	70,000	1.0
Others	50,000	0.7
Total	7,200,000	100.0

SOURCE: NIS 23, Sect. 42, p.2 (June 1955) (C)

b. Ethnic Distribution

The regional distribution of major ethnic groups within Bulgaria is indicated on Map N, attached to this section. It will be noted that there is no distinctive map symbol for the dominant ethnic Bulgarian population inasmuch as this element is spread in strength throughout the entire country, even in regions of heaviest minority concentration. With regard to non-Bulgarian ethnic groups, Map N indicates only the approximate areas in which minority settlements may be found interspersed with ethnic Bulgarian habitations. More precise information on minority locations at present existing in Bulgaria is largely unavailable.*

* For want of better intelligence, detailed ethnic maps of Bulgaria now in use are based almost entirely upon data collected in the 1926 census of the country. (See NIS 23, Sect. 42, Fig-42-4 (C).) Subsequent developments--i.e. population transfers, increased urbanization, full-scale collectivization, etc.--have made this data in large measure obsolete.

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Of the principal minority groups in Bulgaria, Turks are concentrated chiefly in the former Deli Orman district bounded by the old fortress towns of Ruse, Silistra, Varna (now Stalin), and Shumen (now Kolarovgrad); in the tobacco country southwest of Khaskovo; and in the eastern Strandzha Mountain regions south and southwest of Burgas. Pomaks inhabit the Rhodope Mountains of southwest Bulgaria. Rumanians are restricted to lowland areas along the Danube River and, in the extreme northeast, to the Dobruja region bordering on the Black Sea. Not shown on Map O or classified as a separate group apart from the ethnic Bulgarians are the Bulgarian Macedonians who inhabit the area south of Blagoevgrad and west of Nevrokop (now Gotse Delchev). Likewise excluded from cartographical presentation are the Gypsies who are too widely and thinly dispersed to occupy any definable area.

In some important respects the traditional pattern of ethnic distribution within Bulgaria has been modified in recent years by forced population transfers inside and out of the country. In August 1950 the Bulgarian government, acting under the provisions of a 1925 convention providing for the mutual exchange of Bulgarian and Turkish nationals, announced that it intended to deport 250,000 ethnic Turks from Bulgaria within 90 days. No reason was given for the move, but it was evident that the regime wished to use this means of clearing a settled population from fertile agricultural lands into which ethnic Bulgarian colonists and the new collectivization program could be introduced. The Turkish authorities agreed to accept the deportees, although at a much lower rate than originally demanded by the Bulgarians. As of the summer of 1951, when the deportations were halted, some 158,000 ethnic Turks had crossed the frontier into Turkey.¹ The Turkish communities of northeast Bulgaria were apparently the most heavily involved in this transfer, but there are numerous reports of smaller-scale evacuations from the Turkish territories along the south Bulgarian frontier.²

Concurrent with the deportation of Turks went a series of forced population moves within Bulgaria. During 1950 and early 1951 the Communist regime instituted a wholesale clearing of unreliable elements from the

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frontier zone along the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish borders. This operation was conducted without regard to ethnic lines and involved ethnic Bulgarians, Turks, and Pomaks alike. The great majority of the evacuees were resettled on state farms in the vacated Turkish territories of northeast Bulgaria or in under-developed districts of the Dobruja.³ They were forced to remain on these new homesteads until early 1954 when the regime reversed its earlier policy and granted permission for the evacuees to return to the frontier zone if they so desired. An indeterminate number took advantage of this permission and, on arrival home, received partial compensation for the earlier loss of their possessions and property.⁴ Another major population move within Bulgaria during 1950-1951, of which only the barest outline is known, reportedly involved the shift of thousands of Turks from the Dobruja to the Strandzha Mountain area south and southwest of Burgas.*

c. Ethnic, Social, and Political Characteristics

(1) Bulgarians:**

The 6,200,000 ethnic Bulgarians who comprise more than 85 per cent of their country's total population are of basically Slavic race although descended in name from the small tribe of Turco-Tatar Bulgars which first appeared in Eastern Europe during the seventh century. The modern Bulgarians are in the main a simple, vigorous, and rugged people, of medium stature, and with the rough-hewn features of a predominantly peasant folk.

The Bulgarian language belongs to the Slavonic branch of the Indo-European language family. Like Russian, it is written in the Cyrillic alphabet, and many of its words are markedly similar to their Russian

* CIA/RR-GR-101, August 1956, Evasion Geography of Bulgaria, p. 36 (C) reporting this transfer, estimates that some 200,000 Turks were involved--a figure which seems excessive.

** The present description of ethnic Bulgarian characteristics is based largely upon the more extended discussion in NIS 23, Sec. 42, pp. 1-15 (June 1955) (C). Detailed information on the physical appearance, dress, customs, living habits, etc., of the ethnic Bulgarians and other population groups in Bulgaria may be found in CIA/RR-GR-101, Evasion Geography of Bulgaria, August 1956 (C).

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counterparts. Bulgarian has three regional dialects--northeast, southeast, and western--but these present no problems of mutual intelligibility.

Thanks in part to strenuous encouragement by the regime, Russian is the most widely known foreign language in Bulgaria. English, French, and German are taught as elective subjects in the secondary schools.

Most ethnic Bulgarians belong to the Orthodox Church; there are also about 40,000 Roman Catholics and 15,000 Protestants.⁵ Until recently the Bulgarian Church was subordinate to the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul, but in 1953 it broke away and established an independent patriarchate in Sofia. The Bulgarians are usually described as a deeply religious people but are not particularly rigid in doctrine or practice.

Of fundamental importance to an understanding of Bulgarian social structures and political attitudes is the generations-old cleavage between the Bulgarian countryside and the few urban centers. Prior to World War II Bulgaria was primarily a land of small peasant proprietors who constituted almost 80 per cent of the total population and lived in tightly-knit and intensely conservative rural villages. The cities and towns, on the other hand, were in considerable part dominated by a middle-class and professional elite which became increasingly Westernized and alien in spirit to the peasant majority. Gradually there developed in pre-war Bulgaria a rooted antagonism between countryside and city which overflowed into every aspect of public life. The peasantry and their spokesmen were the great traditional force within the country, suspicious of change and government control. The urban elite, particularly in Sofia and a few other major towns, became the fulcrum of political agitation and schemes for national self-improvement.

The Communist transformation of Bulgaria since 1944 has altered only partially this traditional configuration of Bulgarian society. At the present time the peasantry still constitute approximately 75 per cent of the total population and, despite widespread collectivization, represent the most deeply entrenched and stubborn basis of conservative opposition to the

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regime. The authority of the peasant family remains strong and has withstood in large measure the persistent efforts of the state to substitute Communist for familial loyalties. Within a typical Bulgarian village of the present day, the elders continue to retain a decisive role. The young people either obey their parents' wishes with regard to marriage and a career or, if they choose to rebel, generally leave their native villages and begin a new life elsewhere.

Between the rural communities and the urban centers of Bulgaria the old antagonism survives. An American sociologist who carried out detailed studies in a small village near Sofia has testified that one of the major reasons why the peasants opposed the Communist system was their suspicion of it as an "urban movement." According to the same source, collectivization was particularly opposed by the villagers because they felt that the entire scheme rested on "anti-Agrarian and anti-peasant" principles.⁶ More recently an authoritative U.S. intelligence summary, discussing rural-urban tension in Bulgaria, has described it as follows: "There is a fundamental cleavage between the rural Bulgarians and the townspeople, who include the intelligentsia or educated group. An educated person or a townsman who returns to his village is viewed with mingled mistrust and aloofness. Officials, farm specialists, teachers, and other professional people who live in the villages are consequently never completely accepted by the community. They, in turn, maintain an aloofness based on education and urban prestige."⁷ This mutual aloofness, it may be noted, has a particular relevance for Special Warfare since it indicates how a possible basis for anti-regime activity can survive within the villages of Bulgaria quite apart from the local Communist and bureaucratic hierarchies.

Rural traditions of hostility to the Communist regime are not confined entirely to the countryside. Many of the industrial workers recruited by Bulgaria's new economic enterprises are former peasants removed by only a few years from their native villages. These persons undoubtedly retain much of their inbred conservatism and suspicion of urban ways. The

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difficulties which have attended their transformation into an efficient industrial force are evidenced by repeated Communist denunciations of failures to achieve production norms or maintain proper "labor discipline" and by a striking growth in urban resistance activity during recent years.*

Over and above the peasantry and the industrial labor force is the new Communist elite, composed principally of Party leaders, administrators, technicians, military and police chiefs, and intellectuals. These persons form the only strata of the Bulgarian population which can truly be said to profit from the Communist society. Yet the Bulgarian Communist elite, in common with similar elites elsewhere in Eastern Europe, can no longer be considered as a solid bulwark of support for the regime. The events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary have had at least minimal effect in Bulgaria. Particularly worrisome to the regime have been the recent manifestations of unrest and "anti-proletarian attitudes" among the Bulgarian students upon whom the Communist hopes for the future so largely depend.**

Ethnic Bulgarian nationalism, according to an authoritative intelligence summary, expresses itself chiefly in the desire of the overwhelming majority of the Bulgarians for liberation from Communist oppression.⁸ Numerous defector and foreign observer reports declare that while the Bulgarians despair of achieving their liberation unaided--a sentiment reinforced by the example of the November 1956 uprising in Hungary--they look forward to the day when a general war between East and West may spell the end of Communist power. On the other hand, all available evidence indicates that the traditional Bulgarian admiration of Russia and reliance on Russian support has by no means been completely destroyed by the experience of Soviet domination since World War II. Many Bulgarians appear to adopt the view that they and the Russian people are equally prisoners of Communism and that therefore the Russian people cannot be held responsible for the sufferings of Bulgaria.⁹ The prevalence of this sentiment is indicated by the report

* See above, pp. 27-31.

** See above, pp. 32-33.

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of a Greek journalist who visited Bulgaria in April 1957 and apparently was allowed to travel extensively through the country. According to this source, many Bulgarians complained privately to him about their government but very few said anything against the Soviet Union. He concluded from this that Bulgarians as a whole wished to maintain their present close relations with the USSR.¹⁰

(2) Minorities:

In contrast to most states of Eastern Europe, Bulgaria has no pressing minority problems. The Turks, Gypsies, Pomaks, Rumanians, and other minority groups together make up less than 15 per cent of the total population of the country. The potential relevance of these groups to Special Warfare operations is correspondingly limited and is briefly summarized here.

(a) Turks:

The 560,000 Turks of present-day Bulgaria are descended from colonists imported into the country during the centuries of Ottoman Turkish rule. Most of them settled in the more fertile agricultural regions, along main communication routes, or in garrison towns such as Vidin, Pleven, Ruse, Shumen (now Kolarovgrad), and Varna (now Stalin). The religious and cultural center of the Bulgarian Turks, today as in times past, is the ancient city of Shumen (Kolarovgrad).

By far the greatest number of the Bulgarian Turks (approximately 85 per cent) are farmers, although many of the larger towns and cities in Bulgaria have their distinctive Turkish quarters. The Turks speak the Ottoman dialect of Turkish, have their own separate schools and Turkish-language publications. Most adhere to the Sunni sect of Islam. So far as is known, the Bulgarian authorities have not embarked upon a serious persecution of the Moslem clergy beyond deportation of the more troublesome elements to Turkey and confiscation of religious properties.

As regards the social structure and political habits of the Bulgarian Turks, a recent Communist publication has characterized them as follows:

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"Their ancient customs have largely persisted, their cultural level is still low, and they are in poor circumstances economically. The Moslem religion has preserved a certain amount of chauvinism."¹¹ These statements are borne out by other sources which describe the Turks as politically inert and, in proportion to their numbers, remarkably unobtrusive in Bulgarian public life.¹² Further indication of the low esteem in which the Turks are held within Bulgaria is provided by the fact that they are not accepted into the regular armed forces but must serve out their conscript duty in the labor troops.

As noted earlier in this section, the Communist regime's decision in 1950-1951 to deport some 158,000 of its Turkish citizens to Turkey was apparently motivated more by the desire to clear areas for collectivization than by any direct concern with the Turks as a minority problem. After the deportations were halted in the summer of 1951, the Turks were apparently allowed to remain virtually unmolested while the Communist program of collectivization and rapid industrialization was pushed ahead in other areas of the country. As of 1 January 1955 only 957 Turkish families had been enrolled in the collectives. Since that time, however, the regime has made a definite effort to bring the Turks more fully into the mainstream of Communist life. Educational facilities have been improved, the armed forces have been opened to Turkish recruits, and agricultural consolidation has been advanced to the point where in 1956 alone some 13,463 Turkish families joined the collectives.¹³

The present attitude of the Bulgarian Turks towards the Communist regime is difficult to evaluate. Most of them undoubtedly still resent the action of the Bulgarian authorities in instigating the deportations of 1950-1951. At the same time, it is doubtful that the Turks have given much vent to their resentment in the form of overt anti-regime activity. It appears instead that the Turks have remained fairly docile under Communist rule, offering passive resistance to the new order where possible but prepared on the whole to make the best of their predicament. An important factor

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restraining the Turks from greater activity against the regime has undoubtedly been the consciousness of their exposed position as a small Moslem minority in a predominantly Christian country.

(b) Gypsies:

The estimated 182,000 Gypsies of Bulgaria occupy an unusual status in a Communist society. They either live for the most part on the outskirts of towns and villages, where they may eke out an irregular living by handicrafts and odd employments, or follow a wandering nomadic course through various parts of the country. The regime apparently has taken no decisive steps to deal with the Gypsies, and they remain a cultural and economic anomaly within an otherwise highly organized state.

Among themselves the Gypsies speak a Romany dialect of the Indo-European language family, but all are probably equally fluent in Bulgarian. About two-thirds are nominal Moslems of the Sunni sect. The prevailing attitude of the Gypsies towards any Bulgarian government, whether Communist or not, is one of suspicion and evasion of control.

(c) Pomaks:

"Pomak" is the title given to approximately 130,000 ethnic Bulgarians of the Moslem faith whose ancestors were forcibly converted to the Sunni sect of Islam during the 17th century. They are an isolated and culturally retarded element which clings tenaciously to its highland villages in the Rhodope Mountain country and resists all attempts at assimilation. Some portion of the Pomak population, however, has been evacuated in recent years from the Rhodopes and sent to northeast Bulgaria for reasons of frontier security and in order to make room for new mineral and hydroelectric developments in south and southwest Bulgaria.

Nothing reliable is known concerning Pomak attitudes towards the Communist regime, except that in considerable extent they have probably avoided membership in the collectives. In general, the Pomaks can probably be described as clannish and conservative, suspicious of outsiders, and anxious to avoid any kind of regime control.

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(d) Rumanians:

The estimated 70,000 Rumanians of Bulgaria are mostly descended from immigrants who entered the country from the north during the 19th century. In 1940, when Bulgaria annexed the southern Dobruja, some 110,000 additional Rumanians passed briefly under Bulgarian control but were later exchanged for 62,000 ethnic Bulgarians from Rumania.¹⁴ The Bulgarian Rumanians are nearly all members of the Orthodox Church; they probably speak Rumanian and Bulgarian with equal ease. Nothing is recorded of their attitude towards the regime except that Vidin province and the Dobruja, both areas of heaviest Rumanian settlement, were focal points of recent popular resistance in Bulgaria.*

(e) Others:

Smaller minority groups in Bulgaria include Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Tatars, and Gagauzi. The Armenians in 1946 reportedly totaled about 28,000 persons, mostly refugees from Turkish Armenia. According to available intelligence a substantial number have since been resettled in Soviet Armenia.¹⁵ The Greek minority in Bulgaria may reach as high as 20,000 persons, of whom about half are long-term residents and the other half are left-wing sympathizers and Communist guerillas who fled from Greece immediately after World War II. The older Greek element is concentrated in a few towns along the Black Sea coast and in the city of Plovdiv; the newer arrivals are scattered in small numbers through various parts of the country.¹⁶ Bulgaria's Jews who, prior to World War II, exceeded 50,000 persons, have been reduced to a tiny minority of less than 7,000 as the result of heavy migration to Israel.¹⁷ A few thousand Tatars, descendants of tribesmen who fled from the Crimea in 1861, are found in the southern Dobruja. In the same area live the Gagauzi, a vanishing group of less than 5,000 persons who are descended from Turkish stock and speak the Turkish language but are members of the Orthodox Church.¹⁸

* See above, pp. 22-24.

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d. Probable Attitudes towards Special Forces

(1) Bulgarians:

Although the great majority of ethnic Bulgarians are unhappy under their present Communist regime and would welcome its downfall, this state of affairs does not necessarily imply that widespread assistance to a Special Forces type operation would be automatically forthcoming. Prolonged acquaintance with police state rule in both Communist and pre-Communist times has taught Bulgarians the value of caution in their patriotic undertakings. Most of them would probably shrink from active participation in Special Forces operations unless the prospects of success appeared unusually good. On the other hand, judging from the research materials collected in Part I and Appendix I of this report, certain districts within Bulgaria can be positively identified as areas in which resistance activity of significant proportions has occurred during recent years. Such elements of this resistance as still remain, whether in active or quiescent status, can be expected to give active support to Special Forces ventures.

With these limitations in mind, Special Forces would probably derive its greatest initial support from the ethnic Bulgarian peasantry. This is the class with the greatest inbred hostility to Communist rule and the greatest practical grievance--i.e., collectivization--against the regime. Important reservoirs of anti-regime sentiment also exist among workers in the industrial and urban centers of Bulgaria, most of whom labor for inadequate pay under draconian "labor discipline" laws and many of whom are still closely linked to the villages which they have left to become laborers. The ethnic Bulgarian youth represents another important source of potential aid to Special Forces if only because it, in common with youth in other Communist countries of Eastern Europe, has shown in recent years an increasing tendency towards insubordination and rebellion against regime control.

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A great advantage could accrue to unconventional warfare operations in Bulgaria through skillful propaganda utilization of the fact that Special Forces are part of the regular U.S. Army. Most Bulgarians of every class appear to have a profound respect for America and to look upon it as a nation unsullied by European power politics and intrigues. The relatively few Americans who have visited Bulgaria--educators, students, diplomats, missionaries, technicians, etc.--have created a favorable impression which Communist vilification has been unable to efface.¹⁹ Effective use of manpower resources within the existing Bulgarian emigration would be another important step towards proper planning of a Special Forces mission inside Bulgaria and may do much towards ensuring a friendly reception within individual emigre's home locales.*

Probably the single most important factor which would determine the success of a Special Forces operation in Bulgaria will be the international situation prevailing at the time the operation is begun. If at any time the military capacities of the West are engaged in an all-out struggle against the USSR, and there is no danger that resistance activities within Bulgaria will collapse unaided after the manner of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, there seems a good prospect for the success of partisan and/or Special Warfare operations in Bulgaria. Conversely, Special Forces intervention in Bulgaria at a time when the Communist power is fairly secure and the chances of liberation remote may well founder on the characteristic reluctance of the ethnic Bulgarians to risk overt action against an apparently well-entrenched regime.

(2) Minorities:

Special Forces can probably expect little in the way of overt assistance from Bulgaria's minorities even in the event of a general war between the West and the USSR. The Turks and Pomaks appear to rely upon docility and obscurity as their best methods of survival under changing

* The military potential of the Bulgarian emigration is discussed in a forthcoming Georgetown University Research Project study.

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Bulgarian regimes; the Gypsies, Rumanians, and other minorities are too widely dispersed or too few in number to be of much potential military value to an invader. At the same time it can safely be presumed that virtually all the minorities in Bulgaria, with the possible exception of the Greeks, are unhappy with their lot under a Communist regime. Under proper circumstances the Turks, Gypsies, and several other minority elements may be willing to vent their anti-regime sentiments by providing refuge, supplies, and local guidance to Special Forces.

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PART III

FORCED LABOR AND SECURITY FACTORS AFFECTING SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS

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1. Forced Labor

The importance of forced labor as a factor affecting Special Forces operations in Bulgaria has greatly diminished in recent years. Whereas in early 1953 anywhere between 60 and 100 Bulgarian labor camps and prisons were reported in existence, at the present time (March 1957) there are only ten prisons and possibly no more than five or six forced labor camps in the entire country. This reduction has been effected in part through an amnesty decreed in 1953, in part through relocation of the existing prisoner force into fewer and larger places of detention, and in part through increased reliance by the regime on labor troops (trudovaki) in economic enterprises which formerly employed large numbers of forced laborers.

The amnesty of 1953, according to an apparently credible source, was intended mainly to clear the prisons and labor camps of persons who had been imprisoned after World War II as war criminals or "reactionaries" but had never been brought to trial for any specific offense. Included in this category were former political leaders, industrialists, large landowners, intellectuals, and businessmen.¹ Also released under the terms of the amnesty were regularly convicted political and criminal prisoners who had nearly completed their sentences.² All political prisoners freed by the amnesty were required to sign a declaration promising support of the Communist system; those who refused were kept in prison.³ The amnesty of 1953 reportedly did not affect long-term prisoners and forced laborers.

As implementation of the amnesty proceeded, the Bulgarian government announced a reduction in the number of major prisons and labor camps within the country. Prisons are now reported in existence at Burgas, Kynstendil, Pazardzhik, Pleven, Plovdiv, Sliven, Sofia, Stalin, and

Vratsa.* At Belene (4339N-2507E) the largest concentration of forced laborers. * The prison at Kynstendil is reportedly a hospital for prisoners suffering from tuberculosis. One report claims that the Pazardzhik prison has been closed down. Political and criminal prisoners are usually kept segregated within individual prisons.

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laborers in Bulgaria is located on islands in the Danube immediately opposite the town of Belene. It is estimated that between 8,000 and 12,000 inmates are held in the area, representing in large part an accumulation of persons formerly detained in other labor camps which have now been closed.⁴ Outside Belene the only other important forced labor camps known to exist in Bulgaria are found at Dimitrovgrad, where 900 inmates are reported working in the coal mines, and at Sofia, where there are three or more camps whose inmates work in factories and on construction projects.⁵ A few small camps of undeterminate size and importance may still exist at Tolbukhin and other points in the Dobruja.⁶ The total number of forced laborers in Bulgaria is now probably less than 15,000 persons, as opposed to an estimated post-World War II high of 100,000-125,000.

A major factor in influencing the regime's decision to reduce the size of the forced labor population is the existence of a conscript labor service known as the Trudovaks. The Trudovaks are not a Communist invention but were first established after World War I as a partial substitute for compulsory military service and as a means of furthering public works and defense construction. At present there are probably about 10,000 Trudovaks on active duty. Most of them are young men who have been rejected for regular military service on various counts but are obliged to serve out the normal conscript period of two years on labor duty. They remain under Army control and are organized along military lines. Trudovaks are currently employed in civil and defense construction all over Bulgaria; they are also used as a semi-permanent labor force in the uranium mines at Bukhovo (4246N-2334E), the coal mines at Dimitrovo (4236N-2302E), and the lead, zinc, iron, and pyrites mines around Madan (4130N-2457E).⁷

2. Security (Map 0)

Like every satellite nation in the Soviet orbit, Communist Bulgaria leans heavily upon an elaborate security apparatus in order to preserve its power and guard against subversive activity. The agencies of security

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enforcement in Bulgaria are of three kinds: (1) security forces under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior; (2) armed forces under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense; and (3) various auxiliary organizations under the jurisdiction of the government and the Communist Party. Map O, attached to this section, indicates the location of the more important security enforcement agencies in Bulgaria and also delimits the special security zones established along the Bulgarian frontier and in certain key industrial and military areas.

a. Security Forces

According to current Bulgarian governmental theory and practice, the Ministry of Interior has among its tasks the protection of the national security of the country from internal economic and political dangers and from external political threats. Specifically, the Ministry is required to guard against "enemy activity" in the form of espionage, sabotage (technical and administrative), banditry, terrorism, political diversion, and conspiracy.⁸ Subordinate to the Ministry are four agencies directly charged with the implementation of security.

(1) People's Militia:

The People's Militia (Narodnata Militsia) fulfills the function of civil police in the Bulgarian security system. It has an estimated strength of 50,000-70,000 men who are apportioned into town, rural, railway, economic, financial, criminal, motorized, mounted, and pursuit sections. The central militia directorate is at Sofia. Each of Bulgaria's twelve provinces has a provincial militia headquarters which, in turn, controls a varying number of militia districts.⁹ Inasmuch as Special Forces can expect to encounter elements of the People's Militia in appropriate strengths at every population center in Bulgaria, from major city to the smallest village, militia locations have not been plotted on Map O.

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(2) State Security:

State Security (Dzhurnava Sigurnost) is the name adopted by the Bulgarian secret police. Originally part of the People's Militia, it is now directly responsible to the Ministry of Interior. The personnel strength of the secret police is unknown but is thought by at least one authoritative source to number in the tens of thousands.¹⁰ State Security is divided into several branches of which the most relevant to Special Warfare are the intelligence section, which guards against infiltration by foreign elements, and the internal control section, which coordinates the work of agents assigned to uncover and watch opposition to the regime, keep surveillance on labor discipline in factories and agriculture, control movement in security zones, and maintain liaison with the counter espionage section of the Ministry of National Defense.¹¹ The regional organization of State Security within Bulgaria is not known with any certainty and for this reason no State Security unit locations appear on Map O.

(3) Frontier Troops:

The Frontier Troops (Granichna Voyska) are a militarized security force with the primary functions of defending the frontiers of Bulgaria against illegal entry or egress and of cooperating with other security organizations in the maintenance of internal security within the frontier zone. The Frontier Troops number about 15,000 personnel, organized along infantry lines in order to facilitate incorporation into the regular Army structure in the event of war. They have their headquarters in Sofia. Their basic tactical unit is the otryad, or understrength regiment, which is responsible for guarding a designated sector of the frontier line and adjoining areas. At present (March 1957), and as shown on Map O, there are some 16 or 17 otryadi in existence, each with a strength of approximately 70-80 officers and 1,000-1,200 men. The concentration of otryadi is greatest along the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish borders, least along the Rumanian border and Black Sea coast.

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Within its tactical area each otryad is broken down into three or more subordinate units of approximately company strength called kommandaturi. Each kommandatura is further organized into four or more zastavi of approximately platoon strength which carry out the actual patrolling of the frontier. The general tactics and border patrolling techniques of the Frontier Troops are based upon a Bulgarian translation of the standard Soviet manual, Instructions for the Guarding of the Frontier.¹² Detailed information on kommandatura and zastava locations may be obtained from the latest OB holdings in ACST.

(4) Interior Troops:

The Interior Troops (Vutreshni Voyski) were formed sometime during the period 1949-1951 and took over internal security functions formerly entrusted to the People's Militia. The main duties of the Interior Troops are to control resistance elements within Bulgaria and to guard important factories, public buildings, and other installations. The Interior Troops have an estimated total strength of 15,000 personnel. Their headquarters are in Sofia, and they are broken down into 14 regular and two training battalions located in the provincial capitals of Bulgaria as shown on Map O. Each Interior Troop battalion is composed of at least five companies which are usually established at various centers of population and industry within the province.¹³

b. Armed Forces

Although not directly charged with the maintenance of internal security, the armed forces of Bulgaria represent a military force capable of effective utilization against would-be resistance elements. This is particularly true of the Bulgarian Army which is by far the largest of the three services and is organized on a district command basis.

(1) Army:

The Bulgarian Army is currently estimated (March 1957) to number 100,000 men. The country is divided into three army areas, with

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headquarters at Sofia, Plovdiv, and Sliven. The disposition of the major units as of March 1957 is indicated on Map O; more detailed information may be secured from OB holdings in ACSI.

A regular training and duty cycle is carried out by the Bulgarian Army each year. During the winter the various units remain on garrison duty in permanent barracks erected near the larger towns. In May there is a general move to field training areas, usually located within a few kilometers of the permanent barracks. Throughout the summer training progresses from smaller to larger unit level until in late August or early September the peak of tactical efficiency is reached and there are full-scale field maneuvers. The units return to their permanent quarters in October; conscripts who have completed their term of service are released; the new class¹⁴ of conscripts is inducted; and the training cycle begins anew.

(2) Navy:

As of March 1957 the Bulgarian Navy had an estimated strength of 6,200 officers and men. Its operating equipment consists chiefly of patrol craft, torpedo boats, submarine chasers, and minesweepers. Naval commands at Burgas and Stalin are believed to retain operational control over the Frontier Troop detachments stationed in those cities.¹⁵ These detachments, according to best report, are known as the Border Sea Guard (Granichna Mornka Okhrana) and are equipped with naval uniforms and small patrol boats.¹⁶

(3) Air Force:

The Bulgarian Air Force in March 1957 had an estimated strength of 16,000 officers and men, of whom the great majority were organized into antiaircraft battalions. In view of the necessity to maintain constant vigilance against air attack, the Air Force has probably no personnel to spare for purposes of internal security except in cases of great emergency.

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c. Auxiliaries

In addition to its regularly established security forces and armed services, the Communist government of Bulgaria commands the support of several auxiliary organizations capable of rendering valuable assistance towards the preservation of public tranquillity.

(1) DSNM:

Dimitrov's Union of People's Youth (DSNM) is the official youth organization of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Membership, which in March 1951 included 437,000 youths, is open to boys and girls between the ages of 14 and 26. There is also a Pioneers organization within the DSNM framework for children of ages 7 to 14. One of the most important tasks of DSNM is assistance to the regime against "enemy activity" of all kinds.¹⁷ In its simplest form this assistance may involve no more than informing the militia of actual or suspected anti-regime activity. Older age-groups in DSNM, according to a recent report, are organized into regular vigilance groups known as Detachments for the Assistance of the People's Militia.¹⁸

(2) DOSO:

The Voluntary Organization for Defense Training (DOSO) was established in 1951 for the dual purpose of imparting rudimentary military and civil defense training to broad sections of the Bulgarian people and of creating an auxiliary force for the armed forces, militia, and frontier troops. Membership in DOSO is entirely voluntary and is believed to total some 900,000 persons. The importance placed upon DOSO by the Communist regime is indicated by the fact that it is controlled by the Ministry of National Defense and receives substantial financial and material aid from the Army.

DOSO is organized on a regional and cell basis. It offers its members courses in marksmanship, civil defense, communications, flying, parachuting, truck and tractor driving, sailing, skiing, marine engineering,

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and sanitation. DOSO members are also given preferential treatment in Bulgarian schools and professions.¹⁹ In return for the benefits conferred upon it, DOSO is expected by the regime to take the forefront against possible anti-regime activity. Its members are enrolled in detachments for the assistance of the People's Militia, in "fighting groups" established in support of the Frontier Troops, and reputedly in special anti-partisan brigades used to fight resistance elements in the field.²⁰

(3) "Fighting Groups":

About the year 1951 so-called "fighting groups" (boyni grupi) were established in Bulgarian villages near the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish borders as an aid to Frontier Troops operations in those areas. Each group numbers between eight and fifteen men, nearly all of whom are reliable members of DSNM, DOSO, or the Communist Party. Fighting groups are issued weapons at the discretion of local Frontier Troop commanders and are liable for duty whenever suspicious activity is reported in the vicinity of the frontier. They represent a particular hazard to Special Forces in the frontier zone because their members belong to a wide variety of age groups and wear no distinctive uniforms.²¹

(4) Others:

Two other civilian organizations in Bulgaria, the Hunters Association and the Old Comrades of the Partisan Movement, provide a security reserve to the regime. Both groups are predominantly composed of older men who are skilled in the use of arms.²²

d. Security Zones

Two types of security zones, in which free movement of persons is prohibited or closely scrutinized, exist in Bulgaria and are delimited on Map P. A frontier zone of irregular depth is established along all of Bulgaria's borders except the central Rumanian frontier. Restricted areas are established around a few vital centers of industry and defense. Elsewhere in Bulgaria movement of population is relatively uncurtailed except

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for the provision that all persons over 16 years of age must carry passports. Changing of work or permanent residence without permission from the authorities is also prohibited.

(1) Frontier Zone:

The frontier zone at present (March 1957) existing in Bulgaria was established by governmental regulation on 30 June 1956.^{*23} Previous to that time the zone had been much more extensive, occupying virtually half of the entire country. The frontier zone is now rarely more than 40 km. deep along the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish borders, while along the Black Sea coast and the northeastern Rumanian frontier it is generally less than 10 km. deep. The frontier zone once established along the central Rumanian frontier has been abolished, and Frontier Troop activity in this sector is largely occupied with the prevention of smuggling and with routine passport control.²⁴

Within the frontier zone proper, three sub-zones are established. The first sub-zone is along the border line itself, where there is a forbidden area between 100 and 500 meters in depth which only Frontier Troops and authorized persons may enter. Signs with the inscription "Death Zone" are posted, and trespassers may be fired on without warning.²⁵ A great variety of detection devices--barbed wire, plowed strips, trip wires, man traps, etc.--are found in some heavily travelled and strategic sectors of the first sub-zone. In other sectors, however, the rugged terrain defeats the best efforts of the Frontier Troops to maintain close control over the first sub-zone, and Bulgarian defectors have been able to cross the border with relative ease.**

* Information on the new demarcation of the frontier zone is contained in a circular of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcing a reduction in size of the "forbidden zone" along the frontier which foreign diplomats may not enter. Since the same circular also dispensed the diplomats from giving prior notice of their travels elsewhere in the country, it seems logical to assume that the "forbidden zone" actually coincides with the frontier zone which Bulgarian citizens may not enter without special authorization.

** According to an official Greek source, 309 Bulgarians managed to escape into Greece during 1951 alone.

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The second frontier sub-zone extends two kms. into Bulgaria from the inside boundary of the first sub-zone. Persons living in this second sub-zone have a special stamp affixed to their passports which gives them the right to move freely into the interior of the country and back again. They may not move laterally within the two-km. strip beyond the district (okoliya) in which they reside without special permission from the authorities. Persons not resident in the second sub-zone may enter it only if they have received written authorization. A partial exception is made for a few cities and vacation resorts along the Black Sea coast to which access without special permission is allowed along designated roads and rail lines.²⁶

The third frontier sub-zone extends from the inner edge of the second sub-zone to a varying distance inland, as indicated on Map P. This sub-zone is most constricted along the Rumanian frontier and the Black Sea coast; it expands considerably along the Turkish, Greek, and Yugoslav borders. Persons living in the third sub-zone have a stamp indicating such residence affixed to their passports. They may move freely between the sub-zone and the interior of the country but are not allowed to enter the second sub-zone without proper authorization. Lateral movement in the third sub-zone beyond the boundaries of an okoliya also requires a special permit. Persons from the interior of Bulgaria may not enter the third sub-zone unless they have the appropriate documents authorizing such entry.²⁷

Security regulations within the frontier sub-zone, as well as between the frontier zone and the remainder of the country, are maintained by a system of check points and roving patrols.²⁸ Procedures in individual localities are apt to be informal and cursory, but only because the Frontier Troops and civilians are known to each other by sight.²⁹ While the experience of several thousand Bulgarian escapees into Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey indicates that undetected passage by unauthorized persons through the frontier zone is relatively facile, the elaborate security precautions taken by the regime make it inadvisable for Special Warfare to consider the frontier zone

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as a proper arena for extended operations or refuge.

(2) Restricted Areas:


Certain districts and localities within Bulgaria are classified by the regime as restricted areas because of the presence of a "state object" (durzhaven objekt)--i.e., mines, oilfields, heavy industry, dams, and military installations. Movement in or out of these areas is carefully controlled by the militia, and travel without special permission is generally not allowed.³⁰ Populations resident within restricted areas have been closely screened in order to eliminate disaffected elements, with the result that Special Forces could probably not expect to receive indigenous assistance within close proximity to major industrial targets. On the other hand it will be recalled that partisan activity has been reported in or near some restricted areas during recent years, thus suggesting the possibility that Special Forces type operations with or without local popular support may be feasible.*

The probable extent of the principal restricted areas in Bulgaria is depicted on Map O. Some areas are primarily industrial, such as the mines around Bldnevo, Dimitrovo, and Rudozem, the oilfields near Balchik, and the factories at Dimitrovo, Kuzlehalli, and Dimitrograd. Other areas have primarily a strategic importance, such as the naval bases at Stalin and Burgas.³¹ Special travel and residence restrictions also exist in Sofia, where the regime has made strenuous efforts to prevent the drain of population from the rest of the country into the capital. At present persons from other parts of Bulgaria may not remain in Sofia for more than ten days without special permission.³² Persons in the city with no regular employment are liable to expulsion and resettlement in other sections of the country.

* See above, pp. 24-26 and 29-30

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PART IV

VULNERABILITY FACTORS

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1. Introduction

Part IV of this report, which deals with those economic vulnerabilities susceptible to exploitation by Special Forces, does not present information which is readily obtainable from standard intelligence reference sources. The purpose of this part of the report is rather to supplement (by presenting more recent information than is available in some of the older reference sources) and adapt existing intelligence to the peculiar requirements of Special Forces operations planning. Wherever it is considered that basic intelligence reference materials are adequate for the purposes for which this report has been prepared, the reader will be referred to the relevant source(s). In those instances, however, where existing intelligence reference material does not meet the requirements of Special Forces or where reference sources have as yet not been prepared, a more detailed topical treatment is presented in this report.

A phenomenon of Bulgaria under its Communist regime is the frequent changing of place names. For example, the Struma Valley town known as Dupnitsa on maps and in literature circa 1951, had been changed to Marek by 1954 and is currently known as Stenke Dimitrov. Available reference materials, and in particular maps less than ten years old, can be expected to refer to any one place by a variety of names. Within this report the reader will notice considerable variation in place names between the general maps and the Special Forces Area maps in Part V, although in each instance the bases employed in preparing both the general maps and the larger-scale Special Forces Area maps are the latest available. In order to avoid as much confusion as possible, places identified under any one topic heading (e.g., railroads) will be identified on the basis of the place name used on the map accompanying that portion of the text. For the sake of convenience and correlation with the larger-scale maps in Part V, alternate names will sometimes be given following the initial reference.

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2. Transportation (Map P)

Transportation in Bulgaria is accomplished primarily by rail with roads acting mainly in a local capacity as feeders to the rail lines. Most routes are dictated by terrain which allows few possibilities for alternate movement except at the expense of heavy engineering and construction projects involving extensive tunneling, bridging, and filling. As a result, the principal road and rail routes circumvent terrain obstacles by following stream courses through valleys and defiles or natural passes and gaps in the mountains. In some instances, however, in order to connect intermontaine basins and to provide direct access to the Danubian lowlands from the sub-Balkan region, transportation routes have been carved through the intervening mountains. The following discussion analyzes the principal transportation routes from the standpoint of their national and international importance to the end that should a Special Forces operation be conducted in Bulgaria the transportation net could be most effectively disrupted.

a. Railroads

(1) General:

The Bulgarian railway net consists basically of three east-west and three north-south trunk lines; all are standard gauge and, except for some short stretches near Sofia, single track. Numerous branches from these trunk lines serve as connecting links and feeders. Some of the branch feeder lines are narrow gauge; all are single track. The network is not dense but is so evenly distributed that few populated places are more than 20 miles from a railroad.¹ Administratively, the railways are divided into three systems with headquarters and repair shops located in Sofia, Plovdiv, and Gorna Oryakhovitsa. By means of this net Sofia and other industrial centers are linked internally with the country's agricultural and mining areas, and all of these are linked with the Black Sea ports of Burgas and Stalin and the Danube River ports of Vidin, Iom, Orekhovo, Nikopol, Svishtov, and Ruse.

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Traffic on the Bulgarian railroads consists principally of agricultural products, uranium ore, and non-ferrous ore concentrates, which are transported from the interior to the ports for further shipment to the USSR and to other satellites. Return traffic consists of pig iron, coke, rubber, machinery, raw and finished textiles, petroleum, and various consumer goods not produced domestically.²

Coal is an important domestic freight item, originating at the mine fields of Dimitrovo, Dimitrovgrad, Bobov Dol, and Burgas. Much of the coal is not hauled for great distances because the largest industrial consumers are located in the heart of or close to the coal basins. Many smaller industrial establishments, important thermal power plants, and private consumers are, however, dependent upon long-hauled coal. In addition, the railroads themselves are almost wholly dependent upon coal for locomotive fuel and account for almost a quarter of total coal consumption.³ The Gorna Oryakhovitsa system is very vulnerable to interdiction of its fuel supply which must be long-hauled from the southern half of the country.

Although adequate for Bulgaria's peacetime purposes, the Bulgarian railroads would have only a limited strategic value to the USSR in time of war if they were to be used to support military operations to the south and west. A number of factors would contribute to this situation. The first of these is the paucity of international connections. Only three rail connections exist between Bulgaria and Rumania: Bulgaria's Danube River rail terminals are connected to Rumanian lines only via a bridge at Ruse and by a 32-car capacity train ferry between Vidin and Calafat; the remaining connection is an overland one at Kardam on the line Tolbukhin-Constanta. In time of war, additional connections with Rumanian railroads could probably be effected by ferries between Nikopol and Turnul Magurele, and between Svishtov and Zimnicea. A

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proposed bridge between Gigen and the Rumanian railhead at Corabia probably will not be built before the construction of the projected line from Chervenbreg to Gigen is completed.

To the south a connection at Svilengrad on the Orient Express route is the sole operating rail link with Greece and Turkey. A second junction with Greece at Kulata on the Struma Valley line is inoperative. Available information indicates that the Struma Valley line, formerly standard gauge only as far as General Todoroff, with a narrow-gauge connection from there to the Greek border at Kulata and a standard-gauge connection from that point to Demirhisar (Sidhirokastron) on the Greece, Macedonia, and Thrace main line, may have been extended as far as Kulata.⁴ The 14 km. stretch of connecting narrow-gauge line was originally built with the object of subsequent conversion to standard gauge.⁵ The Trans-Balkan (Ruse-Podkova) line similarly could be extended via Zlatograd to a junction with the Greece-Macedonia-Thrace main line near Iasmos (between Xanthi and Komotini) providing an additional through route to the Aegean seaports. Construction of this connection was undertaken during World War II.

Only one connection with Yugoslav railroads exists--at Caribrod, where the Bulgarian sector of the Orient Express line passes into Yugoslavia. A second connection with Yugoslavia could be made at Gyueshevo, if the wartime and early post-war work which was accomplished on the Yugoslav portion of the Skoplje-Sofia line should ever be completed. Another connection could be made with Yugoslavia between Blagoevgrad and Kocani, the terminus of a branch line from Veles on the Belgrade-Thessalonika line. Some construction was also undertaken on this line during World War II.

The existence of only five international connections readily accounts for the fact that only 3 per cent of the traffic on the Bulgarian railroads is through or international in character and further emphasizes the

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orientation of the trunk lines toward the Black Sea and Danube River ports, which act as transshipment points for almost all of the country's foreign trade traffic.

Other factors which would limit the military value of the Bulgarian railroads to the USSR are the inadequacies in both number and age of the rolling stock and the limited carrying capacities of the lines. In regard to the latter, combinations of steep grades, difficult curves, light rails and weak roadbeds severely restrict the net load capacity and the speed of trains operating on all lines. Despite Bulgarian claims of reconstruction of some lines or sections of lines to permit the introduction of high-power heavy locomotives and high-capacity freight cars, freight trains are thought to average not much more than the 1938 figure of 454 metric tons.⁶ The 1949-1953 five-year plan called for an increase in the average tonnage of freight trains from 450 to 570 tons.⁷ On the presumption that the Bulgarian figures refer to gross tonnage of freight trains, the average net load per train would be considerably less.⁸ Indeed, available plan fulfillment figures indicate that the average net load for 10,713 heavy freight trains in 1951 was but 197 tons, and 266 tons for 4,720 trains during the first quarter of 1952.⁹ During the same period, however, freight trains loaded in Sofia averaged 304 net tons. The highest of these tonnage figures is, however, considerably lower than the net load figures for lines from the north which feed into the Bulgarian lines through Rumania and which would be used by Russian forces in a drive to the south and west.¹⁰

During World War II most of the trunk lines were considered capable of handling from 12-16 pairs of trains per day.¹¹ A 1954 estimate, however, places the maximum number of trains per day on the east-west trunk lines Sofia-Burgas-Stalin at 10 pair of trains per day; 10 pair on the north-south Kardam-Svilengrad line; 8 pair on the north-south Trans-Balkan line; and only 6 pair on the Struma Valley line. Recent net loading capacity estimates for these same lines are also lower than World War II estimates and do not exceed 272 metric tons on any line.¹²

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The Bulgarian railroads and especially the trunk lines shown on Map P at some point on their routes overcome a variety of difficult terrain obstacles via passage over bridges, through tunnels, gorges, and defiles, and around sharp curves and switchbacks on steep grades. Interdiction of the lines at such hypercritical points would undoubtedly interrupt traffic for long periods of time. The extent of the physical vulnerability of the principal trunk lines is indicated in the following route descriptions.

The through routes outlined on Map have been selected more for their potential use as invasion routes and lines of communication and supply for Soviet forces driving toward the Mediterranean than for their actual use as through routes by either domestic or international traffic during peacetime. The peacetime traffic pattern on the Bulgarian railways, as standard intelligence references sources indicate, can be best described as wheel-shaped, with Sofia the hub to and from which traffic moves along the rail spokes leading to the borders. Plovdiv and Dimitrovgrad act as hubs of smaller wheels within the main pattern. In the event of a Russian drive toward the Mediterranean, however, this peacetime traffic pattern undoubtedly would be considerably modified, and emphasis would be placed on moving traffic from Rumania and its Black Sea ports through Bulgaria and on into Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. Therefore, although much traffic would of necessity continue to flow into Sofia and Plovdiv in virtue of their functions as railroad centers and junctions, the bulk of the traffic probably would not terminate at those centers but would pass on through to the south and west. Under such conditions it can be expected that the wartime traffic pattern would closely resemble the presentation of Map P .

(2) North-South Routes:

(a) Vidin-Kulata:

This 511-km. long route begins at Vidin on the Danube where a 32-car capacity ferry connects with the Rumanian railhead at Calafat. Seventy bridges and two tunnels are located on the stretch between Vidin

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and Mezdra. A branch from Iom (second in importance to Ruge as a Danube River port) joins the line at Brusartsi. In this area the line serves as an outlet for the grain-producing Vratsa region as well as for a connection between Sofia and the Danube River ports in western Bulgaria through which passes trade with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. A branch line from Vratsa to Orekhovo has been in the construction stage since 1948.¹³ When completed, it will provide an additional route to the Danube and will permit the development of Orekhovo as another commercial port serving western Bulgaria.

Between Mezdra and Sofia the line passes through the Balkan Mountains via the Iskŭr gorge where it is exceptionally vulnerable to interdiction at ten tunnels and at a number of critical bridges over the Iskŭr River. In this area, the route (which is also part of the North Balkan-Sofia-Stalin route) is cut into the sides of the gorge and is susceptible to blockage by landslides.

The sector between Sofia and Dimitrovo is the most intensively used stretch of railroad in the country. In reality the main line in this sector consists of two lines between Sofia and Dimitrovo (one via Vladaya and the other via Voluyak) which act as one-way traffic carriers between the two termini. The line via Voluyak, opened in 1950, carries all the coal and some passenger traffic from Dimitrovo to Sofia. Freight, passenger, and empty coal trains from Sofia proceed to Dimitrovo via the older and more difficult Vladaya route. The route via Voluyak has at least two tunnels, one of which is reported to be 2 kms. long.¹⁴ Both routes cross the Struma River. Twenty-two coal trains, each consisting of from 60-70 cars with an average load of 18 tons, proceed from Dimitrovo to Sofia daily.¹⁵ Three locomotives including one pusher are needed on the difficult stretch between Dimitrovo and Mastitsa; two locomotives are used between Mastitsa and Rasnik. The line is subject to blockage by snow and rock slides between Mastitsa and Rasnik.

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The section from Dimitrovo to Kulata departs from the Struma Valley at Radomir and rejoins it south of Dupnitsa (Marek, Stanke-Dimitrov). The line carries coal via a spur from the mines at Bobov Dol (third in importance in the country) to Dupnitsa, and timber from the western flanks of the Rila Mountains. Well over 100 bridges, culverts, and ducts, and 21 tunnels, three of which are located in the short stretch between Kocerino and Blagoevgrad, enhance the vulnerability of this section. Seventeen tunnels exist on the branch line from Radomir to the Yugoslav border at Gyuveshevo.

(b) Ruse-Podkova:

This 400-odd km. long line known as the Trans-Balkan begins at Ruse, where it connects via a bridge over the Danube with the main Rumanian line from Bucharest to Giurgiu, and extends to the Greek frontier at Podkova. Peacetime traffic is heaviest between Ruse and Gorna-Oryakhovitsa where much freight leaves the line and continues on to Sofia via the North Balkan route. The Ruse-Gorna Oryakhovitsa sector traverses relatively level terrain offering few possibilities for effective disruption of traffic. One report indicates that the laying of a new roadbed preliminary to the double-tracking of this stretch was undertaken in 1953.¹⁶

Between Gorna Oryakhovitsa and Stara Zagora the line crosses the Balkan Mountains, enters the Kazanlik plain, and then crosses the Sredna Gora range via Zmeveski pass entering the Thrace plain at Stara Zagora. In the Kazanlik plain the route is identical with that of the sub-Balkan line between the junctions of Dubovo and Tulovo.

Difficult engineering constructions are exceptionally numerous on the Gorna Oryakhovitsa-Stara Zagora stretch, with more than 20 tunnels, numerous switchbacks in the shapes of figures 8 and 6, very sharp curves, bridges, fills, and grades as steep as 2 1/2 per cent for as much as 16 kms. Many of the tunnels are well over 1 km. long. In one stretch between Platchkovtsi and the summit of the Balkan Mountains at Krestets, the line circles for three miles through three long tunnels and crosses itself at a

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point 300 feet above the starting point of the circle. Traffic in this sector is severely limited in both number of trains and load per train by both the steep grades and the slow speed at which the route can be negotiated. If but one of the many critical structures in this sector were interdicted the line would be inoperative for many months. A 17-km. long branch line from the textile and railroad car manufacturing center of Gabrovo joins the main line at Tsareva Livadaya (Dyanovo, or Vurbanovo). A short branch runs from Platchkovtsi to nearby lignite mines.

From Stara Zagora to Mihailovo the Trans-Balkan follows the route of the west-east Sofia-Plovdiv-Burgas rail line. From Mihailovo the line continues to the important mining and industrial center of Dimitrovgrad (the Maritsa Basin) and a junction with the Orient Express route. This sector of the line crosses the fairly level terrain of the Thrace plain (Maritsa Valley) but is vulnerable at a number of bridges and at a tunnel north of Marino. Interruption of the line in this sector would have many advantages, not the least of which would be the cutting off of the shipments of the products of the Stalin chemical plant in Dimitrovgrad to the Black Sea ports.

From Dimitrovgrad to Podkova the Trans-Balkan negotiates the difficult terrain of the Eastern Rhodopes. Traffic on this stretch consists principally of ore from the lead, zinc and pyrite mines around Kurdzhali and from the ore-processing plant in that town. After processing, the ore is shipped northward to the Black Sea ports for transshipment to the USSR. The pyrites are used in Dimitrovgrad in the production of sulfuric acid at the Stalin chemical plant (1956 sulfuric acid output, 28.6 thousand tons).

Three tunnels, one of which is over 1 km. long, are found between Dimitrovgrad and Kurdzhali. Grades of 2 1/2 per cent are encountered on the line in the section which crosses the Rhodopes. A hydro power construction project on the Arda River at Studen Kladenets has necessitated

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the realignment of a 16 km. stretch of the line between Perperek and Kirdzhali. The new line will follow the right bank of the Arda River. Its construction is necessitated because of the eventual flooding of the present right-of-way by a new lake which will be created when the Studen Kladenets dam is completed. The lake will reach almost to the southeastern edge of Kirdzhali. According to the Bulgarian press the realignment is expected to be finished by the end of 1957.¹⁷ Two tunnels are being constructed in the process of realignment.

(c) Kardam-Svilengrad:

The third north-south through route extends for 460 odd kms. from Kardam on Bulgaria's land border with Rumania to the Greek-Turkish frontier at Svilengrad. This route does not normally function in a through capacity, being identical for the central third of its length with parts of the three east-west trunk lines between the Black Sea ports and Sofia. Nevertheless, as the most direct route between Rumania and the Greek-Turkish frontier at Svilengrad, it is of prime strategic importance.

Very little information is available on the northernmost sector of the route from Iovkovo to the Rumanian border. In this area the line serves the agricultural Dobruja region. Because it traverses relatively level terrain with but few bridge crossings or other vital structures, it is not too vulnerable to interdiction. Wartime intelligence rated the line as having a relatively high traffic capacity, i.e., up to 16 pair of trains per day each with a net load of 363 tons.¹⁸ More recent reports, however, state that the line is of low capacity and unsuitable for heavy traffic.¹⁹ Some post-war reports have stated that a third rail was laid on the line as well as on the intersecting Ruse-Sindel-Stalin (Varna) line to permit the operation of Russian broad-gauge trains.²⁰ Although it is known that in the later stages of World War II much work was done on converting Rumanian and Bulgarian lines in the Dobruja to Soviet broad-gauge, reports on the specific lines involved have not been confirmed.²¹

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If the Bulgarian lines have indeed been converted, it would mean that a similar modification of the connecting Rumanian lines would have had to be made if through movement from the USSR were to be permitted.

From Iovkovo to Nova Zagora the line consists of parts of the principal east-west through and alternate routes between the Black Sea ports and Sofia. These are respectively: between Iovkovo and Sindel a stretch of the North Balkan Sofia-Kaspichan-Stalin main route; between Sindel and Murna an alternate (from Kolarovgrad (Shumen)) to the latter route as well as part of the combined Sub-Balkan route to Burgas and Stalin, and the Sofia-Burgas or Stalin via Plovdiv route; between Murna and Zimnitsa part of the combined two latter routes; and between Zimnitsa and Nova Zagora part of the trunk line Sofia-Burgas or Stalin via Plovdiv. From Nova Zagora the line runs south to Maritsa (Zlati Dol, Simenograd) and thence to Svilengrad.

Traffic on the line is heaviest between Iovkovo and Nova Zagora and consists mainly of goods in transit to or from the Black Sea ports to central and western Bulgaria. The line crosses the easternmost reaches of the Balkan Mountains between Murna and Komarevo, and can be easily interdicted at a number of tunnel locations. From Komarevo to Nova Zagora the line passes through relatively level terrain which makes it invulnerable to interdiction except at bridges. The route from Nova Zagora to Maritsa to Svilengrad follows the right bank of the Blatnitsa, Rakitnitsa and Maritsa Rivers. It crosses the Maritsa River at Maritsa.

At a point approximately half way between Stakhanovo (Sladek Kladenets) (4209N-2552E) and Lyubenova (4212N-2555E) a new line is under construction, branching off to the northeast. It is likely that this branch is part of the projected connection between Maritsa and Burgas via Elkhovo.²² The route of the line along the Maritsa River is occasionally subject to washouts caused by flooding and bed shifting of the Maritsa River.²³ The last washout reportedly occurred in late 1951 when a 400-meter stretch of track south of Lyubinets was destroyed.

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(3) East-West Routes:

(a) North Balkan:

The Sofia-Stalin (North Balkan) line, 580 kms. long, crosses the Balkans via the Iskŭr Gorge and then proceeds along the Danubian plain to Stalin. Twenty-two tunnels and 185 bridges are located on the route; ten of the tunnels are in the Iskŭr gorge where the line is most vulnerable to interdiction. (See above under Vidin-Kulata.) Another important tunnel is located a short distance to the west of Chervenbreg.

The North Balkan line is a principal freight carrier between its two termini as well as between Sofia and the Danube River ports. The line also serves the rich Danubian lowland agricultural area. Branches go north to Orekhovo (narrow gauge), Somovit and Nikopol, and Ruse. Gorna Oryakhovitsa is a most important junction with repair shops and a classification yard.

From Kolarovgrad the main line continues to Stalin via Kaspichan. An alternate route to Stalin leads southward via the rail junction at Murna. Interdiction of traffic moving westward on the line would be most effective if carried out to the west of Kolarovgrad.

(b) Sub-Balkan:

The new Sub-Balkan (Sofia-Dolno-Kamartsa-Klisura-Karlovo-Zimnitsa-Karnobat-Burgas or Stalin) trunk line was opened for through traffic in 1953. The 402-km. long line shortens the distance to Burgas over the old Sofia-Plovdiv route by only 24 kms., and to Stalin via the North Balkan by only 21 kms., but has, nevertheless, replaced the older routes in strategic importance as a through traffic carrier from the Black Sea ports to western Bulgaria. The line has a great number of heavy engineering structures. Twelve tunnels totaling almost 13 kms. were constructed between Dolno Kamartsa and Klisura, the last portion of the route to be completed. One of these, the Koznitsa tunnel just west of Klisura, is almost 6 kms. long. No tunnels are located east of Dubovo. The line

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crosses more than 200 bridges. All of the bridges and tunnels are vulnerable to ground demolition. The line is also susceptible to blockage via rock slides. Traffic on the line was reportedly interrupted in June 1956 by falls of rock on the line west of Kazanluk.²⁴

The Sub-Balkan joins the old Sofia-Burgas via Plovdiv route at Zimitsa. The line encounters many vital bridge structures in this sector. One of these is over the Azmak Dere between Devetak and Karnobat where the line follows the river through a narrow pass cut in volcanic rock. Interdiction of the line at this location would cause a major interruption of traffic on three primary routes (see Map p).

(c) Sofia-Burgas or Stalin via Plovdiv:

This line, well over 400 kms. in length, has been replaced in importance as the major artery from Sofia to Burgas by the Sub-Balkan line described above. From Sofia to the most important junction at Plovdiv (repair shops, classification yard) the line is part of the Orient Express route. The route is not overly difficult, but does cross a number of important bridges which could be readily interdicted. Branch lines in this sector of the railroad include a narrow-gauge connection from Pazardzhik to Dobrinishta and Nevrokop, and a standard-gauge line from Krichim to Peshtera. From Plovdiv another branch extends northwest to Panagyurishte and serves uranium mines near the town of Strelcha and manganese mines near Panagyurishte.

At Plovdiv the main line swings north over the Maritsa River and continues to a junction at Mihailovo with the north-south Ruse-Podkova line and is identical with the latter as far as Stara Zagora where it departs, turns eastward, and proceeds to Nova Zagora and a link up with the north-south Kardam-Svilengrad route. The two lines continue as one to Zimitsa where a further junction is effected with the Sub-Balkan. All three lines are merged from this point as far as Karnobat. Interruption of the line between Zimitsa and Karnobat would have disastrous effects as discussed above.

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(4) New Construction:

A number of new lines have been under construction for many years since the war. In general, the purpose of the new construction is to relieve congestion on existing lines and to provide alternate routes for through traffic. The more important construction projects are as follows:

(a) Stalin-Burgas:

At the present time the two Black Sea ports are connected only by an inland route running via Karnobat, Murna, and Sindel. A new coast line is under construction to provide a through connection between these two important ports. The exact alignment of the route is not known but a number of reports indicate that it branches from the Burgas-Karnobat line to the west of Burgas and proceeds northwest toward the town of Kusharitsa where a four- to five-kilometer long tunnel is being constructed through the easternmost reaches of the Balkan Mountains.²⁵

When completed the new connection will relieve much of the burden on the line between Iovkovo and Karnobat. Long-range plans call for a continuation of this line to the south via Grudovo and Elkhovo to Maritsa. Once the entire project is completed the congestion between Iovkovo and Nova Zagora would be greatly relieved. This sector of single track railroad is now the sole carrier for traffic operating on three routes of strategic importance. The over-all completion of the project would especially enable north-south traffic to by-pass the critical sector, Zimnitsa-Karnobat, and would open a more direct through route to the Greek-Turkish frontiers.

(b) Isperikh-Silistra:

Another line which has been under construction since early in the post-war period is one extending from Samuil on the Ruse-Kaspichan line to Bulgaria's easternmost Danube port at Silistra. The line is being constructed with the intention of opening up Silistra as a port serving the Dobruja. The line is now open as far as Isperikh and was

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scheduled to reach Dulovo, about 25 kms. northeast of Isperikh, by late 1956. In mid-1956, however, a reliable observer reported that no rails had been laid on the roadbed in the vicinity of Dulovo.²⁶

(c) Troyan-Karlovo:

A projected line between Troyan and Karlovo would, if completed, provide an additional north-south route extending from Svishtov, opposite the Rumanian railhead at Zimnicea, to Plovdiv via Levski, Lovech, Troyan and Karlovo. A 10- to 12-km. long tunnel through the Balkans will have to be constructed before the line can be opened to traffic. At last report the roadbed had been prepared for some distance south of Troyan but work on the construction of the tunnel had not commenced.

(5) Conclusions:

Bulgaria's political and industrial heartland could be cut off effectively from the Black Sea ports if the east-west trunk routes were interdicted between Zimnitsa and Karnobat, and between Gorna Oryakhovitsa and Kolarovgrad (see Map P). In like fashion, the heartland could be severed from the Danube River ports if: 1) the North Balkan line were cut in the Iskur Gorge; 2) the Trans-Balkan line were cut between Stara Zagora and Mihailovo; and 3) the Sub-Balkan line were severed between Karlovo and the junction with the Trans-Balkan at Tulovo. Interdiction at these points and on the line between Nova Zagora and Maritsa on the one hand would prevent movement from Rumania and the Black Sea through Bulgaria into Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey and, on the other hand, would allow only local movement within Bulgaria itself. A final cut between Radomir and Dimitrovo on the Struma Valley line would prevent rail movement from the Sofia area to the Greek-Yugoslavia frontier.

Interdiction of north-south trunk lines at the places shown on Map P would have one further advantage. In addition to preventing the through movement of freight from Rumania and the Black Sea ports into Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, a curtailment of rail movement and industrial


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activity in the northern half of Bulgaria would be necessitated. The necessity would arise from the fact that the northern half of the country would be severed from its fuel supplies which originate in the coal fields on the south side of the Balkan Mountains.

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b. Highways

(1) General:

Bulgarian highways do not possess a fraction of the importance which the railroads have in the economy of the country. In an economic sense roads serve mainly as feeders of agricultural and mining products to the railroads and ports. In only one or two local instances, as in the Rhodope mining area, are they sufficiently important economically to be of interest to Special Forces. From a national viewpoint the greatest importance of the Bulgarian roads is of a military or strategic nature. This importance is reflected in most of the road construction programs which have been undertaken in recent years. For the most part these programs have been designed for the dual purpose of developing through routes from Rumania toward Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, and improving or constructing lateral links in the vicinities of the Greek and Turkish frontiers. It is the clear purpose of these programs to integrate the Bulgarian road net with those of other satellites and the USSR in line with the over-all strategic military requirements of the Communist bloc.

Among the principal new construction projects have been north-south routes from Iom to Sofia; Orekhovo to Sofia via Borovan, Vratsa and Mezdra; and Ruse-Byala-Turnovo and thence via the old route through Shipka Pass or a new road through Khainboaz (Republika) Pass (4247N-2539E) to the southern flanks of the Balkan Mountains. In addition, approaches to the Greek and Turkish frontiers have been considerably improved and roads that were once suitable only for mules are now reported to be fit for heavy vehicular traffic. Improvements to lateral routes especially to those converging on Sofia through the Black Sea ports have also been made.

(2) Adequacy:

Bulgarian roads both in construction and in extent of network are inadequate by all modern standards. Although official Bulgarian claims from time to time speak highly of new roads, these generally are of

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the standard gravel type, poorly-constructed, with a limited carrying capacity and susceptible to immediate deterioration. Recent improvements have failed to affect the essential weakness of the road net in respect to road foundations. The highly publicized "international highway" (from Rumania via the combined road and railroad bridge over the Danube between Giurgiu and Ruse), developed since 1952 between Ruse and Byala (4327N-2544E), was reliably observed in mid-1956 to have collapsed in some places to an extent that rendered it serviceable to only one-way traffic.²⁷ Parts of the new Republika Pass trunk route through the Balkan Mountains were also observed in mid-1956 to have collapsed in at least three places on the southern side of the mountains and to have become partially blocked by landslides in about sixteen places south of the pass itself. In view of the essential weakness of the road foundations maintenance programs are of little value. No matter how carefully a road is repaired, it usually requires further attention in a few months. Repairs are largely limited to filling innumerable potholes and spreading another layer of earth over the road surface.²⁸ Extensive use is made of Trudovak labor to maintain the system in a usable condition and to carry out new construction programs.

The principal and some selected through highway routes are depicted on Map Q. Lateral connections and alternate routes, which in some instances are often in as good a condition (generally poor) as the broadly-designated main routes, are also shown on Map Q. Recent route descriptions by reliable observers indicate that the appraisals of the main highway routes given in standard intelligence reference sources, on the whole continue to remain valid even though these sources are in some instances many years old.²⁹ Typical is a recent report which summarizes the condition of Bulgarian roads on the basis of a German Army Handbook written in 1940: "The Bulgarian road network does not meet modern requirements. The main difficulties are these:

1. On all roads, good stretches alternate suddenly with lengthy sections of neglected and frequently completely unmetalled surface.

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2. Heaping-up of ballast and narrow stretches of road between cliffs and rivers frequently make two way traffic impossible.

3. Many bridges are so narrow that traffic can only pass in one direction at a time. Very often there is a right-angle bend in the road immediately in front of both ends of the bridge.

4. Streams and rivers, carrying more or less water according to the season, often flow across the road.

5. Many bridges are constructed of wood and some are capable of carrying only very light roads.

6. Nearly all roads are very dusty in dry weather and muddy, with a tendency to cause skidding in wet weather.

7. The terrain is such that detours are seldom possible.

8. From the middle of December until the middle of April, snow drifts cause a problem in many places on mountain roads."³⁰

Estimates of the extent of the Bulgarian highway net vary widely; i.e., from nine to 19,000 miles.³¹ The discrepancy apparently arises in accounting for the large number of unsurfaced country and forest roads, many of which are less than three meters in width, and which are used mainly for animal-drawn transportation between villages or for logging purposes in forests. Many roads of this type appear on existing maps as motorable, but recent reconnaissance indicates that they are for the most part impassable except by jeeps and other front-wheeled drive, or tracked vehicles. Even some of the more improved roads occasionally fill this description. For example, the route through the eastern reaches of the Balkan Mountains between Omurtag and Sliven via Gradets (see Map Q), according to a reliable recommendation, is to be avoided if possible because of the very poor condition of the road surface in combination with sharp curves and steep grades.³²

One factor which militates against any rapid improvement of Bulgarian highways is a lack of modern road construction machinery. Although some

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road construction and maintenance machines have been received from the USSR, they were in a number of cases old and unusable at time of delivery. A shortage of spare parts and an insufficient number of skilled operating and maintenance personnel are also part of the machinery problem. Unskilled manual labor will probably continue to be the bulwark of Bulgarian highway construction and maintenance programs for many years to come. The new Khainboaz Pass trunk route, which allegedly was constructed as a strategic military route through the Balkan Mountains, was carved out of the mountains almost entirely by brigades of Trudovaks and "volunteer" laborers.³³

Very few Bulgarian roads are either concrete or asphalt-paved. Asphalt-ing procedures were begun only in 1953 and as yet have accomplished very little. By 1955 only 300 kms. of roads had been asphalted. It was planned to provide an additional 600 kms. of roads with asphalt surfaces in 1956, but no information is available as to whether this objective was reached. As they are currently being carried out, asphalt-ing procedures are proving to be most inadequate. The Bulgarian press has openly acknowledged that some of the most recently asphalted roads are already in poor condition. In mid-1956 one Bulgarian publication complained that a stretch of newly constructed and asphalt-paved road in the Rhodope mining district south-west of Kirdzhali (4139N-2521E) had deteriorated into a very poor state after only five months of use; the road was alleged to have collapsed in the center so that instead of a concave surface from which rain water could drain, the road had in effect a convex surface which caused water to accumulate in the center.³⁴ Stretches of the asphalted roads Khaskovo-Plovdiv, and Sofia-Botevgrad were also stated to be in bad condition after only a year or two of use.³⁵

(3) Vulnerability:

Bulgarian highways are vulnerable naturally through rapid deterioration and through effects of weather. They are also potentially vulnerable to interdiction by Special Forces. Although the over-all

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vulnerability is considerable it is not so great that the through movement of all traffic could be prevented (as in the case of the railroads) by interdiction at but a few critical places, as a greater number of alternate routes is available for highway movement than for rail traffic. Nevertheless, the many weaknesses of the Bulgarian highway system could be exploited profitably by Special Forces to their considerable military advantage.

Natural vulnerabilities inhere in the poor quality of roadbeds and surfaces, and the inadequacies of maintenance and construction machinery. These conditions render the roads very vulnerable to climatic effects. Mountain roads are frequently snow-blocked for lengthy periods during the winter months. Snow clearance is carried out locally by brigades of "volunteer" laborers working without benefit of snow removal machinery. Spring rains and thaws produce serious effects on poorly consolidated roadbeds and often damage or wash out entirely road foundations over some short stretches. Flooding in lowland areas similarly affects road surfaces and also frequently damages poorly constructed bridges. During the dry summer months, heavy dust is an obstacle to rapid movement on all unpaved roads. Other natural vulnerabilities are the sharp curves and steep grades in mountainous sectors, and the tendency, particularly in the Sofia area, for first-class through routes to converge upon and funnel through larger population centers.

The principal targets for Special Forces operations in regard to Bulgarian highways are their physical structures, primarily bridges but also overpasses and viaducts. Frequently road vulnerability is coincidental with railroad vulnerability in that roads and railroads cross rivers over side-by-side structures offering joint targets, or roads cut through railroad embankments where the railroad is carried over the cut via a bridge. The destruction of bridges over major rivers or at points on minor streams where fording would be impossible owing to terrain conditions is, however, but one of many methods which could be employed by

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Special Forces to interdict selected highways. Other methods would include: the blockage of mountain routes by induced landslides and rock falls from above the roads where they transit cuts and passes; and the forced subsidence of roads and beds into rivers at points where the roads run above and parallel to rivers, and are cut into the sides of gorges or cliffs. It is very likely that through a careful selection of target sites Special Forces could, by interdiction of one or two principal routes, force the use of exceptionally poor alternate routes whose bases would soon give way under the heavy burden of military traffic. In many instances traffic could be forced into one way patterns, or over detours of great length, because of inadequate road width and low bridge carrying capacity on alternate routes. In effect an unlimited number of possibilities and a very wide range of targets would be presented to Special Forces seeking to interdict the Bulgarian highway system.

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c. Pipelines

It can be expected that pipelines will become increasingly important in the development of Bulgaria's newly-tapped oil reserves (see under Fuel). Recent reports indicate that the immediate construction of two pipelines is contemplated. Both of these will run from the Shabla oilfield to ports where the crude oil can be loaded into tankers. The first line is expected to lead via Tolbukhin to the Danube River port of Silistra.³⁶ Storage facilities have allegedly been developed at Silistra in anticipation of the use of that port as a transshipment point for Bulgarian crude destined for other satellites and especially Czechoslovakia.³⁷

According to a Bulgarian announcement a second pipeline is to run from the oilfield to Stalin.³⁸ This line may be a separate one or may be but an extension of a 30-km. long line from Shabla to Kavarna on which construction was supposed to have begun in August 1956.³⁹ At the present time the output of the Shabla oilfield is trucked to both Kavarna and Stalin, with an estimated two-thirds of the production going to the first port.

Completion of the pipelines linking Shabla to Silistra, Kavarna and Stalin would permit a considerable expansion in crude oil production which is necessarily limited by the inefficient truck transport system now employed to move the oil. These pipelines would be suitable targets for Special Forces. They could be best interdicted at pumping stations which, though more difficult to destroy than a stretch of pipeline, cannot be replaced as readily as the pipeline itself. Since Bulgaria has little, if any, domestic production of pumping equipment, the destruction of pumping stations could be expected to have long-lasting effects.

An older pipeline, extending from the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania via an underwater crossing of the Danube between Giurgiu and Ruse, has its terminal point at Ruse. This pipeline, which could be best interdicted in Rumania, delivers Rumanian refined products to a major storage center (estimated capacity--500,000 gallons), located immediately east of

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the town of Ruse.⁴⁰ The line contains eight pipes, of which three are used for gasoline and five for other petroleum products. The refined products are distributed to interior Bulgaria via railroad tank cars and can be interdicted in Bulgaria through disruption of the rail net.⁴¹ It is possible that, as some reports indicate, some crude oil is also conveyed via this pipeline to the three small distillation plants located in Ruse.⁴² These plants may also make use of some of the production of the Shabla fields. Their production is of negligible importance (see under Fuel).

d. Waterways (See Map Q)

The Danube is the only navigable waterway of any importance serving Bulgaria. It is the trade artery which connects Bulgaria to the other satellite states as well as a major traffic carrier for the trade of Central Europe. Interdiction of Danube River traffic would not be a suitable objective for Special Forces possessing only limited operational capabilities. Special Forces could, however, deprive Bulgaria of access to this important trade and supply route by successfully interdicting road and rail lines leading inland from the Danube River ports.⁴³

Current plans, for which construction target dates have not been announced, call for the development of two additional inland water transport routes in Bulgaria. The first and most practical of the two proposed projects is one which would connect Devnya (4314N-2733E), where the Karl Marx soda plant and a new cement plant are located, with the port of Stalin and the Black Sea. The new waterway would accommodate seagoing vessels and would permit them to berth alongside the new plants. The waterway would be formed by widening and deepening the 1.5-km. connection between Varnensko Ezero (4311N-2750E) and Gebedzhensko Ezero (4311N-2738E). The latter lake and the bed of the Olevnyanska River which feeds it would be similarly widened and deepened as far as Devnya. A 2.5-km. long canal already connects Varnensko Ezero to Stalin harbor. The entire waterway would be 26 km. long, from 7-8 m. deep and from 35-40 m. wide with several ship by-passing places.⁴⁴

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By permitting the direct loading of ships at the Karl Marx soda works, the Devnya Canal would eliminate the rail haul between the works and the port of Stalin, thereby considerably easing the burden on both the single track rail line serving Stalin and the cargo handling facilities of that port.⁴⁵ 1956 soda production at the Karl Marx plant totalled 97,000 tons, of which 86,000 was calcined and the remainder caustic.⁴⁶ The production of calcined soda is expected to increase ⁴⁵ per cent by 1960.⁴⁷ The bulk of the production of this plant is exported to other satellites and to the Middle East.⁴⁸ The interdiction of any one of a number of rail and road bridges which cross the route of the new canal could effectively block the channel to shipping.

A more ambitious and long-range inland waterway scheme, on which construction allegedly began in 1956, is one to construct a shipping canal between Burgas and Pazardzhik (4211N-2419E).⁴⁹ This canal would follow a route Pazardzhik-Plovdiv-Chirpan-Stara Zagora-Nova Zagora-Sliven-Karnobat-Burgas. Among the more difficult engineering feats which the plan entails is a tunnel through the Sredna Gora between Nova Zagora and Sliven.

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3. Fuel

a. Coal

The effectiveness of coal production and supply is of vital importance to the Bulgarian economy. In line with the development of heavy industry and electrification under the Communist program for economic expansion, coal production has risen from an annual two million tons pre-war to 10.5 million tons in 1956.⁵⁰ 1957 production has been scheduled at 10.9 million tons.⁵¹ Although this growth in production represents a significant achievement, it falls short by three million tons of the 14 million ton target set by the 1953-1957 Five Year Plan. Production increases, moreover, have not kept pace with growing demands and public complaints about coal shortages are chronic.⁵² During the severe winter of 1953-1954, the country suffered through a fuel crisis, although coal production was then at an all time high. The crisis resulted from a combination of factors. These included inadequate production due to excessive turnover in the labor force; increased consumption occasioned by the severity of the winter; and a breakdown in the coal distribution system because of snow blocked rail lines.⁵³ Of these contributing causes, the disruption of rail transportation was judged to be the most important and is an excellent example of how even a temporary dislocation of the rail transportation system in Bulgaria can precipitate a major crisis in the country's economy.

Bulgarian coal is mainly of the brown coal or lignite variety and is of low quality. The quality of the coal being mined is, moreover, constantly decreasing.⁵⁴ This explains why the demand for coal continues to outstrip production even though the latter is currently five times as great as it was before the war. Because of the low and declining quality of the coal, increasing amounts are needed to produce results which were formerly obtained from lesser amounts of coal of higher calorific content. More coal must be produced to meet a constant demand. Bulgaria's industrial expansion program and the resulting increasing demands to the coal industry

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account for the chronic coal shortages even though annual coal output has continued to increase.

Although some of the largest industries are not directly vulnerable through interdiction of their coal supplies, in virtue of their locations in the heart of the coal fields (e.g., Lenin steel works in Dimitrovo, Stalin chemical works in Dimitrovgrad), the railroads, which annually account for a quarter of the total coal consumption, and especially that portion of them north of the Balkan Mountains, industrial establishments in Sofia, Ruse and elsewhere, and many important thermal power plants throughout the country are especially vulnerable due to their reliance on coal. The Dimitrovo steel works (1956 production, 129.5 thousand tons of steel and 99.2 thousand tons of rolled steel products, apparently based mainly on scrap and imported pig iron) is probably vulnerable to some extent to loss of supplies of coke. Domestic coke production (an estimated 8-10,000 tons prior to 1947 against a planned 1953 output of 20,000 tons) from ovens in Plachkovtsi and Kazanluk must be supplemented by imports (probably from Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR).⁵⁵ The Dimitrovo steel works is expected to begin production of pig iron in 1957. Initial production is to be at an annual rate of 113 thousand tons,⁵⁶ and will be on the basis of domestic iron ore. Heretofore, Bulgarian iron ore (1956 output, 236.2 thousand tons) has been exported to the USSR in exchange for Soviet manufactured pig iron. Pig iron production will begin with the completion of a blast furnace at the Lenin works.⁵⁷ Another blast furnace remains to be built before over-all construction plans for this facility are fulfilled.⁵⁸ The operation of these furnaces will necessitate adequate supplies of coking coal.

An estimated 85 per cent of the country's coal is mined at Dimitrovo, about 40 km. southwest of Sofia. Much of the output of the Dimitrovo mines is consumed, either directly or indirectly (in the production of power), by the Dimitrovo steel industry. The bulk of the output is shipped northward via rail to Sofia and other consuming centers. An estimated 22,000

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tons of coal are shipped from the mines daily.⁵⁹ Loaded trains proceed northward via the railroad line through Voluyak and return via Vladaya (see under Railroads). Coal from the third ranking mining area at Bobov Dol (4221N-2300E) and from fields near Breziani (4152N-2311E) is also shipped to Sofia via the same route. It is evident that sustained interdiction of rail service on the two routes between Dimitrovo and Sofia would have far-reaching effects on the entire country by depriving it of more than 85 per cent of its coal supplies.

The second most important coal mining area is the Maritsa Basin surrounding Dimitrovgrad. This new industrial city comprises the former towns of Mariino, Rakovski and Chernokonovo. The Dimitrovgrad area was formerly of little importance but has been developed in recent years as the center of the Bulgarian chemical industry. Its chief feature is the Stalin chemical works, whose output rests upon 1) the gasification of coal from the Maritsa mines, and 2) pyrites from the Rhodope mining district. In 1956, the Stalin chemical works produced 105.4 thousand tons of nitrogenous fertilizers, 28.6 thousand tons of sulfuric acid, and lesser amounts of ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate, and other related chemicals.⁶⁰ Much of the sulfuric acid is reportedly consumed by the Kazanluk munitions works.⁶¹ Current plans call for a considerable expansion of facilities at the Stalin works, a six-fold increase in fertilizer output, and a five-fold increase in sulfuric acid production by 1960.⁶² A new plant to be built in Dimitrovgrad will begin producing a super phosphate fertilizer based on sulfuric acid from the Stalin plant and phosphates from the USSR. The new plant is to have an annual capacity of 100 thousand tons of super phosphate fertilizer, and will be built with Soviet assistance.⁶³

Although the largest consumers of Maritsa Basin coal are the Dimitrovgrad chemical and power plants, located in the heart of the basin, it is likely that the Marbas also has a regional importance as a coal

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supplier. Plovdiv in particular is thought to be dependent to some extent on coal from the Maritsa Basin.⁶⁴ Stara Zagora, Nova Zagora, Maritsa, Kaskovo, and Kurdzhali are other likely important consumers. All of these towns are serviced by single-track rail lines radiating from Dimitrovgrad. The interdiction of the rail connections between Dimitrovgrad and these towns would do much to deprive the latter of their coal supplies. However, in view of the extent to which alternate rail routes are available in this area, some rerouting of coal shipments would still be possible.

Other coal producing areas in Bulgaria for the most part are of only local significance. The Rudnik or Cherno More coal mine northeast of Burgas supplies primarily a nearby thermal power plant. Surplus production is consumed in Burgas. Other small coal fields are at Iom (lignite), Svoge (anthracite), and Sliven (bituminous). These coal deposits are reportedly difficult to work and contribute very little to the total coal production in Bulgaria.⁶⁵

b. Oil

Bulgaria has embarked on a program of exploitation of recently discovered oil deposits along the Black Sea coast. The full extent of the newly tapped reserves is as yet unknown but it is likely to involve off-shore as well as on-shore deposits. Under the program, crude oil production has risen from nothing in 1952, the year of discovery, to 150 thousand tons in 1955 and 246.7 thousand tons in 1956. It is expected to reach 280 thousand tons in 1957.⁶⁶ The only known producing field is located in the Dobruja in the area Shabla-Tyulenovo, north of Balchik and Kavarna. A recent observer of this area has disclosed that there are as many as 120 free-flowing producing points in the field.⁶⁷ Another source reports that about 50 wells in the field are on pump.⁶⁸ Oil is gathered and stored in a number of concrete reservoirs in the field, whence it is transported to Kavarna and Stalin by a fleet of tank trucks. The construction of a pipeline linking the field to these two ports is expected to

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remedy this inefficient transportation situation at an early date (see under Pipelines). Although the Shabla field is the only one known to be producing, it has been reported that exploratory drillings all along the Black Sea coast have confirmed the existence of other oil deposits. These are allegedly located in the vicinities of Bulgarovo (4237N-2719E) north-west of Burgas, and Rezovo (4200N-2759E) on the Turkish frontier.⁶⁹

At present, Bulgaria is deriving little practical benefit from the extraction of its oil reserves. Of the 246.7 thousand tons of crude which were produced in 1956, only one-fifth of the amount is estimated to have remained in the country.⁷⁰ The bulk of the crude oil production is exported primarily to Czechoslovakia, but also to Greece and Italy. This situation can be attributed to the fact that Bulgaria lacks adequate refining and especially cracking facilities necessary to convert her domestic crude production into usable petroleum products. Three small distillation plants in Ruse and another in Verila (4237N-2335E) southeast of Sofia account for all of her refining capacity. The combined production of these plants is of negligible significance in terms of the country's daily needs for petroleum products (estimated annual consumption 350 thousand tons).⁷¹ Until additional facilities are developed, Bulgaria will continue to remain dependent on imported refined petroleum products.

Fuel oil imports are landed and stored for interior distribution at the Black Sea and Danube River ports. The refined products originate in Rumania and the USSR. Major storage facilities are at Ruse, the terminal point for a pipeline from the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania, Burgas and Stalin. Smaller storage depots are located in Svishtov, Lom and Somovit. Except for the pipeline serviced facility at Ruse, these storage dumps are replenished by tankers and barges plying the Black Sea and Danube River. Fuel is distributed inland via truck and railroad tank cars. These imported fuel supplies are most vulnerable to interdiction through disruption of the road and rail links between the interior and the ports. Interdiction of

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Bulgarian crude oil production through the destruction of the transportation arteries (pipeline, road, railroad) via which the oil is removed from the fields to transshipping points, although having relatively little effect upon the Bulgarian economy would, however, have the advantageous effect of depriving Satellite Europe of this source of crude oil.

4. Power

a. General

Bulgaria's Communist program for economic and industrial development has placed heavy emphasis on increased production of electric power. Although during the past 12 years many new plants have been built and additions have been made to old plants in order to increase substantially the country's generating capacity, Bulgaria continues to surpass only Albania in the production of electric power in the satellite states. Nevertheless, significant strides have been made in electric power production as witnessed by the fact that post-war production has risen steadily by 200-300 million kwh. annually.

TABLE II
ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION
(Billion Kwh.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Bulgaria</u>
1939	.268
1947	.490
1948	.549
1949	.664
1950	.804
1951	1.024
1952	1.365
1953	1.570
1954	1.743
1955	2.055
1956	2.397

Table II shows that less than 300 million kwh. were produced in the last pre-war year. By 1952 annual production had been raised to 1.3 billion,

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kwh.; in 1953 1.5 billion kwh. were produced. Between 1955 and 1956 production rose from 2 billion kwh. to 2.3 billion kwh. As noteworthy as it is in terms of Bulgaria's industrial development, this steady increase is, however, somewhat misleading in the absence of a comparison to other countries. Indeed, when comparisons are made, they accurately depict the full extent of Bulgaria's underdeveloped economy. For example, Bulgaria's 1954 output of approximately 1.7 billion kwh. compares very unfavorably with the 3.2 billion kwh. produced in the same year by Denmark, a country with roughly only one-half the area and population of Bulgaria. When compared to the state of Ohio, which has approximately the same area and population as Bulgaria, the latter's 2 billion kwh. of electric power produced in 1955 is dwarfed by the former's 42 billion kwh.

Despite an increase in power production to nine times the pre-war level, demand continues to exceed supply, primarily because the rapid industrial demand increase has not been matched by increases in installed capacity. Bulgarian industry annually consumes an estimated two-thirds of all the power produced, and in order to meet this heavy demand in hours of peak load, power must sometimes be rationed.⁷² The increase in electric power production shown in Table has been achieved mainly at the expense of the intensive use of installed capacity to the detriment of adequate maintenance programs. Whenever it is necessary to make repairs to existing generating equipment, the country must stand the loss of many millions of kwh. For example, in 1954 45 million kwh. were lost to the economy because of boiler repairs in the Republika power station in Dimitrovo. A rotor failure in one of the turbines at the Dimitrovo thermal station was responsible for the loss of an additional 11 million kwh. over a period of 61 days during 1954. The rotor failure and the necessity for making boiler repairs were both attributed officially to the lack of proper maintenance.⁷³

Since 1945, 250,000 kw. of new generating capacity has been added to the Bulgarian plant, thereby doubling the generating base.⁷⁴ It is expected

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that installed capacity at the end of the current five-year plan will total 700,000 kw., but recent indications are that the plan will not be fulfilled on schedule. The Bulgarian press as late as March 1956 complained that important projects such as the Stalin and Batak power schemes were seriously lagging.⁷⁵

Ninety per cent of the installed capacity is located in the southern half of the country where coal and water supplies are also located. In addition, most of the power construction programs underway are being carried out in the same area. Northern Bulgaria and especially the Danube Plain and the Dobruja are largely dependent upon southern Bulgaria and Rumania for their power supplies. It is in northern Bulgaria and especially in the Dobruja that most of the country's diesel plants are located (see Map R). For the most part these are small and do not exceed 5,000 kw. The power deficit Dobruja area looks to the completion of a national transmission system and additional plants in the southern half of the country to assure it of adequate power supplies. Until such a time as the various construction programs are completed, the Dobruja and the Danube River ports will continue to rely on small diesel plants to meet their local power needs.

Three large concentrations of power producing facilities exist (see Map R). The largest concentration is in the Sofia-Dimitrovo region, which with its 130,000 kw. accounts for more than one-fourth of the country's installed capacity. The completion of programs currently underway in this area with respect to the building of new hydro plants and the extension of existing thermal facilities is expected to add another 114,000 kw. to the area's total capacity by the end of 1957. Dimitrovgrad with three existing thermal plants and one under construction has the country's second largest concentration. Generating capacity in this area is expected to total more than 120,000 kw. by the end of 1957 if current plans are met on time. The third concentration exists to the south of Plovdiv where generating

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capacity will approach 130,000 kw. when current construction is completed in 1958. The addition of new plant facilities anticipated by long-range plans will further increase the power production capacity of the Plovdiv area.

b. Hydro

Although Bulgaria has, in virtue of its many mountain streams, a relatively high hydro power potential in relation to its size, this potential cannot be fully realized without difficulty owing to the irregular or seasonal flow of the streams. Proper harnessing of the Bulgarian rivers, therefore, necessitates construction of dams by which the stream flow can be maintained at a constant level throughout the year. Construction projects of this type take many years to complete. In this fact lies another of the many reasons why Bulgarian power production has not increased at a rate which would match the growing demand of the country's power consumers.

The incessant demand for power has in some instances lead Bulgarian planners to build and place in operation hydro plants with substantial (by Bulgarian standards) installed capacity without first regulating stream flow by means of dams and storage lakes. Such plants have been built at points where terrain conditions permit the achievement of a high operating head through long penstocks. This method of procedure is especially noticeable in the case of the new 8,000 kw. Petrovo (4127N-2329E) plant. This plant is unable to realize its potential capacity because an insufficient amount of water precludes the operation of all its three turbines at once.⁷⁶ Until just recently when the Vasil Kolarov and allied dams near Batak were completed, the Vucha plant near Krichim (4203N-2428E) was forced to operate at only 40 per cent of capacity during the dry summer months because of insufficient water supply.⁷⁷ Other hydro plants throughout the country continue to be similarly affected throughout the year by irregular water supplies.

The fulfillment of long-range plans will remedy the inconstant water supply situation through the construction of an adequate number of

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strategically located dams and reservoirs. These will both regulate stream flow to existing hydro plants and permit the construction of new plants, thereby substantially increasing both installed capacity and its full utilization. According to current plans approximately 50 dams and 70 hydro plants eventually will be constructed in the mountains of southern Bulgaria. Among the more important schemes now in the process of construction or contemplated, are those on the Arda (Studen Kladenets and other dams), Isk^Uur (Stalin dam), and Klisura (Petrokhan scheme) Rivers; the Batak waterway and Dospat schemes based on the Kolarov and allied dams; and the projected Belmeken (4211N-2343E) Sestrimo (4213N-2354E) system. Most of these schemes have as an added purpose the provision of water for irrigation of nearby areas.

The Arda plan anticipates the construction of 12 to 15 power plants serving southeast and northeast Bulgaria, and irrigating the plains of Khaskovo (4155N-2532E) and Kharmanli (4155N-2554E). Water from the Stalin dam near Gorni Pasarel (4229N-2235E) will motivate the Pasarel, Kokalyane, and Pancharevo power plants, and provide for the irrigation of the Sofia plain. The Batak waterway, which consists of a number of dams, canals, and pressure tunnels, the keystone of which is the Vasil Kolarov dam between Batak and Dospat, is the most ambitious of all the programs. It is expected that the power plant portion of this program will be completed in 1958 when the 30,000-38,000 kw. capacity Aleko plant near Aleko Constantinovo (4209N-2417E) is to begin operating. Two other plants at Batak and Peshtera with capacities of 30,000 kw. each will round out the power plant side of this system which will also provide irrigation water for the Plovdiv plain. Allied with the Batak waterway is the Dospat scheme which is also based on the Vasil Kolarov dam and includes a number of smaller dams along the Vucha River and its tributaries. In addition to the previously mentioned Vucha plant, hydro facilities at Devin (4145N-2424E) and Krichim are part of the Dospat system.

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The Belmeken hydroelectric system will be based on the Sestrimska River and will include a major dam near Belmeken Mountain, numerous canals, and three new power plants. These will be located at Belmeken (4211N-2343E), Sestrimska and Momina Klisura in the Momina Klisura gorge where the Sestrimska joins the Maritsa River. Power from these plants will be transmitted to the power deficit areas of northern Bulgaria. The project will take 12 years to complete.

Other combined power and irrigation schemes include the already operating Rositsa and Georgi Dimitrov systems. The Rositsa (Stamboliski) dam, 18 kms. south of Sevlievo (4302N-2506E), by regulating the stream flow of the Rositsa River provides a constant supply of water to the Rositsa I power plant at Gorsko Kosovo (4307N-2510E) and also permits irrigation of 62,000 acres of the Rositsa Plain. Water from the Georgi Dimitrov (Koprinka) dam on the Tundzha River west of Kazanluk is currently used to power two new hydro plants, one of which (capacity 7,300 kw.) is at the dam, and the other, one of the country's largest (22,000 kw.) at Stara Zagora (4225N-2538E). Over 30 kms. of canals, including a 6-km. tunnel through the mountains between Rezino and Stara Zagora, carry water from the dam to the Stara Zagora plant. After passing the plant at Stara Zagora the water is used for irrigation in that area. The 9 sq.-km. lake behind the Georgi Dimitrov dam also provides irrigation waters for the Kazanluk Plain.

Many varied vulnerabilities of interest to Special Forces are centered in Bulgaria's hydro scheme complexes. In view of the country's chronic power shortage, it is evident that the destruction of even some of the smaller hydro plants would have serious economic effects. It is only through the collective output of all the plants that day to day power needs are met.

Bulgaria's hydro plants can be interdicted in a number of ways. These include outright demolition, destruction of connecting pressure

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canals and penstocks, and destruction of transformers, circuit breakers and other equipment which cannot be immediately replaced and which for the most part have to be imported. The small domestic electrical equipment industry (ELPROM in Sofia) is unable to mass produce heavy electrical equipment and Bulgaria relies on the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for many necessary items. The blowing up of dams on which many plants are dependent for regular water flow and, in some instances, for adequate head would in a number of cases restrict or prevent power plant operation and provide the added effects of downstream flooding and loss of irrigation waters. These are but a few of the local and national economic effects resulting from the interdiction of hydro power plants in Bulgaria.

c. Thermal

To date the Bulgarians have made fairly equal use of coal and water power and have supplemented the electrical output achieved by these motive forces with a number of diesel powered stations ranging in size from 1,000 to 5,000 kw. Because of the longer time required to build hydroelectric plants, the Communist planners first sought to meet the country's immediate needs for electric power by expanding existing thermal stations and building a number of new ones. In 1952, thermal power plants were producing 69 per cent of the country's power, and hydroelectric plants were producing only 28 per cent. It is not expected that production between the two will be balanced until the end of the fourth five-year plan in 1967. Until that time, therefore, Bulgaria's thermal power plants will continue to be the most important. Thermal power capacity is nowhere near as diversified as the hydro capacity but is concentrated in only a few large plants. These include the Vulko Chervenkov, Maritsa II and Maritsa Iztok plants in and near Dimitrovgrad; the Republika and Dimitrovo plants in Dimitrovo; the Stalin and Kurilo plants in and near Sofia; and the Yanko Kostov plant in Stalin. The 50,000 kw. Republika plant which is currently being expanded to 75,000-100,000 kw., the 50,000 kw. Vulko Chervenkov plant and the 60,000 kw. Stalin plant

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account for the bulk of the post-war increase in generating capacity. These plants moreover are currently undergoing further expansions which will make their importance loom even larger.

All thermal plants in Bulgaria excluding the diesel plants which may be considered as a special category are coal burning facilities. Thermal power plants rank second behind railroads in coal consumption. In 1954 they consumed 2.166 million metric tons of coal or one-fourth of all the coal produced in that year. Together with the railroads, which for their own part annually consume another 25 per cent of coal production, Bulgaria's thermal power plants account for one-half of the country's coal consumption.

Bulgaria's large and important thermal power plants could not be as readily interdicted by Special Forces as could the smaller hydro facilities. With only four exceptions these large plants are located in the heart of the coal producing regions and they are, therefore, relatively invulnerable to loss of fuel supplies through the interdiction of railroads. The important exceptions, however, are the Stalin and Kurilo plants in and north of Sofia which depend upon coal hauled from the Dimitrovo mines; the Maritsa Iztok plant, which when completed will depend upon coal from the Maritsa Basin mines to the west; and the Yanko Kostov plant in Stalin which must receive its coal either by sea or by long haul over the railroads from the mining areas to the southwest. The remaining important thermal power plants are nevertheless vulnerable through more direct measures such as the destruction of transformers, or other plant facilities which cannot be easily repaired. Transformers are an especial weakness because those of a heavy-duty nature are not produced domestically and must be imported.

d. Transmission System

Almost all of the important power plants are interconnected in regional nets through which power is freely exchanged. These regional

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nets are gradually being linked up through a national high-voltage transmission system which is still being constructed. At present, the basic transmission system consists of a 110-kv. line following a course Plovdiv-Sofia-Mezdra-Chervenbryag-Pleven-Gorna Oryakhovitsa-Razgrad-Ruse. Branches from this line run between Dimitrovo and Sofia and from Mezdra to Vidin. An international connection with Rumania exists between Ruse and Giurgiu. It is planned to construct another between Vidin and Craiova. A second major 110-kv. line runs from Dimitrovgrad through Maritsa Iztok to Karnobat, Provodoya, and Stalin. Branches from this line run from Dimitrovgrad south to Kŭrdzhali and from Karnobat to Burgas. The line is being extended from Stalin to Tolbukhin. A link-up with the first mentioned line is also being constructed between Stalin and Razgrad via Kolarovgrad. When this link-up is accomplished, a 110-kv. system will encircle the country with the exception of a stretch between Plovdiv and Dimitrovgrad which according to the best information available, are joined by only a 60-kv. line.

According to recently announced plans, the 110-kv. transmission system will be supplemented by a 220-kv. line which is to run from the Aleko sub-station near the power plant of the same name, to a sub-station at Maritsa Iztok and thence via Yambol and Provodiya to the Dobruja. Another line, also beginning at Aleko, will cross the Balkan Mountains via Kalofer, Kazanlık, Gabrovo and Turnovo to Gorna Oryakhovitsa. The new transmission system will be built in stages. In 1957 and 1958, the line between Aleko and Gorna Oryakhovitsa will be constructed. During the same period, the first part of the line to the Dobruja will be erected as far as Maritsa Iztok. The sector between Maritsa Iztok and the Dobruja is not scheduled for completion until 1962 and will evidently await completion of work on the Arda River hydro complex which will be tied into the net via Maritsa Iztok.⁷⁸ The purpose of the new transmission system will be to insure adequate power supplies to the Danube and Dobruja regions. The power will be drawn from the surplus production of the Batak and Arda River hydroelectric systems.

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
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Transmission systems of 60-kv. exist between the power plants in the Rila Mountains and Sofia and between Dimitrovgrad and Gorna Oryakhovitsa. The latter system crosses the Balkan Mountains between Kazanluk and Gabrovo and has a number of branch lines which both supply power to towns on either side of the mountains and pick up power from the plants which are located between the lines' termini.

All of Bulgaria's cross-country transmission systems and especially the 110- and 60-kv. lines would be suitable targets for Special Forces. Although transmission lines can be more easily repaired than power plants, the disruption of transmission systems through the destruction of towers from which the lines are suspended and, more importantly, the destruction of easily interdicted sub-stations and transformer yards, would have serious and long-lasting consequences, especially in a country such as Bulgaria where most of the equipment necessary to maintain a transmission system must be imported.

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5. Telecommunications

a. General

The Bulgarian telecommunications net is depicted on Map S. In general the telecommunications system covers the country in a manner that permits the rendering of adequate, if not prompt and reliable, service to the government, the Army and security forces, the railroads, industry and private users. Service is provided through wired telephone and telegraph facilities and radio. The former include independent systems for the railroads, the Army, and presumably for the security forces. The military net, which is carried on pole lines of the public system, is believed to be tied in, in the Black Sea area, with the Rumanian system and the Russian Odessa military district. Radio communications are also employed by the railroads and the military, including the Army and security forces. Other uses of radio facilities include: meteorological, coastal, and aeronautical communications; domestic and international broadcasts; and domestic and international communications. A number of standard and readily available intelligence reference sources provide recent and relatively complete coverage of these telecommunications systems.⁷⁹

One of the greatest weaknesses of Bulgarian telecommunications is its dependence on imported equipment, spare parts, and essential components. Despite a build-up of the domestic electrical equipment and communications industry the country is dependent on other satellite countries and the USSR to fill many of its modern equipment needs. Domestic output is largely limited to batteries, insulating conductors, cable and wire, small transformers, and motors. Domestic manufacture of radio transmitting and receiving sets is more of an assembly process based on imported parts than it is outright manufacture. All production is controlled through the electro-technical combine, ELFROM, which has two main plants (the Vasil Kolarov and Kliment Voroshilov) in Sofia and subsidiary plants in Ruse (Naiden Kirov), Kazanlık, Gabrovo, and Eliseyna. Annual capacity

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for the assembly of major telecommunications items has been estimated at 150,000 radio receivers; 60,000 automatic and manual telephone sets; 40,000 loudspeakers, and 500 amplifiers.

b. Vulnerability

Although the Bulgarian telecommunications system is highly vulnerable to interdiction through the cutting of wire lines and the destruction of installations which are located in rural areas, the ready availability of alternate circuits and alternate means of telecommunications precludes the effective disruption of the entire system through a Special Forces type of operation. Nevertheless, the interdiction of parts of the system would produce many desirable results. For example, the destruction of equipment which cannot be easily repaired and which, including even such small items as vacuum tubes, must be imported from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and the USSR, could conceivably result in the immobilization of selected repeater stations and exchanges. Although the more important of these are located in relatively inaccessible urban areas, installations of secondary importance which are invariably located in local post offices could be reached by Special Forces. Offices and equipment associated with the railway telecommunications system are located in railway stations.

Destruction of easily repaired open wire lines, which generally parallel roads and railroads, could prove temporarily advantageous by forcing the rerouting of messages and isolating certain areas from wire communications for short periods. Forces rerouting probably would also provoke considerable nationwide delay in transmission as a result of the over-burdening of low capacity alternate circuits.

Radio communications could be interdicted by Special Forces directly through the destruction of facilities and equipment or indirectly through power supplies. It is not known, however, to what extent radio stations and other telecommunications media are equipped with reserve power sources. It has been alleged that a number of small diesel power stations with a maximum


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capacity of 10,000 kw. are being located in strategic places to serve as alternate sources of power during emergencies.⁸¹ Whether any of these will be, or have been, provided to important radio communications facilities is not known. Destruction of irreplaceable high voltage transformers at radio transmitting sites would in most instances cause a permanent shutdown in transmission. Interdiction of coastal radio stations which are important in the defense of the Black Sea coast and to shipping on the Black Sea and the Danube River would be a worthwhile Special Forces objective. It is to be expected that the more important radio transmission sites would be guarded in time of war.

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6. Mining

a. General

Bulgaria's principal mining (including oil producing) areas are shown on Map T . The very generalized presentation of this map is designed only to highlight the mineral producing regions. The map should be used in conjunction with standard intelligence reference materials which contain the basic information necessary to a proper understanding of the extent to which Bulgarian mineral resources (excluding coal and oil which have been previously discussed in this report) are being developed and utilized.⁸² Map T shows that there are two major areas of mining activity. These are the Rhodope district, with Kŭrdzhali serving as a hub of operations, and the Sofia hinterland. Among the smaller areas those of significant economic importance include the Bobov Dol coal mining district; the Gabrovo area, which produces coal, iron and manganese; the Provadiya area whose salt reserves are the basis for one of the country's largest industrial establishments--the Karl Marx soda works at Devnya; the oil fields between Balchik and Shabla; and the Burgas Bay district with small reserves of coal, iron, copper, salt and, probably, oil.

The Rhodope mining basin, which on Map T has been extended northward to Dimitrovgrad in order to include the Maritsa Basin coal deposits and the iron reserves of Khaskovo, produces a variety of minerals. The most important of these are lead and zinc, chrome, copper, and pyrites. The extraction of these minerals is planned and coordinated by Garubso, the state-owned mining directorate with headquarters in Kŭrdzhali. Garubso was, until late 1955, a joint Russian-Bulgarian enterprise and is still probably subject to considerable direction by Russian advisers.

Kŭrdzhali also has important flotation plants and a new (since 1955) lead-zinc smelter. These plants are fed by ore-hauling trucks from the mines to the southwest and by a 42-km. aerial cableway which originates in the vicinity of Borieva (4127N-2458E). Other flotation plants in the

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Rhodope Basin are located at Madan (4130N-2457E), the second most important mining town in the Rhodopes; Rudozem (4129N-2453E); Srednogortsi (4132N-2455E); and Strashimir, which is located between Zlatograd and Madan on the main road between those two towns.

The mineral output of the Rhodope mining basin is exported to other satellites and to the USSR, the primary consumer. In the absence of adequate domestic refining facilities, Bulgaria exchanges its ore concentrates for refined products. Although the new smelter in Kirdzhali is expected to help meet domestic needs for refined lead and zinc, it will probably not eliminate the country's dependence upon imports of those metals and their products. The present pattern of concentration and export could be somewhat altered in future years, however, if current plans are followed. Hydroelectric power development schemes to the immediate north and east of the Rhodope mining basin are expected to supply power necessary for expanded mining operations and possibly electrolytic refining of lead and zinc. Inadequate power supplies are currently received from Beli Izvor and Ustovo. (See Power map.)

Important minerals mined in the Sofia region include, in addition to the coal mined at Dimitrovo (see above under Fuel), iron, manganese and uranium. Of these, uranium is strategically important. It has been estimated that Bulgarian uranium, which is mined principally in the Bukhovo area northeast of Sofia, fulfills approximately 4 per cent of Russian uranium requirements. The Bukhovo mines are reportedly subject to direct Russian supervision. Uranium ore is concentrated at plants in Bukhovo and Kremikovzi (4247N-2330E) and is exported to the USSR via the Sub-Balkan rail line and the Black Sea ports. In the past, much of the manganese produced in this and other mining areas has been exported, principally to Poland (the largest consumer), East Germany, Austria, and Italy. Some of the manganese is undoubtedly consumed by the Dimitrovo steel works and additional amounts will probably be required if steel production is expanded according to plan.


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b. Vulnerability

Bulgaria's mineral production can be interdicted in many ways, of which some would consist of direct attacks on mines and related structures and others of indirect interdiction through the disruption of road and railway transport, and power supplies. In the Rhodope mining district the destruction of a number of important aerial cableways, power plants and transmission lines, and bridges on roads over which ore is trucked from mines to processing plants would have a very considerable adverse effect on production. In view of the fact that the southern half of this area is restricted and under the control of Bulgarian security forces, whom Special Forces would want to avoid, Special Forces could employ a more indirect and somewhat easier, but nonetheless effective, method of interdicting Rhodope mineral production. They could sever the Trans-Balkan railroad at any point between Kŭrdzhali and the junction with the Orient Express line at Dimitrovgrad. Should this rail link be cut, it is most unlikely that truck transportation, whose potentiality is limited by poor roads and an inadequate number of vehicles, would be able to transport more than a fraction of the ore tonnage which normally moves northward by rail from Kŭrdzhali to Bulgarian consuming centers and export points. An added advantage which would be gained by interdicting this railroad would be the denial of Rhodope pyrites to the Stalin chemical combine in Dimitrovgrad.

In the Sofia, as well as in smaller mineral producing areas, the severing of rail communications in strategic places and the interdiction of power plants and transmission lines serving the mines and processing plants, in many instances, would have as great an effect on mineral output as could be achieved through a series of attacks on isolated mines and structures. Indirect interdiction would be desirable also because the more important mines and especially the uranium mines and processing plants are the objects of extraordinary security precautions. Others, as in the case of the Dimitrovo coal mines, are sometimes located in relatively inaccessible industrial districts.



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7. Conclusions

Of the many weaknesses in the Bulgarian economy two are outstanding-- rail transportation and electric power. A third vulnerability, coal, is closely allied with the other two and cannot be readily separated from them. Of these three vulnerabilities, railroad transportation is by far the most important. Bulgaria's complete dependence on its limited, though adequate, single-track railroad system cannot be over-emphasized. Without the railroads, Bulgaria would be unable to move her raw materials from producing centers to domestic processing and consuming centers and, more importantly, to the Danube and Black Sea ports for export to the USSR and other satellites. In the absence of rail transportation the Sofia, Dimitrovo, Dimitrovgrad and other smaller industrial and urban centers would be deprived of the many finished and semi-finished products which are indispensable to the Bulgarian economy and which are imported via the Danube and Black Sea water routes. From a military standpoint the railroads are of great strategic importance as extensions of overland routes from the USSR to Greece, southern Yugoslavia, and European Turkey. It is through the effective disruption of the railway transportation system that Special Forces could do the greatest harm to the Bulgarian economy and at the same time seriously impede a Russian military effort launched via Bulgaria and designed to overrun the northeastern shores of the Mediterranean.

The over-all vulnerability of the railroads is very high and results from the fact that they must everywhere overcome difficult terrain obstacles via bridges, tunnels and other heavy engineering developments. Because all trunk lines are only single track only one of the many key structures encountered on each line would have to be destroyed to render the line inoperative for many months. Through a careful selection of target sites, rail traffic could be so disrupted that it would be impossible to re-route through trains. Railroad interdiction, therefore, would everywhere in Bulgaria be the first objective of Special Forces.

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Electric power is Bulgaria's second most important vulnerability. The country as a whole is a power deficit area. Moreover, no one part has as yet a power surplus which would assure other areas of constant power supplies. Even though current power construction programs in southern Bulgaria are intended to create power surpluses which can be transmitted by means of a nationwide system to power deficit sections and especially the Dobruja, it is likely that these programs will be unable to meet the intended goal in view of the ever-growing power requirements of the Sofia, Dimitrovgrad and other industrial areas. In view of the likelihood of a continuing power shortage, small power plants, consequently, will probably continue to retain a degree of importance greatly disproportionate to their size. In virtue of the nationwide need for power from any source, the interdiction of power plants which are linked to the power distribution net and which are located in readily accessible rural areas would have an accumulatively adverse effect on the country's economy. In some instances, even small diesel plants, which for want of alternative power sources and the fact that replacements would have to be imported, would be worthwhile Special Forces objectives.

Coal is Bulgaria's third important weakness. Without it, Bulgarian industry, large and important thermal power plants, and the railroads could not function. Coal distribution can be interdicted through the railroads. The interdependency of coal, rail transport, and power production is such that disruption of any one service automatically affects the other two.

Of the other facets of the Bulgarian economy--roads, mining, telecommunications, waterways, pipelines and oil--though each is in its own right vulnerable to interdiction in a variety of ways, none is as important as the three primary vulnerabilities. Telecommunications could not be effectively disrupted on a nationwide basis but could be interdicted locally in connection with the railroads. Inland waterways and pipelines as means of transportation occur in only local instances. Domestic oil and most of the mineral ores and concentrates are exported and are only indirectly

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important to the nation's economy. They can, furthermore, be reached through the railroads as can the refined petroleum products and processed metals for which they are exchanged in international trade. All of these target systems should be regarded by Special Forces as secondary objectives.

Highways are deserving of special consideration but not as an economic target system. They are primarily important as strategic through routes for military traffic moving from the USSR and Rumania toward the Greek, Turkish, and Yugoslav frontiers. The many structural weaknesses of the highways render them subject to rapid deterioration under heavy use, which in turn would occasion much re-routing. This could be done on the basis of any number of alternate routes which probably would, however, also soon deteriorate to a state of impassability. Momentary circumstances would, therefore, largely determine the importance of any highway route and its suitability as an object for Special Forces interdiction.

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PART V

SPECIAL FORCES AREAS

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Introduction

The first half of this report consists of a four-part discussion of the criteria which determine the suitability of Bulgaria for Special Forces operations. Part I deals with Bulgaria's resistance history with particular emphasis on contemporary resistance activity. Part II analyzes geographical factors affecting Special Forces operations such as terrain and climate variations, possibilities for cross-country movement, vegetation cover, and settlement patterns. The second section of Part II is concerned with the ethnic and social characteristics of the Bulgarian people as well as with those factors which might incline or disincline them to support Special Forces operations. Part III discusses the importance of forced labor in Bulgaria. The distribution of security forces and security zones is also analyzed in Part III from the standpoint of their bearing on Special Forces activities. Part IV contains a discussion of Bulgaria's economic vulnerabilities with particular attention to railway transport, electric power, and coal supplies as outstanding among the country's vulnerability factors and also offering the most important objectives to be interdicted by Special Forces.

The second half of this report--Part V--consists of a more detailed analysis of those specific areas within Bulgaria which are considered most suitable for Special Forces operations according to the criteria outlined above. This analysis is, moreover, related to maps of smaller scale and more definitive nature than those accompanying the general sections in the first half of this report.

The evaluation leads to the conclusion that, on the basis of geographic and concealment possibilities, only the immediate borders of the Danube River are wholly unsuitable for Special Forces operations. Throughout the remainder of the country favorable combinations of dissected terrain and forest cover provide many opportunities for concealment and refuge. Suitability for Special Forces operations in terms

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of ethnic distribution and security controls is uniform throughout the country except in the frontier zone and a few security zones in interior Bulgaria. Important structures which would be the objects of interdiction by Special Forces are more or less evenly distributed throughout the country and are within striking distance of suitable cover and areas of predominantly rural population.

The weighing of these factors both favorable and unfavorable to Special Forces has resulted in the delineation of three "Special Forces Areas" which are depicted on Map U and which are discussed separately in this portion of the report. Each area is examined on the basis of concealment possibilities; ethnic structure and attitudes of its population, especially as the latter have been manifested in recent resistance; incidence of forced labor and security controls; and economic importance, with particular reference to structures which might be vulnerable to interdiction by Special Forces. Every region of Bulgaria in which objectives of major economic importance are located has been included within the confines of one of the suggested Special Forces Areas.

It will be noted that in each of the proposed Special Forces Areas, there are heavily settled urban and industrial concentrations around which stringent security controls prevail. The Partial List of Key Structures for each area does not attempt to distinguish between those structures which lie in or close to these security zones and others which lie in less densely populated rural areas not normally subject to extraordinary security precautions. Operations planning will have to take cognizance of this aspect of the Special Forces Area analyses. However, whereas it is generally true that operations which can be carried out at some distance from heavy population concentrations and from security control areas are preferable from the standpoint of Special Forces, it is a characteristic of Bulgaria that favorable physical features offering concealment and evasion possibilities are frequently present in close proximity to urban

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concentrations and their key targets. In cases where key targets are situated in the midst of Bulgarian cities, Special Forces can attack these key structures indirectly by the disruption of communications or power lines. Each key structure should thus be studied individually; the Partial List of Key Structures appended to each area analysis is not meant to be a list of target recommendations nor is it a complete list of vulnerable key structures.


Because Bulgaria's peacetime economy as well as its anticipated wartime function is so clearly oriented geographically to a broad north-south axis between it, the USSR, and other satellites, the three suggested Special Forces Areas have been selected so as to conform to this axis and to include in each at least one of the country's three main routes of transportation and communication which in time of war would probably become major avenues for the movement of military traffic from the USSR and Rumania into Greece, southern Yugoslavia, and European Turkey. The westernmost route through Bulgaria via the Iskŭr Gorge through the Balkan Mountains, the Sofia Plain, and the Struma Valley is included in Special Forces Area I. Special Forces Area II has as its central feature the difficult north-south rail route from the Danube River bridge crossing at Ruse to the Greek frontier south of Podkova. The major portion of the overland route from Rumania to the Turkish frontier is included in Special Forces Area III. Although this selection results in a three-part dissection of routes of considerable economic importance between the Black Sea coast and western Bulgaria, as well as a dissection of such natural geographic features as the Balkan Mountains, a selection of Special Forces Areas based wholly on internal geographic and economic concepts would fail to reflect the basic political-geographic orientation of Bulgaria toward the USSR. It will be noted, however, that the three suggested Special Forces Areas form a continuous belt across Bulgaria, thereby affording a close continuity in these internal geographic and

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economic features. The somewhat arbitrary boundaries between areas, therefore, should not be construed as obstacles to the movement of Special Forces from one area to another.

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Special Forces Area I (Map SFA I)

a. Introduction

Special Forces Area I has as its central feature the Sofia Basin upon which converges a number of important rail and road routes and which is the principal consumer of the power, crops, much of the fuel, and some of the minerals produced in the area. A principal objective of Special Forces operating in Area I might be the isolation of Sofia from the Danube River and Black Sea ports and from the coal fields to the south. A second possible objective, which would be partially achieved through isolation of Sofia, is the interdiction of through rail and road traffic between Rumania to the north and Greece and Yugoslavia to the south and west.

Geographic factors affecting the attainment of Special Forces objectives in Area I are generally favorable. All of the points and specific areas of vulnerability described in sections "e" and "f" below are accessible to foot troops, although in areas of more rugged terrain movement may be difficult. On the other hand, rugged terrain may be advantageous to Special Forces personnel where it provides local cover and retards pursuing forces. Severe winters are the greatest limiting factor both in the Sofia Basin and in the high mountains, but good concealment is available in the wooded mountain slopes. None of the key structures described in section "f" is farther than 20 miles from some form of natural vegetation cover; many are located almost in the shadow of suitable refuge areas.

Assistance for Special Forces operations in Area I could probably be derived from the ethnic Bulgarian population, among whom there was considerable resistance activity in the years 1951-1955. An unfavorable factor to Special Forces is represented by the heavy concentration of security and armed forces in the Sofia Basin.

b. Cover Areas

Area I is endowed with excellent cover areas. Almost all of Bulgaria's coniferous forests are located here. The map following this section shows the distribution of forested areas. It does not distinguish

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between coniferous and deciduous forests which the reader can locate on Map J, "Vegetation", which shows extensive tracts of coniferous forests.

In the region encompassing the Sofia Basin, roughly north of 4220N, west of 2400E, and within the limits of Area I, dense pine and beech forests cover the mountain slopes. The area northwest of the Sofia Basin is not continuously forested, but large stands of shiblyak provide adequate cover.

Dense continuous forests in the Murgash Mountains (4250N-2340E), northeast of the Sofia Basin, have served in the past as a refuge area for partisan bands. Other former refuge areas are located in the Vasilevska Mountains (4250N-2425E) and in the Sredna Gora. Good forest and brush cover is also located in the Rila Mountains and other ranges in the southern part of Area I. Characteristics of cover in these mountains, as well as in the Balkan ranges, have been discussed in previous sections of this study.*

c. Population and Resistance Factors

The dominant population element in Area I, as elsewhere in Bulgaria, is the ethnic Bulgarian. In the Struma Valley region south of Gorna Dzhumaja (now Blagoevgrad) and west of Nevrokop (now Gotse Delchev) live Bulgarian Macedonians between whom and the remainder of the ethnic Bulgarian populace there is a certain mutual aloofness based largely on slight cultural differences and divergent national ambitions. The principal minority group in Area I are the Pomaks whose villages are sprinkled through the mountain regions east of the Mesta River and south of the 42nd parallel. Pomak villages (e.g., Gorno Drenovo, 4139N-2350E) are often located in close proximity to ethnic Bulgarian (e.g., Kovachevitsa, 4141N-2350E, and Leshten, 4138N-2350E) and Turkish villages, with the distinctive feature that Pomak settlements generally occupy the higher elevations and leave the valley basins to the ethnic Bulgarians and Turks. A few Turkish villages in Area I are found in the general vicinity of Devin (4145N-2424E).

* See above, for vegetation, pp. 57-60, and for cross-country movement, pp. 65-73.

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Considerable anti-regime activity has occurred in Area I within recent years. In the period 1951-1952 five important areas of peasant resistance are identified: in the south, in the region bounded by Nevrokop (now Gotse Delchev) and Breznitsa (4140N-2340E) on the east and Mikrevo (4138N-2312E) on the west; in the southwest, in the region bounded by Leshko (4156N-2258E) on the south, Sapareva Banya (4217N-2316E) on the east, and extending beyond Radomir (4233N-2258E) in the east; in the southeast, in the region bounded by Peshtera (4202N-2418E) and Pazardzhik (4211N-2420E) on the west and Plovdiv and Kuklen (4202N-2447E) on the east; and, in the northeast, in the region bounded by Pirdop (4242N-2411E) on the south, Orkhanie (now Botevgrad, 4254N-2348E) in the west, Pleven in the north, and the boundary of Map SFA I in the east.* Anti-regime activity in Area I during 1953-1955 maintained its vigor but took on an increasingly mixed urban-rural character.

Significant loci of resistance were found in two districts: in the center of Area I, in the region bounded by Elisayna (4305N-2330E) on the north, Orkhanie (now Botevgrad) on the east, and Pernik (now Dimitrovo, 4236N-2302E) and Breznik (4244N-2255E) on the south; and, in the southeast, in the region bounded by Cham Koriya (4216N-2336E) in the west, Ikhtiman (4226N-2349E) in the north, Ravnogor (4157N-2422E) in the south, and the boundary of Map SFA I in the east.**

Special Forces units operating in Area I would have to draw their principal support from the ethnic Bulgarian population. Some help could probably be derived from the Macedonians and Pomaks in the south of Area I but in neither case would this assistance be effective outside the relatively limited areas of Macedonian and Pomak settlement.

Partial indication as to the feasibility of unconventional warfare operations in Area I is provided by the experience of Bulgarian partisan bands in World War II. Large guerilla forces based on the Yugoslav border were able to penetrate into the regions northwest and north of

* See above, pp. 24-26, and Appendix I.

** See above, pp. 29-30, and Appendix I.

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Sofia. An important partisan band, numbering in all some 300 men, was poised in the wooded mountain area between Voynyagovo (4235N-2445E) and Poibrene (4230N-2400E). From this vantage point it was in an excellent position to strike repeated blows at the vital east-west rail line connecting Sofia with Plovdiv and Burgas.*

d. Forced Labor and Security Factors

Formerly a prominent feature in the economic life of Bulgaria, forced labor concentrations in Area I have declined to the point where they no longer represent a significant factor in Special Forces planning. The only known labor camps still existing in Area I are located in metropolitan Sofia; camps which existed in other localities as late as 1953 are believed to have been disbanded.

Security and armed forces in Area I are at greatest strength in metropolitan Sofia, which holds both general headquarters and major operational units of the Interior Troops, Frontier Troops, and regular military forces. Southeast of Sofia, in the general area formed by Sofia-Ikhtiman-Samokov (4220N-2334E), is the principal military training and storage area in the country. Interior Troop battalions in Area I are found at Sofia, Vratsa, Pleven, Gorna Dzhumaja (now Blagoevgrad), and Plovdiv. Army infantry divisions are located at Sofia, Vratsa, Pleven, Marek (now Stanke Dimitrov, 4216N-2307E), and Plovdiv; tank regiments are established at Sofia and Plovdiv; and there are mountain rifle regiments at Simitli (4153N-2306E) and Smolyan (4135N-2441E). Frontier Troop regimental headquarters are fixed at Dragoman (4256N-2256E), Simitli, Smolyan, and probably also at Devin; smaller Frontier Troop units are deployed at various points within the frontier zone.

Security zones within Area I are of two types. The frontier zone along the Yugoslav and Greek borders, in which movement is forbidden to anyone except residents and properly authorized persons, lies either east of the

* See above, pp. 13-14.

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nearest parallel roads along the frontier or, as in the lower part of Area I, lies south of a line drawn directly across rugged mountain country. Restricted industrial zones in which population movements are carefully scrutinized are reported in existence around such sites as Sofia, the Bukhovo (4246N-2334E) uranium mines, the Pernik (now Dimitrovo) coal mines, and the Batak (4157N-2413E)-Peshtera (4202N-2418E) hydroelectric complex. Special Forces may expect to encounter frequent road blocks and check points within the frontier zone and restricted areas; in all other parts of Area I there appear to be no unusual security precautions beyond the general requirement that all persons must carry passports which can be shown to local authorities upon demand.

e. Economic Vulnerabilities

(1) Transportation:

(a) Railroads and Fuel:

The principal rail routes of Area I are the north-south Vidin (4400N-2253E)-Kulata (south of Area I) route through Sofia; the North Balkan line, which is identical with the Vidin-Kulata line between Mezdra (4309N-2343E) and Sofia; and the Sub-Balkan line leading eastward from Sofia to Karlovo (4239N-2448E). The combined North Balkan and Vidin-Kulata line is most vulnerable in the Iskŭr Gorge where it transits ten tunnels and many important bridges. It can be readily interdicted by the destruction of any one of these structures or by induced landslides or rock falls from the top of the gorge.

South of Sofia the two rail connections via Vladaya (4238N-2312E) and Voluyak (4246N-2315E) should be cut to interdict and prevent rerouting of coal from the country's largest coal field at Dimitrovo (Pernik on Map SFA I). Interruption of traffic on these rail lines would have many added advantages. All through rail movement via Sofia to the Greek and southern Yugoslav frontiers would be prevented; coal from Bobov Dol (4222N-2300E) and lesser mines further down the Struma Valley would be denied to the remainder of the country; and the large and important thermal

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power plants in Sofia (the 60,000 kw. Nadezhda or Stalin plant) and the nearby suburbs of Kurilo (20,400 kw.) would be deprived of their fuel supplies. In the event that Special Forces would not be able to penetrate deeply into the security defenses between Dimitrovo and Sofia, they might attempt to sever the Struma Valley rail line between Dimitrovo and Radomir where a branch turns west to Kyustendil (outside SFA I) and the Yugoslav frontier. Interdiction between these two points would be equally effective in disrupting rail movement proceeding south from Sofia but would not have the desirable advantage of interdicting the country's largest supply of coal.

The strategically important Sub-Balkan rail line which for maximum effect should be interdicted in Area II, to the east of Karlovo, is nonetheless exceptionally vulnerable in Area I at 12 tunnels between Dolno Kamartsi (4243N-2352E) and Klisura (4242N-2427E). Only one of these tunnels would have to be destroyed to render the line inoperative in Area I. It is to prevent any rerouting of through traffic between Sofia and the Black Sea, via Plovdiv and Karlovo, that the Sub-Balkan should be interdicted in Special Forces Area II, east of Karlovo.

(b) Highways:

Strategic north-south routes through Area I include two highways: one from Bulgaria's Western Danube to Sofia via Ferdinand (now Mikhaylovgrad, 4235N-2314E) and Petrokhan Pass, the other via Vratsa (4313N-2333E) and the Iskur Gorge. Both routes have been improved in recent years; the Petrokhan Pass road is occasionally snow-blocked during the winter months. These highways continue south from Sofia to Greece via the Struma Valley and an alternate route via Samokov, Bansko (4150N-2329E), and Nevrokop (now Gotse Delchev) through the Rila Mountains and the Mesta River Valley. The latter route has been realigned in the vicinity of Gorni Pasarel (4229N-2334E)-Kalkovo (4227N-2333E) as a result of the inundation of that area by the lake from the recently constructed Stalin dam. Another north-south route of strategic importance in Area I parallels the eastern

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border of SFA I from Pleven and connections with the Danube and runs to the Greek frontier south of Smolyan, via Troyan Pass in the Balkan Mountains, Karlovo, Plovdiv, Asenovgrad, (just beyond Area II) and Chepelare (4143N-2441E). Parts of this route are very narrow. In the Troyan Pass, especially, the road is capable of handling only one-way military traffic.

A number of lateral connections between the principal north-south routes exist throughout Area I. Among the more important of these are a highway to Yugoslavia via Dragoman Pass and another via Radomir to Kyustendil and beyond. The latter branches from the north-south Struma Valley route at Dimitrovo (Tserkva on Map SFA I). Three other important and reportedly well-maintained highways in Area I lead eastward from Sofia toward the Eastern Danube, the Black Sea, and the Turkish frontier. The first of these is the trunk road via Murgash Pass to Orkhanie (now Botevgrad), Yablanitsa (4302N-2406E), Lovech (4308N-2442E), and Turnovo in Area II. The second is a direct route east from Sofia to Burgas, roughly paralleling the Sub-Balkan rail line. The third, which is one of the best highways in Bulgaria, is that portion of the international highway from Yugoslavia to Turkey between Sofia and Plovdiv.

All of the roads of Area I traverse difficult terrain and have many bridge structures (some wooden) as well as numerous cuts, fills, sharp curves, and steep grades. All of these features make them highly vulnerable to ground interdiction at innumerable places.

(2) Power:

Many important power plants are located throughout Area I. Most of these are linked to the net which feeds the Sofia-Dimitrovo sector, the principal power-consuming center in the area. Area I's power system can be interdicted in a variety of ways. In addition to the destruction of plants and such irreplaceable equipment as transformers, the cutting of high tension power lines would be an effective stroke. Among the more important lines in Area I are a 60-kv. line from the Rila plants near Rila (4208N-2308E) to Sofia; a 110-kv. line from Dimitrovo (Moshino on

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{ SFA Map I) to Kurilo; a 110-kv. line from Kurilo to Mezdra and Pleven; a 110-kv. line between Mezdra and Ferdinand (Mikhaylovgrad); and a 110-kv. line from Kurilo to Plovdiv. Other important power lines in Area I include a 35-kv. line from Mala Tserkva (Mala Tsŭrkva, 4215N-2331E) to Sofia to which the plants of Boyana (4326N-2739E) and Simeonovo (4236N-2320E) are thought to be connected. The 60-kv. lines which interconnect the Dospat plants with Plovdiv and Pazardzhik, together with lines which will lead from the Batak plants into a sub-station at Aleko Konstantinovo (4209N-2417E), are important target objectives in the southeastern part of SFA I. Plants near Raykovo (4134N-2445E) and Ustovo (4134N-2446E) are important sources of power for mining projects in SFA II. Their interdiction would deprive the Rhodope mines and associated plants of a much needed supply of power.

Destruction of major sub-stations at Kurilo and Kazichene (approximately 4239N-2328E) is also important. The latter station collects power from the Stalin scheme power plants and might also be connected to the Kurilo-Plovdiv 110-kv. line. Blowing up dams in the Stalin scheme around Gorni Pasarel would deprive the power plants in that area of a constant volume of water, cause downstream flooding, and deny the Sofia Plain its crop-irrigation water. The interdiction of many of the small plants in the northern part of Area I would deprive a number of mines and related enterprises of their power supplies.

(3) Telecommunications:

Telecommunications lines in Area I parallel roads and railroads and should be considered as joint targets for interdiction wherever the transportation media are interdicted. Important radio transmitters of considerable power for Radio Sofia are located in Vakarel (4235N-2342E), Kostinbrod (4349N-2314E), and Gorna Malina (4241N-2343E). Another important transmitter in Sofia, north of the central railroad station, would not be a feasible target for Special Forces.

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(4) Mining:

In addition to the coal fields in Area I, uranium mines in the vicinity of Bukhovo, and copper mines at Eliseyna (4305N-2330E) and Samokov represent significant mining enterprises. None of these would need to be interdicted directly. All uranium is exported to the USSR, which has many other more important sources of supply. Ultimately all mining output in Area I, whether destined for domestic consumption or for export, can be interdicted through the railroads and to a lesser extent through power supplies.

f. Partial List of Key Structures

(1) Bridges and Tunnels

Structure	Location	Remarks
1. Railroad bridge	Over Iskür R. near Lakatnik (4304N-2324E)	130 ft.; 2-span; steel box truss on masonry piers
2. Railroad tunnel		One of many in this sector
3. Railroad bridge	Over Iskür R. near Bov (4303N-2322E)	2 or 3-spans as above; 1,440 ft. long
4. Railroad tunnel		One of many in this sector
5. Railroad bridge	Over Iskür R. N of Kurilo (4250N-2319E)	130 ft.; 2-spans; steel box truss; first bridge in Iskür Gorge
6. 2 Railroad bridges	Near Kumaritsa (4248N-2321E)	New steel deck truss; 30 m. long; 4 steel supports on stone and concrete bases. Original 55-ton bridge was replaced in May 1956 by new 75-ton bridge placed alongside
7. Railroad tunnel	3 kms. S of Rasnik (4242N-2300E)	2 kms. long; snow and rock slides can block line here
8. Railroad bridge	Over Struma R. 2 kms. N of Dimitrovo freight station	60 m. long; 3-span; concrete
9. Railroad bridge	Over Struma R. 200 m. W of Tsurkva (4236N-2307E)	150 m. long; 16-span; iron
10. 4 Railroad bridges	Over main highway to Sofia; between Dragichevo (4237N-2309E) and Sofia	

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Structure	Location	Remarks
11. Railroad tunnel	Near Zlatusha (4246N-2303E)	Under spur of hill
12. Railroad tunnel	Near Kherakovo (4242N- 2307E)-Khrabusko road (4248N-2303E)	Under spur of hill
13. Railroad bridge	N of Dupnitsa (4215N- 2306E)	3-span; 135 ft. long; concrete
14. Railroad bridge	N of Dupnitsa	1-span; steel; box truss 75 ft. long
15. Railroad bridge	S of Dupnitsa	6-span; stone and concrete; line from Bobov Dol coal mines
16. Railroad tunnel	S of Kocerinoovo (4206N-2304E)	675 ft. long
17. Railroad bridge	Over Rilska R.	Numerous road bridges also in this area
18. 2 Railroad tunnels	Between Rilska R. bridge and Gorna Dzhumaya (4201N-2306E)	One 537 ft. long; one 405 ft. long
19. Railroad bridge	Over Iskur R. S of Reberkovo (4307N-2340E)	2-span; steel deck truss; line enters tunnel immediately after crossing bridge
20. Road bridge	Over Struma R. at Simitli (4153N-2306E)	100 m. long; thru steel lattice girder on 3 masonry piers; one-way traffic only
21. 2 Road bridges	Over Struma R. 4 kms. N of Simitli and over Stara R 3.5 kms. N of Simitli	25 m. long; steel trestle Wooden; 14-ton capacity
22. Road bridge	Over Bistritsa R. at Gorna Dzhumaya (4201N- 2306E)	Concrete and masonry
23. Road bridge	Over Rilska R.	12 m. long; stone
24. Railroad bridge	Over unidentified stream near Bunovo	100 m. long; 1-span steel bowstring
25. Railroad tunnel	W of Klisura (4242N-2428E)	6 kms. long; Koznitsa tunnel
26. Railroad tunnel	W of Klisura	80 m. long
27. Railroad tunnel	W of Klisura	3 kms. long; curved on grade
28. Railroad bridge	S of Klisura	100 m. long; concrete; short tunnels at either end

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Structures	Location	Remarks
29. Railroad bridge	E of Klisura	100 m. long; concrete; 100 m. long tunnel at S end
30. Road bridge	Over Panega at Lukovit (4312N-2410E)	80 ft. long; steel plate
31. Road bridge	SW of Yablanitsa at 4256N-2404E over Maluk Iskür R.	100 ft long; 1 pier; steel girder deck; no alternate crossing point
(2) Power Plants:		
1. Hydroelectric	Bansko (4149N-2329E)	Small; since 1926
<u>Batak Scheme</u>		
2. Hydroelectric	Batak(4157N-2411E)	Capacity 30-40,000 kw.; under construction; scheduled completion 1956; first of 3 encascade; water from Kolarov dam via 12 kms. long underground tunnel. Penstocks, surge tank, turbines, etc., all underground.
3. Hydroelectric	Batak-Peshtera	30,000 kw. capacity; scheduled completion, 1957; 2nd of 3; part of Batak from Kolarov dam; may be enlargement of old Peshtera plant or may be new
4. Hydroelectric	Batak-Aleko (Debrashtitsa) Located between Peshtera (4202N-2428E) and Pazardzhik	Capacity 30-38,000 kw.; scheduled completion, 1958; 68,000 kw. with Peshtera; part of Batak Scheme; water from Kolarov dam via Batak and Peshtera plants, and from here into irrigation canals on Plovdiv plain
- * -		
5. Thermal	Batanovitsi or Temelkovo (4237N-2257E)	Capacity 4,400 kw.; supplies cement plant with surplus
6. Hydroelectric	Boyana (4238N-2316E)	Capacity 1,500 kw.; power to Sofia
7. Hydroelectric	Boykovo (4159N-2437E)	Capacity 1,500 kw.; line to Plovdiv
8. Hydroelectric	Beli Iskür S of Samokov (4219N-2333E); in canyon of Iskür R. below Stalin Peak (4210N-2335E)	Capacity 16,000 kw. (2 turbines at 8,000 kw.); under construction 1955; to be completed in 1955 or 1956; 6 kms. long tunnel conveys water from Beli Iskür dam to plant
9. Hydroelectric	Chepelare (4143N-2441E)	Small; local use

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Structure	Location	Remarks
10. Hydroelectric	Cherni Vit (approx. 4250N-2412E)	Capacity 2,400 kw.; under construction 1955; probably operating 1956
11. Hydroelectric	Chernogorovo (4216N-2424E); on Luda Yana R. from Tsar Asen dam	Capacity unknown; part of Topolonitsa Scheme
12. Hydroelectric	Cherven Bryag (4316N-2406E)	Small
13. Hydroelectric	Chirprovtsi (4323N-2253E)	Capacity 750 kw.; water via 3 km. canal
14. Thermal	Dolno Mitropoliya (4337N-2432E)	Capacity 350 kw.; local use; sugar refinery

Dospat Scheme

15. Hydroelectric	Dospat-Devin (4145N-2424E)	Capacity unknown, probably 5,000 kw.; 1st of 3 in Dospat Scheme on Vucha R.; water from dam near Dospat
16. Hydroelectric	Dospat-Krichim 12-20 kms. S of Krichim (4202N-2428E)	Capacity unknown; probably 5,000 kw.; new in 1952; 2nd of 3 in Dospat Scheme; water from dam near Mikhalkovo (4150N-2425E)
17. Hydroelectric	Vucha (Krichim Old) (4203N-2428E); area Vucha railroad station, in village of Vica	Capacity 16,000 kw.; enlarged in 1951; built in 1932 and now one of 3 in Dospat Scheme
- * -		
18. Hydroelectric	Karlovo (Levskigrad) (4238N-2449E) on Stara Reka R.	Capacity 1,200-1,490 kw.; existed in 1940; enlarged between 1949-1951 possibly by a new plant
19. Hydroelectric	Koynare (4322N-2409E)	Capacity 1,400 kw.; power to local sugar refinery; surplus to Pleven area
20. Thermal	Kurilo (4249N-2321E)	Capacity 20,400 kw.; standby for Sofia; pumping station (8 pumps) and 800 m. long canal leading from river; fuel, coal from Dimitrovo
21. Hydroelectric	Lovech (4208N-2443E)	Capacity 360 kw.
22. Hydroelectric	Lukovit (4312N-2410E); on Panega R.	Capacity 6,900 kw.; power to Pleven and Chervenbreg via separate lines
23. Hydroelectric	Mala Tsurkva (4215N-2330E)	Capacity 4,800-6,000 kw.; in use since 1935; has been enlarged since date of construction; operated from Beli Iskur dam via Rila-Sofia water aqueduct
24. Hydroelectric	Mezdra (Brusen) (4309N-2340E); on Iskur R.	Capacity 2,000-3,600 kw.; enlarged in 1949

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Structure	Location	Remarks
25. Hydroelectric	Mikovishte (Toplika) (4133N-2346E)	Capacity small; built in 1950; power to Nevrokop (Gotse Delchev)
26. Thermal	Nadezhda (Stalin) 500 m. W of Sofia rail- road station and to right of Sofia-Nadezhda road	Capacity 60,000 kw.; originally 10,000 kw.; expansion to 25,000 kw. begun in Dec. 1955; second expansion of 25,000 kw. planned for 1956; exhaust steam used for heating in Sofia. Fuel, coal from Dimitrovo
<u>Petrokhan Scheme</u>		
27. Hydroelectric	Petrokhan-Klisura (4312N-2309E)	Capacity 5,000 kw.; at dam; 1st of 3 in Petrokhan Scheme beginning at Klisura dam; total for 3 plants 18,800-25,000 kw.
28. Hydroelectric	Petrokhan-Burziya (4312N-2309E) near Klisura; located N of Petrokhan Pass (4307N- 2307E) in valley of Burziya R. near village of same name	Capacity 5,800 kw.; 2nd of 3 in Petrokhan Scheme
29. Hydroelectric	Petrokhan-Berkovitsa	Capacity 8,000 kw.; 3rd of 3 in Petrokhan Scheme
- * -		
30. Diesel	Pleven (4235N-2436E)	Capacity 4,000 kw.
31. Hydroelectric	Radomirski (approx. (4315N-2412E); on Panega R.	Capacity 2,000 kw.; power to net
32. Hydroelectric	Raykovo (4134N-2444E)	Capacity unknown-small; in use
33. Hydroelectric	Razlog (4153N-2327E); on Byala (Bela) R.	Capacity 1,000-1,400 kw.; put in use in 1952
34. Thermal	Republika, Moshino Dimitrovo (4236N- 2303E)	Capacity 50-60,000 kw.; being enlarged to 75-100,000 kw. by installing new boiler, turbine generator and cooling tower; line to Kurilo (4250N-2319E); 2 cooling towers; 3rd to be as large as other 2 combined; water from dam on Struma R.; fuel, local coal
<u>Rila Scheme</u>		
35. Hydroelectric	Rila-Barakovo (4204N-2304E)	Capacity 2,000 kw.; since 1924; power to Barakovo paper mills and sawmills in Gorna Dzhumaya
36. Hydroelectric	Rila (4208N-2308E)	Capacity 9,600 kw.; primary line to Dupnitsa; water via penstock from Pastra

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Structure	Location	Remarks
37. Hydroelectric	Rila-Pastra (4207N-2313E)	Capacity 6,400 kw.; primary line to Sofia; one of 4 in Rila hydro system; water from Kamenitsa Basin
38. Hydroelectric	Rila-Kamenitsa N of Pastra (between Pastra and Kalin plants at Kamenitsa Basin)	Capacity 3,500 kw.
39. Hydroelectric	Rila-Kalin (4211N-2317E) N of Pastra on Rila R near Kalin dam	Capacity 4,000 kw.
- * -		
40. Hydroelectric	Simeonovo (4237N-2320E)	Capacity 6,700-9,000 kw.; since 1930; operated via Rila-Sofia water aqueduct
41. Diesel	Sopot (4238N-2446E)	Capacity unknown; power for local mill
<u>Stalin Scheme</u>		
42. Hydroelectric	Stalin-Pasarel near Dolni Pasarel (approx. 4232N-2330E); located near Sofia-Samokov road	Capacity 26,000 kw.; scheduled completion 1956; water from Stalin dam near Gorni Pasarel (4229N-2335E) via 6 km. long pressure tunnel; 2 transformers of 110-kv.
43. Hydroelectric	Stalin-Kokalyane on right bank of Iskur R. near Kokalyane	Capacity 22,000 kw.; under construction; scheduled completion 1955; water from Stalin dam via tunnel from Pasarel plant and also probably from dam at Kokalyane near plant; power from here to substation at Kazichene (approx. 4239N-2328E); irrigation canal for Sofia plain begins here
44. Hydroelectric	Stalin-Pancharevo (4236N-2325E)	Capacity 3,400 kw. plus; has been enlarged; built 1900; power to Sofia via Pancharevo-German
- * -		
45. Hydroelectric	Strupets (4308N-2353E)	Capacity small
46. Hydroelectric	Studena (4232N-2308E) at foot of Studena dam on Struma R.	Capacity 2,000 kw.; operating since 1954
47. Hydroelectric	Svoje (4258N-2321E)	Capacity 225 kw.
48. Hydroelectric	Teteven (4254N-2416E)	Capacity unknown, probably small; may also be known as Beli Vit; irregular output; frequent breakdowns; constructed since 1951
49. Hydroelectric	Toros (4304N-2416E)	Capacity small
50. Diesel	Troyan (4253N-2442E)	Capacity small

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Structure	Location	Remarks
51. Thermal	Tsurkva (Dimitrovo) (4236N-2307E)	Capacity 25,000 kw.; operates at 18,000 kw.; transformer yard with 10 transformers; power to Lenin plant in Dimitrovo via 6 lines; Lenin plant only 1/2 km. E; 1 or 2 cooling tower(s) E of plant; fuel, coal via telpher line 2 km. long; capacity 60 tons per 24 hours; line suspended from 7 towers, 3 steel and 4 concrete; line enters plant area from S
52. Hydroelectric	Ustovo (4134N-2447E)	Constructed prior 1954; supplies Raykovo-Ustovo area and mines
53. Hydroelectric	Vidima (near Troyan) (4253N-2442E)	Capacity 3,000-3,500 kw.; may be a second plant to original Troyan plant constructed in 1929
54. Diesel	Vratsa (4313N-2332E)	Capacity 375 kw.
55. Substation	Kazichene (4239N-2328E)	Collects power from Stalin plants and may be on 110-kv. line Kurilo-Plovdiv
56. Thermal	Plóvdiv (4208N-2445E) near S limits of city	Capacity 4,800-6,400 kw.; standby for Vucha plant

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Special Forces Area II (see Map SFA II)

a. Introduction

Special Forces Area II includes a major portion of the Maritsa Basin (Marbas) between the Balkan Mountains in the north and the Rhodope Mountains in the south. The new industrial city of Dimitrovgrad, supplanting the former hamlets of Chernokonovo, Marino, and Rakovski (approximately 4203N-2535E), lies in the approximate center of the Area. Special Forces in Area II might have as their principal objectives the interdiction of the north-south rail and road routes crossing the Balkan Mountains and leading to the Greek frontier, as well as the disruption of the east-west lines joining Area II to neighboring Areas I and III and linking the Black Sea ports to western Bulgaria. Other objectives would be the interdiction of coal traffic radiating from Dimitrovgrad; interdiction of the mineral output from the Rhodope mining basin in the southwest corner of Area II; and the disruption of Area II's power system.

Cover areas, while not as abundant here as in Area I, are well distributed throughout the Balkan Ranges, the Balkan foothills in the north, and the southern ranges of the Eastern Rhodopes and Sakar Mountains. Terrain and climate offer difficulty during the winter only on the high summits and steep slopes in the western part of the Balkan Mountains and, in the high Balkan passes.

Ethnic Bulgarians are the population group in Area II most likely to assist Special Forces; some help may also be forthcoming from the Turk and Pomak minorities. Resistance elements in Area II kept up continuous harassment of the regime during the years 1951-1955, particularly in the wooded mountain areas immediately north of the Maritsa Basin. Major headquarters of security and armed forces are at several key points in Area II; there are also special security zones established around Dimitrovgrad and the Rhodope mining basin.

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b. Cover Areas

The forested areas depicted on Map SFA II consist mainly of deciduous trees. A few coniferous forests grow in the Balkan Mountains north of Kalofer (4237N-2453E). Deciduous forests north of the Maritsa Basin offer good cover, but south of the basin concealment must often be sought in the extensive areas of scrub growth. Except for the areas southwest of Kurdzhali (4139N-2523E) and along the Greek border, trees grow in many small thin patches throughout the Eastern Rhodope and Sakar Mountains. Many evergreen species of scrub grow near the Maritsa River and in the Sakar Mountains. In the Maritsa Basin, cover is available only in scattered patches of trees such as those between Stara Zagora (4225N-2538E) and Simeonovgrad (now Maritsa, 4202N-2550E) and along parts of the Maritsa and Tundzha Rivers. Slopes bordering the basin have a fairly continuous cover of scrub growth and sparse groups of trees with much underbrush.

c. Population and Resistance Factors

Ethnic Bulgarians occupy Area II in a solid bloc everywhere except in the mountain regions of the extreme south. Strong concentrations of Turks are found along the Western Arda River, reaching their greatest density in the area bounded by Rabovo (4137N-2540E) on the east, Topolovo (4141N-2547E) on the northwest, and the Greek border on the south. Scattered Turkish settlements can be found in the general vicinities of Popovo (4321N-2613E), Eski Dzhumaya (now Turgovishte, 4315N-2634E), and Ozartag (4306N-2625E). Pomak villages are encountered in the hill regions west and south of Kurdzhali. It should be noted, however, that traditional lines of Turk and Pomak settlement in Area II have been partially disrupted by successive population deportations and by the development of mining in the general area southwest of Kurdzhali, with the result that a substantial number of ethnic Bulgarians have moved into areas which formerly were heavily Turk or Pomak.

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Large portions of Area II have been the sites of significant anti-regime activity during recent years. In 1951-1952 a formidable center of resistance was situated in the mountain region bounded by Gabrovo (4252N-2519E) and Kazanluk (4237N-2524E) in the west and the corresponding boundary of Map SFA II in the east. Another center of resistance was located in the northeast corner of Area II, north and east of Omirtag and Popovo. In the west of Area II, peasant resistance was active during 1951-1952 in the Maritsa Valley region between Otets Paisievo (4227N-2454E) and Popovitsa (4208N-2504E).^{*} During 1953-1955 anti-regime activity in Area II took on a mixed urban-rural character. Peasant resistance remained strong in the general area bounded by Elena (4256N-2553E), Turnovo (4305N-2539E), Gabrovo, and Kazanluk, while important evidences of urban discontent appeared at Dimitrovgrad, Khaskovo (4156N-2534E), Kharmanli (4156N-2555E), Nova Zagora (4229N-2601E), and Yambol (4229N-2630E).^{**}

Of the several population groups in Area II, only the ethnic Bulgarians are in a position to provide an important base of potential support to Special Forces. The Turks and Pomaks of the south, although occupying one of the most important mining areas in the country, are too greatly penetrated by ethnic Bulgarian elements to provide more than local support to unconventional warfare. During World War II partisans were active in several parts of Area II, particularly in the Elena region, where some 500 guerillas reportedly were congregated, and in the wooded mountains south and southwest of Kazanluk, which held a partisan brigade of 300 men.^{***}

d. Forced Labor and Security Factors

Only one forced labor camp, at the Dimitrovgrad coal mines, is believed to be in operation in Area II. Camps formerly established in such cities as Asenovgrad (4201N-2452E), Kazanluk, Stara Zagora (4255N-2538E),

^{*} See above, pp. 25-26, and Appendix I.

^{**} See above, pp. 29-30, and Appendix I.

^{***} See above, pp. 13-14.

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and Turnovo have been dissolved.

Security and armed forces in Area II are distributed through the various urban centers, with no particular area of major concentration. Interior Troop battalions are located at Khaskovo, Stara Zagora, and Gorna Oryakhovitsa (4307N-2541E). Army infantry divisions are found at Kurdzhali and Khaskovo; a tank regiment is situated in Kazanluk. Frontier troop regimental headquarters are established at Elkhovo (4211N-2634E), Chorbadzhiysko (4123N-2524E) and Lyubimets (4151N-2605E), with suitable operational deployment of smaller units throughout the frontier zone.

The extent of the frontier zone in Area II is indicated on Map SFA II. Restricted areas in which special security precautions are in force are reportedly established at Dimitrovgrad and in the Rhodope mining area south and southwest of Kurdzhali.

e. Economic Vulnerabilities

(1) Transportation:

(a) Railroads:

The strategically most important railroad line in Area II is the Trans-Balkan which, proceeding from Ruse on the Danube, enters Area II north of Bela (now Byala, 4327N-2544E), negotiates the main Balkan range between Turnovo and Stara Zagora, and continues via Dimitrovgrad and Kurdzhali to the Greek frontier. This line has one of the lowest traffic capacities of all rail lines in Bulgaria (see above, pp. 114-116), and through traffic is limited to eight pairs of trains per day in the difficult crossing of the Balkan Mountains. The line is extremely vulnerable to interdiction in the Balkan crossing sector at any one of the more than 20 tunnels, numerous bridges, switchbacks on the mountain sides, and other features of heavy engineering. It would be more desirable, however, to interdict the Trans-Balkan between Stara Zagora and Mikhaylovo (4215N-2532E) where it operates over tracks of the Sofia-Plovdiv-Burgas trunk route. Interdiction in this sector could be accomplished at the important

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Sazliyka (Rakitnitsa) River crossing southwest of Kaloyanovets (4218N-2535E). The line would also have to be interdicted between Kurdzhali and Dimitrovgrad in order to cut off shipments of mineral ores and concentrates from Kurdzhali to Burgas and Stalin, and to deprive the Stalin chemical works in Dimitrovgrad of its pyrites. Interdiction of this portion of the line could be accomplished at any one of five tunnels and numerous bridges between Dimitrovgrad and Kurdzhali. One of the most vulnerable structures is a 3,670 foot-long tunnel south of Most (4144N-2532E).

The Sub-Balkan line is vulnerable throughout its length in Area II at a great number of bridges. In order to prevent any re-routing of traffic to Sofia from other lines which may be blocked either in this Area or in Areas I and III, the Sub-Balkan should be interdicted between the junction at Tulovo (4234N-2533E) and the western border of Special Forces Area II. In addition to a high vulnerability at its numerous bridge structures (ten bridges, the longest of which is 53 feet, are found on the short stretch between Tulovo and Kazanluk alone), the Sub-Balkan is susceptible to blockage by landslides in the vicinity of Kazanluk. The alignment of this route as shown on Map SFA II in the vicinity of Kazanluk is thought to be incorrect. Reliable observers have reported that between Kalofer and Kazanluk the railroad runs north of the road and passes through Gorna Sakhrane (4239N-2513E).

Of the remaining rail lines in Area II the one between Nova Zagora and Maritsa (formerly Simeonovgrad) is the most important. This line is part of the strategic Kardam (4322N-2617E)-Svilengrad (4146N-2612E) route between Rumania and the Turkish frontier. Its interdiction would, at one and the same time, cut this northern approach to Turkey and prevent re-routing of traffic from either the Trans-Balkan line or the Sofia-Plovdiv-Burgas line if these lines were blocked on their combined sector between Mikhaylovo and Stara Zagora. Two bridges between Radnevo (4217N-2556E) and Gara Gelebovo (southwest of Sladuk Kladenets,

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4209N-2553E) would be likely targets for destruction in an operation which could also be aimed at interdicting the new thermal power station (50,000 kw.) and transformer substation, Maritsa Iztok, near Sladuk Kladenets. The destruction of a critical bridge over the Maritsa River at Simeonovgrad (Maritsa) would interdict coal shipments from Dimitrovgrad to this new power station.

(b) Highways:

Strategically important highways in Area II include the Shipka Pass and Khainboaz (Republika) Pass routes across the Balkan Mountains and roads in the Rhodope mining area. The routes through the Balkan Mountains are particularly vulnerable to induced landslides and the destruction of bridges.

In the Rhodope sector many highways have been improved, straightened, widened, and asphalted in order to provide access to the district from the north and to permit the trucking of ore from the mines to the railroad at Podkova (4124N-2524E), Momchilgrad (4132N-2525E), and Kŭrdzhali. An improved connection from the west has been made between Asenovgrad and Kŭrdzhali via Topolovo and Kumoniga (4148N-2514E).

In the north and central part of Area II, recent road improvements have included realignments and asphaltting. The main road from Sofia to Stalin, which crosses Area II via Sevlievo (4302N-2506E), Turnovo and Omurtag, has been realigned near Turnovo in order to by-pass that city to the south. Asphaltting of this highway has also been in progress since 1954 to the west of Turnovo as far as Balvan (4305N-2525E). The Sub-Balkan road has been realigned west of Kazanluk in order to skirt the lake formed by the Georgi Dimitrov dam. Improvements have also been made to the highway between Turnovo and Bela (Byala) leading north to Ruse and the Danube River bridge and south across the mountains via the Shipka and Khainboaz Passes.

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(2) Coal:

Most of the coal produced in Area II is mined at Dimitrovgrad and is consumed at that location by large thermal power plants and the Stalin chemical works. It cannot, therefore, be readily interdicted by Special Forces. Insofar as other cities in Area II and neighboring Areas I and III are dependent upon Marbas coal, their supplies can be interdicted by severing the railroads radiating from Dimitrovgrad. Coking coal from Plachkovtsi (4250N-2528E) and Kazanlik can also be interdicted by severing the railroad net of Area II.

(3) Power:

Area II's power supplies can be interdicted through the destruction of plants and transformer stations and the cutting of transmission lines. Especially important targets would be the transmission lines emanating from Dimitrovgrad where some of the Area's largest plants are located. The interdiction of the 220-kv. transmission system which is to be constructed in Area II in 1957-1958 to supply power to northeast Bulgaria would force that power deficit section of the country to rely on wholly inadequate power sources. Substations at Maritsa Iztok, Kurdzhali, and southwest of Stara Zagora would also be important target objectives. Destruction of the 30-km. long diversion canal from the Georgi Dimitrov dam to the 22,000 kw. hydro facility north of Stara Zagora would render that large plant inoperative. Another diversion canal leading from Stokite (4252N-2504E) to the 14,000 kw. Rositsa II plant at Batoshevo (4254N-2505E) could also probably be interdicted by Special Forces. The destruction of the Alexander Stamboliski dam near Sevlievo would cause much downstream flooding and loss of crop-irrigation water along the Rositsa River. Interdiction of the new dam and power plant (60,000 kw.) at Studen Kladenets (4136N-2539E) would have important effects on both the Rhodope mining area and Special Forces Area III, which is expected to draw power from this source. The

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interdiction of other plants and transmission lines throughout Area II, in addition to local consequences, would probably also have important regional and national effects inasmuch as most of them are interconnected in Area II and to Areas I and III.

(4) Telecommunications:

All telecommunications lines and facilities in Area II should be regarded as joint targets for interdiction with roads and railroads.

(5) Mining:

Some of Bulgaria's most important mineral deposits are located in the Rhodope Mountains southwest of Kŭrdzhali. In addition to interdicting the railroads, roads, and power facilities in and leading to the Rhodope mining area, Special Forces could attack the important 42-km. aerial cableway from Borieva Reka (4127N-2458E) to Kŭrdzhali. Inconclusive evidence indicates that a second cableway was constructed after 1951 parallel to the existing one in order to increase the flow of ore to the processing plants in Kŭrdzhali. Another cableway between Borieva Reka and Rudozem (4130N-2450E) was also reported to have been constructed in 1953.

f. Partial List of Key Structures

(1) Bridges and Tunnels:

Structure	Location	Remarks
1. Railroad bridge	Over Yantra R. at 4329N-2540E	3-span; 200-250 ft. long; iron trestle; masonry piers; possibly guarded
2. Road bridge	Over Yantra R. at Bela (Byala) (4327N-2544E)	New 3-span reinforced concrete arch about 50 m. long; replacement for old bridge
3. Railroad bridge	Over Drenovski R. near Ganchovets (4259N-2531E)	Steel lattice girder; 60 ft. long; one masonry pier
4. Railroad bridge	Over Drenovski R. at Dryanovo (Drenovo) (4258N-2528E)	Steel girder 225 ft. long; 2 masonry piers
5. 3 Railroad tunnels	In 3-mile stretch N of Krestets (Krŭstets) 4247N-2534E	1,770, 1,200, and 960 ft.; many other tunnels in area

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Structure	Location	Remarks
6. 3 Railroad tunnels	Over 3-mile stretch S of Krestets (Krustets 4247N-2534E)	3,300, 2,493, and 1,869 ft.
7. 2 Bridges (road and railroad)	Over Khainboaz R. at Nikolaevo (4237N-2548E)	Each 30 m. long on 2 piers; bridges 4 m. apart; river fordable in dry season
8. 2 Railroad bridges	Over small unidentified streams between Vetren (4236N-2541E) and Dubovo	Each 15 m. long
9. 2 Bridges (road and railroad)	Over Tundzha R. S of Tulovo (4234N-2533E)	Each approx. 150 m. long; road bridge deck type concrete construction, 1953; railroad bridge described as steel truss construction
10. Railroad bridge	Over Bidechka R. S of Zmeyovo (4230N-2537E)	50-80 m. long; stone; overpasses both river and Stara Zagora-Kazanluk highway
11. Railroad bridge	Over Bidechka R. between Stara Zagora (4255N-2538E) and Zora (4225N-2542E)	35-40 m. long
12. Railroad bridge	Over swamp E of Zora (4225N-2542E)	25 m. long; concrete
13. Railroad bridge	Over Sazliyka R. (Rakitnitsa R.) S of Kaloyanovets (4218N-2535E)	25 m. long; steel; constructed in 1952 after original structure washed out by flood
14. 2 Railroad tunnels	N of Marino Station, Dimitrovgrad (4204N-2535E)	
15. Railroad bridge	Dimitrovgrad (4204N-2535E)	300 m.; steel
16. Railroad bridge	Simeonovgrad (Maritsa) (4202N-2550E)	The original steel structure has been replaced by one of reinforced concrete; 300 m. long; 9 spans each at 29 m.
17. 2 Railroad bridges	Between Radnevo (4217N-2556E) and Gara Gelebovo (4208N-2551E)	Exact locations unknown
18. Railroad bridge	Boyanovo (4215N-2638E) over Tundzha R.	4-span; reinforced concrete and steel
19. Railroad bridge	SW of Zimnitsa (4235N-2636E) on line to Yambol and Elkhovo	
20. Railroad bridge	3 km. N of Lyubimets (4151N-2605E) over Biserska R.	15-20 m. long; steel

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Structure	Location	Remarks
21. Railroad bridge	S of Lyubimets (4151N-2605E) over Lozenska R.	25 m. long; steel on concrete foundation
22. 2 Railroad tunnels	Between Malinovo (4146N-2532E) and Most (4144N-2531E)	One short and one 1,200 m. long
23. 2 Railroad tunnels	Between Perperek and Kurdzhali at 4139N-2530E and 4138N-2529E	Recently constructed in re-alignment of railroad
24. Combined road and railroad bridge	Over Arda R. at Kurdzhali (4139N-2523E)	5-span; 150 m. long; concrete and steel; northern pier destroyed in March 1956 by flood; has been repaired
25. Railroad bridge	2 km. E of Skutare (4211N-2451E)	15 m. long
26. Railroad bridge	1 km. W of Manole (4211N-2456E)	15 m. long; iron on concrete arch

(2) Power Plants

1. Hydroelectric	Asenitsa I in Asenovgrad (4159N-2452E)	Capacity 6,700 kw.; line NW to Plovdiv via Krumovo (4205N-2448E); passes 4.5 km. W of Katunista
2. Hydroelectric	Asenitsa II in Asenovgrad (4159N-2452E)	Capacity 1,500-1,800 kw.
3. Hydroelectric	Beli Izvor (4132N-2504E)	Capacity unknown; began operating in 1952
4. Hydroelectric	Byala Cherkova (4312N-2519E)	Capacity unknown; small
5. Hydroelectric	Cholakovtsi (4304N-2536E) near Turnovo	Capacity 250 kw.
6. Diesel	Cholakovtsi	Capacity 500 kw.
7. Hydroelectric	Drenovo (4258N-2528E)	Capacity 270 kw.
8. Hydroelectric	Ferdinandovo (4259N-2519E)	Capacity unknown; small
9. Hydroelectric	Gabrovo (4252N-2519E); might also be known as Shipka	Capacity unknown; small; power to local mills
10. Diesel	Gabrovo (4252N-2519E)	Capacity 2-3,000 kw.; local use
11. Thermal	Gabrovo Bedek (Platchkovtsi) (4249N-2526E)	Capacity 2,700 kw.; local use

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Structure	Location	Remarks
12. Hydroelectric	Georgi Dimitrov; near Siltikovo at Georgi Dimitrov dam on Tundzha R.; 4 1/2 miles due W of Kazanluk on Kazanluk-Karlovo road	Capacity 7,300 kw. from one turbine; dam also known as Koprinka; lake 3-6 kms. long, covering 8.6 sq. km., also used for irrigation of Stara Zagora and Kazanluk plains; plant on right bank of river
13. Thermal	Gorna Oryakhovitsa (4307N-2541E)	Capacity 2,000 kw.; enlarged since 1948
14. Diesel	Gorna Oryakhovitsa (4307N-2541E)	Capacity 450 kw.
15. Hydroelectric	Kalomen (4302N-2525E)	Capacity unknown; small
16. Diesel	Kazanluk (4237N-2524E)	Capacity 1,200-1,500 kw.
17. Hydroelectric	Kutino, near Ardino (4135N-2506E)	Capacity unknown; in planning stage 1956; water to plant via 13-km. tunnel from Kutino dam on Arda R.
18. Thermal	Maritsa II Dimitrovgrad at Marino (4204N-2534E)	Capacity 14-20,000 kw.
19. Thermal	Maritsa III (Vulko Chervenkov) Rakovski quarter of Dimitrovgrad (4203N-2535E); E side of Khaskovo-Stara Zagora road between Maritsa R. and rail-road	Capacity 25,000 kw.; supposedly being expanded to 50,000 kw. by 1957; power supplied to Dimitrovgrad and its Stalin works and coal mines and also to Sofia, Plovdiv, Kirdzhali, Madan, Rudozem and Burgas; water pumped from Maritsa R. over distance of 1 1/2 - 2 km.; fuel, coal, supplied by train from mines N of town, and possibly by overhead cableway
20. Thermal	Maritsa Iztok (approx. 4209N-2553E); located between Lyubenovo and Rozov Kladenets near confluence of Sokolitsa and Suzlikya (Blatnitsa-Rakitnitsa) rivers	Planned capacity 50,000 kw.; fuel, coal, from Maritsa Basin; large substation nearby
21. Diesel	Nova Zagora (4229N-2611E)	Capacity unknown
22. Thermal	Omurtag (4306N-2625E)	Capacity unknown; small
23. Diesel	Popovo (4321N-2641E)	Capacity unknown; small

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Structure	Location	Remarks
24. Hydroelectric	Rositsa I (Batoshevo I) near Gorsko Kosovo (4307N-2510E); below dam Stamboliski on E bank of River Rositsa	Capacity 7,300 kw.; being expanded in 1956 to 10,000 kw.; power fed into Kurilo-Gorna Oryakhovitsa 110-kv. line, via Rositsa village; power also to Gabrovo and Lovech; dam also for irrigation of 250,000 dekaras (62,000 acres); lake 19 km. long, covering 11 sq. km. behind dam.
25. Hydroelectric	Rositsa II (Batoshevo II) at Batoshevo (4254N-2505E); above Stamboliski dam 18 km. from Sevlievo	Capacity 13,200-14,000 kw.; 5 km. canal beginning near Stokite
26. Diesel	Sevlievo (4302N-2506E)	Capacity unknown; small
27. Diesel	Sliven (4240N-2619E)	Capacity 2,000 kw.
28. Hydroelectric	Stara Zagora (4225N-2538E)	Capacity 22,000 kw.; water from Georgi Dimitrov dam via 26 km. long canal Rozovo-Gorvo Grandiste-Rezino thence through 6 km. tunnel to basin 4 km. N of Stara Zagora and thence to plant. Transformer station SE of Stara Zagora at junction of roads Stara Zagora - Gorna Oryakhovitsa and Stara Zagora-Nova Zagora; connected to Dimitrovgrad line
29. Hydroelectric	Stara Zagora	Capacity unknown; small; old plant, since 1925
30. Hydroelectric	Studen Kladenets (approx. 4138N-2538E) E of Kurdzhali (4139N-2521E) at Dyavolski Most; on right bank of Arda R. at dam	Capacity 60,000 kw.; under construction to be completed in 1957; water from dam and thence for irrigation of Khaskhovo plain. Eventually 12-15 plants to be built in conjunction with this scheme; one of these to be at Kurdzhali (4139N-2521E); another at Ivaylovgrad (4133N-2607E). Power from plant via 110-kv. line beginning at transformer station to Maritsa Iztok plant and Kurdzhali.
31. Diesel	Turnovo (4304N-2540E)	Capacity small
32. Thermal	Trevna (4252N-2530E)	Capacity 3,440 kw.
33. Diesel	Turgovishte (Eski Dzhumaya) (4314N-2635E)	Capacity unknown; small
34. Hydroelectric	Turiya (4235N-2510E) near Kazanluk	Capacity 9,250 kw.

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
Structure	Location	Remarks
35. Hydroelectric	Tuzha - at Golemo Selo on Tuzha R.	Capacity 3,400 kw; water from river via 800 m. open canal and 4 km. of underground tunnels into reservoir 400 m. N of plant via pipe; power to Kazanluk
36. Thermal	Vulkan-Dimitrovgrad at Chernokonevo (4204N-2532E)	Capacity 4,000 kw.; expansion begun in 1955; supplies nearby cement and asbestos products plants
37. Diesel	Yambol (4228N-2631E)	Capacity 425 kw.
38. Hydroelectric	Yenina (4240N-2525E) 5 km. N of Kazanluk	Capacity 700 kw.; in use since 1912
39. Substation	Kurdzhali	Receives power from Dimitrovgrad and Studen Kladenets

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SPECIAL FORCES AREA II

LEGEND

- BRIDGES**
- RAIL BRIDGES WITH IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
 - HIGHWAY BRIDGES WITH IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
 - TUNNELS WITH IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
- HYDROELECTRIC**
- UNDER 10,000 KW
 - 10,000-25,000 KW
 - 25,000 KW AND OVER
 - UNDER CONSTRUCTION
 - UNKNOWN
- THERMAL**
- UNDER 10,000 KW
 - 10,000-25,000 KW
 - 25,000 KW AND OVER
 - UNDER CONSTRUCTION
 - UNKNOWN
- DIESEL**
- ▲ UNDER 1,000 KW
 - ▲ 1,000-7,500 KW
- POWER TRANSMISSION LINES**
- 50 KV - 225 KV
 - UNKNOWN
 - UNKNOWN PROPOSED
 - PROJECTED
- ROADS**
- RAILROADS
 - EXISTING
 - UNDER CONSTRUCTION
 - PROPOSED
- RAILROADS**
- EXISTING
 - UNDER CONSTRUCTION
 - PROPOSED
- SELECTION**
- RAILS
 - SELECTION
- LAKES**
- LAKES
- FIRST AND SECOND FRONTIER SUB-ZONES**
- FIRST AND SECOND FRONTIER SUB-ZONES
- RESTRICTED AREAS**
- RESTRICTED AREAS



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Special Forces Area III (Map SFA III)

a. Introduction

Special Forces Area III includes the whole of eastern Bulgaria bordering the Black Sea. From north to south, the Area extends from the Danube River to the Turkish border, covering the Dobruja in the north, the eastern reaches of the Balkan Mountains in the center, and the Strandzha Mountains in the south.

Area III's economic importance focuses mainly on the rail lines linking the two Black Sea ports of Burgas and Stalin (formerly Varna) to central and western Bulgaria (Special Forces Areas II and I). Other economic features are the Dobruja oilfields; the Provadiya salt deposits which form the basis for one of Bulgaria's largest industrial enterprises, the Karl Marx soda works at Devnya; and minor coal and copper deposits near and south of Burgas. Area III's strategic importance lies in its rail routes. In addition to the railroads leading westward from the Black Sea, Area III contains most of the overland rail connection between the Rumanian Black Sea port of Constanta, and Turkey.

Of the geographic factors relevant to Special Forces to Area III, vegetation cover is of major significance since terrain and climate impose practically no limitation on movement and survival. Most of Area III is well wooded with tracts of forests and scrub interspersed with open stretches of cultivated fields, pastures, and wasteland. Most of the points and areas of vulnerability are within easy range of adequate cover areas. Suitable vegetation cover is lacking only in the eastern part of the Bulgarian Dobruja in the vicinity of the oilfields and rail connection between Tolbukhin (formerly Bazargic) and Rumania.

Ethnic Bulgarians and to a lesser extent the Turks of Area III represent likely sources of assistance to Special Forces operations. Resistance in Area III during the years 1951-1955 was not as vigorous as elsewhere in Bulgaria but was sufficiently widespread to provide a significant measure of anti-regime activity. Security and armed forces in Area III have their

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major concentrations at Burgas and Stalin (formerly Varna).

b. Cover Areas

Large oak forests offer good seasonal cover in the western and central sectors of the Dobruja. The potential for cover in the eastern part is extremely limited.

South of the Dobruja, in the area from the Shumen hills to the Avrenska Plateau, high brushwoods associated with thorny shrubs provide good concealment. Brushwoods in the area southeast of Shumen (now Kolarovgrad, 4316N-2654E) are noted for their density. Tree growth, sparse near Shumen, increases farther east between Bazargic (now Tolbukhin, 4334N-2750E) and the Kamchiya River. Forested areas, located mainly on the lower slopes of hills, are interspersed with brushwood. Most of the hill summits are bare. Cover is also available in the dryer parts of the dense broadleaf forest growing in the swamps of the Kamchiya River. The forest stretches 18½ miles inland and borders the river for a width of one to two miles.

Extensive forests on the slopes of the Balkan Mountains offer good cover. Although they are intermittent in places, such as in the rolling coastal hills, the extent of open land between the forests is usually small.

The Burgas Basin, although not as well forested, can be approached from wooded slopes surrounding the basin, such as from the wooded area four miles long near the 1,000-foot summit between Karnobat (now Polyanovgrad, 4239N-2659E) and Aytos (4242N-2715E). Within the basin, the area south of Burgas is fairly well wooded. Hills north and west of Burgas are covered with small groves of trees with much underbrush. These groves alternate with patches of scrub and more open areas of pastures, cultivated fields, and wasteland. Scrub growth west of Burgas is dense and excellent for concealment.

Forest cover increases south of the Burgas Basin. Densely forested tracts, although not shown on Map SFA III, cover parts of the Strandzha Mountains. Many wooded ravines and patches of thick pseudomacchia are well distributed among the forests and open areas.

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c. Population and Resistance Factors

Ethnic Bulgarians, Turks, and Rumanians are the principal population groups in Area III. The Bulgarian element is distributed throughout the territory covered by Map SFA III, with strongest concentrations below the 43rd parallel and in the hinterland of Stalin (Varna). Turkish settlements are intermingled with Bulgarian villages everywhere in the northern half of Area III and are particularly numerous in the Tolbukhin (Bazargic)-Verbitsa (4259N-2641E)-Turtucaia (now Tutrakan, 4403N-2637E) triangle. Rumanians in Area III are largely confined to the Dobruja region northeast of Tolbukhin and the Danube coastal area west of Silistra (4407N-2716E). The Turkish districts of northern Area III were hard hit by the forced deportations instituted by the Bulgarian authorities in 1950-1951, with the result that many former Turkish villages have been transformed into state farms manned by ethnic Bulgarian colonists. An indeterminate number of Turks from northern Area III were also resettled in 1950-1951 in the Strandzha Mountain country southwest of Burgas.*

Resistance elements in Area III were active during the years 1951-1955. For the period 1951-1952 three major areas of predominantly rural anti-regime activity can be discerned: in the south, in the general region of Burgas, Khadzhiite (4237N-2705E), and Goritsa (4248N-2732E); in the northeast, in the region bounded by Topolovo (4311N-2727E), Stalin (Varna) and Tolbukhin (Bazargic), and in the northwest, in the region bounded by Kolarovgrad (Shumen) in the south, Alfatar (4356N-2717E) in the north, and extending westwards beyond the boundary of Map SFA III.** In the more recent period, 1953-1955, there is a noticeable decline in opposition activity in Area III, with only the district of Bairam Dere (4259N-2704E), Peshtersko (4254N-2720E), and Aytos identifiable as a rural resistance area. Isolated acts of urban resistance during the same years were reported at Kolarovgrad, (Shumen), Stalin (Varna), Burgas, and Michurin (4210N-2751E).***

* See above, pp. 79.

** See above, pp. 25-26, and Appendix I.

*** See above, p. 30, and Appendix I.

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Special Forces units operating in Area III must derive their principal support from the ethnic Bulgarian inhabitants. Some material assistance in the form of supplies and refuge may be forthcoming from the Turks who, although hostile to the present regime, would probably be reluctant to run the risks of overt opposition. The Rumanians of Area III are in general a docile and law-abiding people of little potential value to Special Forces. A possible clue to Special Forces operational feasibilities in Area III is furnished by German military records of World War II which indicate that a Bulgarian partisan group of undetermined strength was active in the Karnavadska and Kamchiska Mountains immediately south of the 43rd parallel.*

d. Forced Labor and Security Factors

Such forced labor settlements as may still exist in Area III are limited to a few agricultural colonies at Tolbukhin and other points in the Dobruja. There is a strong presumption, however, that these and all other forced labor camps in Area III were closed in 1953.

Important concentrations of security and armed forces are found at several points in Area III. Interior Troop battalions are established at Burgas, Stalin (Varna), and Kolarovgrad (Shumen). Army infantry divisions are situated in Burgas and Kolarovgrad (Shumen), an infantry regiment at Stalin (Varna), a mountain rifle regiment at Zvezdets (4207N-2725E), an armored regiment at Stalin (Varna), and a coastal defense command at Dolni Chiflik (4259N-2743E). Frontier Troop regimental headquarters are located in Malko Turnovo (4159N-2732E), Tolbukhin (Bazargic), Stalin (Varna), and Burgas. The Frontier Troop units in the latter two cities are amphibious and regularly patrol the Black Sea coast.

The frontier zone in Area III is most extensive in depth along the Turkish border. Along the Black Sea coast and northeast Rumanian frontier it is rarely more than 10 kms. wide; west of Silistra (4407N-2716E), it ceases entirely. Restricted industrial zones in Area III are reportedly established around Burgas, Stalin (Varna), and the oilfields northeast of Balchik (4325N-2810E).

* See above, p. 13.

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e. Economic Vulnerabilities

(1) Transportation:

(a) Railroads:

Area III's railroad net includes two lines of economic importance and one of strategic importance. The strategically important route is that portion of the overland connection between Rumania and Turkey which enters Area III north of Kardam (4345N-2806E, shown as Caradurumus on Map SFA III) and leaves the Area at Zimnitsa (4235N-2636E). Between Zimnitsa and Polyanovgrad (Karnobat) this line is merged (over the same single track stretch) with the Sub-Balkan and Sofia-Plovdiv-Burgas lines. This short sector of railroad will continue to be one of the most important in Bulgaria until such a time as the coastal connection between Stalin and Burgas is completed and the projected line between Burgas and Area II via Sredets (now Grudovo, 4221N-2711E) and Elkhovo (Area II) is constructed. Interdiction in the Zimnitsa-Polyanovgrad (Karnobat) sector, therefore, would be most advantageous and could be accomplished at the Azmak Dere River crossing.

The North Balkan line, which enters Area III west of Kolarovgrad (Shumen) and divides into branches serving Stalin and Burgas, should be interdicted west of Kolarovgrad in order to prevent any rerouting of traffic from the Black Sea ports to northern, central, and western Bulgaria.

(b) Highways:

Area III's highway net has been developed in recent years to provide better access from the Black Sea ports and neighboring Area II to the Dobruja and the Turkish frontier. The coastal highway, especially, has been much improved. Asphaltting of this highway has recently been completed between Balchik and Shabla (4333N-2832E) in order to speed the flow of oil from the Shabla fields to Stalin (Varna). Throughout Area II tactical considerations would largely determine which, and at what points, highways should be interdicted.

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(c) Pipelines:

Two pipelines are reportedly being constructed in SFA III in the Dobruja and will connect the Shabla oilfields with the ports of Stalin (Varna) and Silistra (see above, pp.129-130). The routes which these lines will follow are not known beyond the fact that one will run via Tolbukhin (Bazargic) and the other via Kavarna (4325N-2821E). It is not known whether the lines will be above or below ground. They will, however, undoubtedly have pumping stations located at regular intervals, and it is at these stations that they would be most vulnerable to interdiction by Special Forces.

(2) Fuel:

Coal is mined in Area III only at Burgas; otherwise the Area is undoubtedly dependent on coal shipments from Areas I and II to meet its needs. Coal could be delivered by sea but this is not known to be the normal case. The most important coal consumers are the railroads; the Area's largest (12,000 kw.) power plant in Stalin; and smaller thermal plants in Burgas and Devnya (4313N-2733E). One of the Burgas plants, the old 7,500 kw. Adriya plant, is known to be supplied from local coal sources. It is not known, however, whether the limited output of the Burgas coal mines supplies the new Vasil Kolarov thermal plant (capacity unknown, but estimated as high as 40,000 kw.) in Burgas or the thermal plant in nearby Devnya.

Oil has been produced in Bulgaria since 1953 from fields in the vicinity of Shabla-Tyulenovo (4330N-2835E). Nearly all of the production is exported via the ports of Kavarna and Stalin. Until the pipelines mentioned in the preceding section are completed, interdiction of the highways over which the output is trucked to the ports and destruction of physical equipment throughout the oilfield, such as pumps, storage tanks, etc., will be the major avenues of attack open to Special Forces. Close attention should be paid to developments in oil production at newly discovered fields at Bulgarovo (4237N-2719E) and Rezovo (4200N-2759E). In the likely event that quantity oil production should develop in these locales, Special Forces

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would probably want to include them as important targets for interdiction in SFA III.

(3) Power:

Area III's power system is the weakest in Bulgaria. Primary attention should be devoted to interdicting the 110-kv. transmission lines serving this Area from Area II and from Rumania to the north. One of these is the line from Maritsa Iztok in Area II to Polyanovgrad (Karnobat), Provadiya, Stalin (Varna) and Tolbukhin (Bazargic). A major substation is located at Provadiya; if destroyed, its equipment could not be easily replaced. Another important substation through which power is distributed in the Dobruja is located in the vicinity of Baladzha (now Stozher, 43°N-27°50'E). A second transmission line enters Area III northwest of Kolarovgrad (Shumen) and comes from Rumania via Ruse. This line could be interdicted west of Kolarovgrad (Shumen) as part of an operation aimed at the North Balkan railroad. The 220-kv. line from Maritsa Iztok in Area II is not expected to be completed in Area III before 1962.

(4) Telecommunications:

All telecommunications facilities and lines throughout Area III should be approached as targets to be interdicted in conjunction with the roads and railroads. Inasmuch as the telecommunications net in Area III is linked to the USSR military net, presumably via Constanta to Odessa, interdiction of wire connections leading north from Stalin (Varna) would be particularly useful. The destruction of radio communication stations along the Black Sea coast would deprive Soviet shipping of this aid to navigation.

(5) Mining:

Mining activities in Area III are carried on at a number of places. In addition to the previously mentioned coal and oil deposits, salt mining in the Provadiya-Devnya area is of importance. It is on the basis of these deposits that the Karl Marx soda works conducts its operations. Most of this plant's production is exported via Stalin (Varna)

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and can be most effectively interdicted by severing the rail connection between Devnya and Stalin. The connecting rail line is vulnerable at a number of bridges.

Small coal and copper deposits near Burgas are not directly vulnerable to interdiction by Special Forces. Two new copper mining areas south of Burgas in the vicinities of Rosen (4223N-2734E), and Malko Tŭrnovo near the Turkish border, are reportedly worked on a fairly large scale. A new flotation plant to process expanded copper production at the Rosen mines was constructed in 1953. Ore is transported from this plant to Burgas by truck and can be interdicted through the roads. Ore from the mines at Malko Tŭrnovo is presumably trucked from that area to the flotation plant at Rosen and could be similarly interdicted by disruption of the road net. Production at Rosen can also be interdicted by destroying the power connection between Rosen and the Adiva power plant in Burgas, from which power is presumably obtained.

f. Partial List of Key Structures

(1) Bridges and Tunnels:

Structure	Location	Remarks
1. Railroad bridge	Over Devnya Canal at approx. 4310N-2713E	110 ft. long; 2-span
2. Railroad bridge	Over Provadiska R. near Sindel (4307N-2736E)	80-100 ft. long
3. Railroad bridge	Over Teke Dere R. between Kolarovgrad (Shumen, 4316N-2654E) and Kaspichan (4318N-2710E)	84 m. long
4. Railroad bridge	Over Golyana Kamehiya R. near Ivanski (Zlokuchen, 4308N-2702E)	
5. 1 Road bridge over railroad and 2 railroad bridges over the road	Between Bulgospol (4303N-2721E) and Komunari (Polna Muvnd (4303N-2719E)	Road crosses railroad via 150 ft. long steel girder bridge; road and railroad in narrow river valley at this point
6. 2 Railroad bridges	Between Duskotna (4252N-2711E) and Chif Mahala (4256N-2713E)	One is a 7 arch stone bridge (300-360 ft. long) over unidentified river and road; in valley

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Structure	Location	Remarks
7. Railroad tunnel	Kosharitsa; between Keshla Dere (4245N-2742E) and Obzor (4249N-2753E)	Between 4-5 km. long on new line Burgas-Stalin (Varna)
8. 2 Railroad bridges	East of Zhitarovo (Vetren 4236N-2723E)	Short, over unidentified streams in swampy area; railroad built up here by fill
9. Railroad bridge	Over Burgas-Aitos highway NE of Lozovo (4232N-2724E)	
10. Railroad bridge	Over Azmak Dere R. between Devetak (4235N-2650E) and Polyanovgrad (Karnobat 4239N-2659E)	Railroad follows river through narrow pass
11. Road bridge	Over Burgasko Ezero (Lake Burgas) (4230N-2725E)	Concrete on 2 piers; coastal highway to Turkey begins here
12. Road bridge	Over canal connecting Mardrensko Ezero (Lake Mardren) with Black Sea at 4226N-2630E)	Reinforced concrete; "Poda Bridge"
13. Road bridge	N of Zvezdets (4207N-2725E)	3 arch concrete; 30 m. long
14. Road bridge	Over Veleka R. between Brushlen (Breshlyan 4203N-2726E) and Zvezdets (4207N-2725E)	3 arch concrete; 30 m. long
15. Road bridge	Between Brushlen (4203N-2726E) and Malko Turnovo (4158N-2730E)	Concrete; 10 m. long
16. Road bridge	N of Malko Turnovo (4158N-2730E)	Concrete; 10 m. long

(2) Power Plants:

1. Thermal	Adriya (Budnik) (4237N-2736E); at Chernomore coal mine 10 km. NE of Burgas	Capacity 7,500 kw.; furnishes power to Burgas; reportedly expanded in 1949
2. Diesel	Balchik (4325N-2810E)	Capacity unknown; small
3. Hydroelectric	Batovo (4321N-2804E)	Capacity 230 kw.
4. Thermal	Burgas (4230N-2728E) (Vasil Kolarov Plant); located in area N of Burgas	Capacity unknown; possibly 40,000 kw.; put in use in 1952
5. Diesel	General Toshevo (I.G. Duca) (4342N-2802E)	Small; power for nearby agricultural institute and kolkhoz
6. Diesel	Kaspichan (4319N-2710E)	Capacity unknown

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Structure	Location	Remarks
7. Thermal	Karl Marx (Devnya) (4313N-2733E)	Capacity 1,500 kw. plus; at soda plant of same name in Devn; 1,500 kw. turbine being installed in 1956 to be driven by exhaust steam from existing turbine of unknown capacity; power to soda plant and also to Stalin
8. Diesel	Kolarovgrad (Shumen) (4316N-2655E)	Capacity 535 kw.; local
9. Diesel	Provadiya (4311N-2727E)	Capacity 485 kw.
10. Diesel	Shabla (4331N-2833E)	Capacity 650 kw.; power utilized by 2 pumping stations serving Shabla-Blatnitsa (4340N-2832E) irrigation systems. System irrigates 13,000 dekar (3,200 acres) through 23 kms. of canals
11. Thermal	Stalin (Varna) (4313N-2755E)	Capacity small; near textile mills in S section; power for same
12. Diesel	Stalin; NW of railroad station	
13. Hydroelectric	Tucha in Vladimirts (4311N-2653E); on Golyama Kamchiya R.	Capacity 1,400 kw.; local use
14. Diesel	Tolbukhin (Bazargic) (4334N-2750E)	Capacity 4,000 kw.
15. Thermal	Yanko Kostov in Stalin (4313N-2755E)	Capacity 12,000 kw.; most important plant NW Bulgaria located W of slaughterhouse area on SW shore of Devnya Canal near lake

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FOOTNOTES

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APPENDIX I

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN BULGARIA
(1951-February 1957)

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APPENDIX I
RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES IN BULGARIA
Part I
(1951-1952)

Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Asenovgrad 4201N 2452E	Sep 51	A mass meeting of peasants reportedly convened in 1951 outside the government offices in Asenovgrad to protest the shortage of food and clothing.	USARMA Ankara, AAC 144, 17 Jul 53 (DAIN 28869) C-3 (S)	1
Asenovgrad	Apr 52	In April 1952 six kms. of the railroad line at Yavorovo (probably a suburb of Asenovgrad) and five kms. of the line between Yavorovo and Sofia were destroyed by saboteurs.	USARMA Athens, NR-MTD 194, 18 Jul 53 (DAIN 28870) P-3 (S)	2
Atanasovo 4231N 2728E	Sep 52	The resistance group formerly led by Yari Magritov in the vicinity of Kableskovo (see below, Incident No. 36) has been reconstituted near the village of Atanasovo. (See incident listed under Iom)	CIA/SO 104396, 21 Apr 53, P-5 (S/US Only)	3
Belogradchik 4348N 2240E				
Bezhanovo 4311N 2422E	Prior to Aug 51	In April 1951 an uprising took place in Bezhanovo. The purpose was to regain farmers and agricultural implements from the kolkhoz. During the uprising the local police in Bezhanovo were overwhelmed, and army reinforcements were sent from Pleven (4325N-2437E). When the army commander learned the reason for the revolt, he refused to intervene, saying that the army was not fighting the people. The police in Doukovik (probably Lukovit, 4312N-2410E) were then notified and sent a part of their force to quell the uprising. Three policemen were killed. The same night many villagers took refuge in the mountains.	ARMY A Greece, R-458-51, P-6 (ID 834330) (S)	4

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Blagoevgrad 4201N 2308E	Jan 52	The Bulgarian newspaper Pirinsko Delo reports that a trial of terrorists, murderers, and spies took place in Blagoevgrad on 28 and 29 December 1951. These persons had previously set fire on 15 December 1951 to the food warehouse of the provincial cooperative union.	CIA/00-W-22485, 22 Apr 52, no eval (C)	5
Bogdanovo 4331N 2748E		(See incident listed under Tolbukhin)	CIA/00, no eval (S/US Only)	6
Botevgrad 4254N 2348E	Prior to Oct 52	A resistance group appeared in the region around Botevgrad. Some young villagers have joined the group. It has been pursued by the militia from Botevgrad and by volunteer groups of Party members from the villages of Litakovo (4257N-2341E), Vrachev (4253N-2345E), Pravets (4253N-2355E), and Trudovets (4255N-2350E). The militia and volunteer groups have surrounded the area in which the resistance band is active, have occupied all strategic places, and have arrested many villagers with the aim of completely liquidating the resistance group which has been in existence in the area for two years.		7
Boyana 4326N 2739E	19/5-1951	In the fall of 1951 a textile factory located near Boyana was completely destroyed by fire which was set by members of a Bulgarian underground organization. A great number of laborers in the plant were arrested in connection with this incident.	AIIR Wringer, 51-7501-E, F-3 (C)	8
Boyana 4326N 2739E	Late Jun 51	About the end of 1950 an illegal association was formed in Bregovo, which printed and distributed an illegal appeal to the Agrarians. The first such appeal was put into circulation in November 1950; the fourth and last in March 1951. The association was supervised from Vidin (4400N-2553E) but its headquarters were in Bregovo. The association was detected in April 1951 and 30 persons were brought to trial; many were sentenced to prison.	CIA/50 78592, 16 Jan 52, P-2 (ID 867291) (S); SO 80932, 19 Feb 52 (S)	9

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Bregovo 4326N 2739E	Sep 51	Source, a Bulgarian refugee in Trieste, received a letter from a fellow refugee in Yugoslavia in which it was stated that a farmers' uprising took place at Bregovo in Vidin Province in September 1951. The rebellion was caused by a government order calling for the internment of 200 Bregovo citizens and confiscation of their property. Almost the entire population of the village, armed only with farm implements, marched against the militia. The uprising was not suppressed until a second militia unit had been called into action. Over 100 persons were arrested for conspiracy against the state; 10 farmers were sentenced to immediate hanging. The convicted farmers were members of a secret organization which aimed to dissuade kolkhoz members from working and to organize sabotage. Several members escaped into Yugoslavia. The organization (name unknown) was equipped with typewriter, mimeograph machine, and a few weapons.	CG/OSI TRUST/RETRCOS, R-73-52, P-3 and P-6 (ID 87111) (S/US only)	10
Brezova 4221N 2508E	Prior to Aug 51	A guerrilla-type resistance unit of about 100 men, based somewhere in Greece, has been active in the Nevrokop district. On 14 August 1951 it fought a battle with militia forces in the area between the villages of Breznitsa, Kornitsa (4138N-2340E), and Lezhmitsa (4137N-2340E).	CIA/50 83537, 7 Mar 52, -6 (ID 883654) (S/US only); ARWA Greece, P-458-51, (ID 834330) (S/US only)	11
Brezova 4221N 2508E	Apr 52	In April 1952 the peasants of Brezova village rebelled against the agricultural cooperative and refused to work in it. This rebellion was quickly suppressed by the authorities.	CIA/CS, -3 (S)	12
Brezova 4221N 2508E		(See incident listed under Nikolaevo)		13
Bulgarski Izvor 4302N 2446E	Prior to Oct 52	On 4 September 1952 a large fire broke out in the village of Bulgarski Izvor. The fire was started by an incendiary grenade which was thrown at the office of the village collective.	CIA/00, no eval (S/US Only)	14
Bulgarski Izvor 4302N 2446E	Apr 51	In April 1951 peasants at Bulgarski Izvor sabotaged the local telephone lines.	CIA/50 66673, 13 Aug 51, -3 (ID 832908) (C)	15

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Burgas 4230N 2720E	1951	During the night of 23 February 1951 a bomb was thrown at the Soviet Army monument in Burgas and caused its destruction. Bombs were also thrown during the same night at the offices of the Burgas district Communist Party and the Burgas post office. Informant does not know how much damage was done in the latter two instances. The perpetrators were not discovered.	CIA/CS, -3 (C/US Only)	14
Burgas	Prior to Jun 52	A Bulgarian torpedo boat was sunk in the port of Burgas. The authorities attributed the sinking to sabotage, and in April 1952 the entire crew was arrested.	CIA/SO 93310, 7 Aug 52, -6 (S/US Only)	15
Burgas	1952	Informant, who attended a DOSO pilots training course at Sarafovo (4233N-2739E) Airfield from June to August 1952, claims that he has knowledge of the partial destruction by sabotage of two DOSO-owned training planes in August 1952. These acts of sabotage were not recognized as such, because the resulting crashes were attributed to student errors in piloting.	CIA/CS, -3 (C/US Only)	16
Burgas	1952	Four one-story ammunition storehouses situated on a temporary airfield northwest of Burgas and kept under permanent guard were attacked by unknown persons on a night in late June or early July 1952. Informant, who was billeted near the place, heard "many" shots but later learned that none of the attackers had been caught. No damage was done to the storehouses.	CIA/CS, -3 (C/US Only)	17
Burgas	Sep 52	In September 1952 in Burgas 16 persons belonging to the Mikko Perev resistance group were condemned to death or to imprisonment. Four members of the Ivan Raikov resistance group were also captured and condemned to death in Burgas. Their trial was reported in the 25 December 1951 issue of the Bulgarian Communist paper, <u>Rabotnichesko Delo</u> .	CIA/SO 104398, 21 Jan 53, F-6 (S/US Only)	18
Chervena Voda 4348N 2606E	Jul 51	Within the past few days numerous persons have been arrested following renewed anti-government activities by the workers. At Chervena Voda 30 persons were arrested; at Ruse (4351N-2557E), 35 persons.	CIA/SO 78020, 10 Dec 51, -3 (S/US Only)	19

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Chichil 4355N 2237E	Mar 51	In March 1951 about 250 women went to the cooperative buildings in Chichil, stoned the guards, and seized livestock. When the militia from Kula (4351N-2232E) arrived, the women tore the epaulettes off the shoulders of the militia commander. On 24 March 1951 many women and men of Chichil were arrested for participation in the affair, and the livestock was re-imounded.	CIA/SO 73731, -3 (C/US Only)	20
Debela Mogila Approx. 4218N 2619E	1952	When Source was in a hospital at Sliven (4210N-2619E) in April 1952 there was much talk in the town about a military operation which had taken place against a party of more than 100 partisans who were said to be operating in the Debela Mogila range of hills north of Sliven. Segments from Sliven and Yambol (4229N-2630E) reportedly took part in the operation. All the partisans were said to have been captured; some were sentenced to death and others received prison terms of varying length.	OSRM/A Turkey, R-291-52, B-2 (ID 1129256) (S)	21
Dermantesi 4342N 2417E	Nov 51	In late November 1951 there was a riot among the members of the Dermantesi collective against the government's agricultural policy.	CIA/SO 80736, 29 Jan 52, -6 (C/US Only)	22
Dobrich 4210N 2610E	Jul-Aug 51	On or about 10 August 1951 an organized group of young people threw fire bombs at shops along the main streets of Dobrich.	CIA/SO 90727, 25 Jun 52, -3 (ID 1059020) (S/US Only)	23
Milgach 4313N 2611E	Spring 52	Unknown persons burned the stable of the Dilgach collective in the spring of 1952. As a result 30 cattle were destroyed.	ARMVA Greece, R-633-52, F-3 (ID 1104484) (S)	24
Elesnitsa 4422N 2308E	Prior to Jun 51	Sources heard that in the district between Flesnitsa and Petrich (4424N-2313E) a conflict broke out in the middle of June 1951 between the militia and an armed group led by Agalikaf. During this clash two soldiers were killed and one wounded. The bandits also captured a rural guard who was later released. Some villagers saw the dead and wounded as they passed by on a vehicle.	525th WTS Group R-11-53, no eval (ID 823980) (S/US Only); CIA/SO 71785, 12 Sep 51 (ID 841009) (S/US Only)	25

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Etropole 4250N 2400E	Apr 52	(See incidents under Lopyan) In 1951 a fire started in the shoe section of the "Suryi Chmk" military apparel factory in Gabrovo. The fire was attributed to sabotage.	CIA/CS, -3 (C)	26
Gabrovo 4252N 2518E	Jul 52	According to an informant in Birmo, Turkey, two Soviet officers and five Soviet soldiers in the manufacturing town of Gabrovo were killed by unknown assassins on 27 June 1952. The assassins, who were not identified but are presumed to be partisans, escaped. Six persons who were later arrested were subsequently found to have no connection with the incident. Five other persons were arrested at Sevilievo (4302N-2506E), including a priest.	CIA/SO 104915, 21 Jan 53, P-6 (S/US Only)	27
Gabrovo 4301N 2417E	Summer and Fall 52	During the summer and fall of 1952 there were rumors in Gabrovo of a group of saboteurs in the Popovsko, Razgradsko, and Ruzensko districts northwest of Gabrovo. These persons were reportedly burning haystacks, seed stores, forage stores, etc., belonging to the collectives. Authorities had taken steps to liquidate these saboteurs.	OWM/A Turkey, R-46-53, B-2 (ID 1144/48) (S)	28
Gabrovo 4301N 2417E	Apr-May 51	About the end of March 1951 an armed group of 10 persons from the village of Yurichin (4306N-2426E), five persons from Galata, and about 25 persons from other villages plundered Galata and seized the community telephone and typewriter. The group then withdrew in the direction of the Stara Planina Mountains and reappeared in the area between Teteven (4255N-2416E) and Pirdop (4242N-2411E).	CIA/SO 68187, 30 Aug 51, no eval (S/US Only) 1525th MIS Group, R-6-53 (ID 818311TR) (S/US Only)	29
Gavtinovo 4217N 2343E	Prior to May 51	A cheese factory was built in Gavtinovo and the villagers were advised that they would have to give a certain amount of milk by 15 May 1951. As of 20 May 1951 no one had contributed the required quota of milk, despite the insistence of the authorities that they do so. The Communists regarded this as an instance of coalition and organized resistance; they told the villagers that if the milk was not forthcoming by 20 May there would be deportations. Source does not know whether this threat was actually carried out because he left the village on the day that the threat was posted.	525th MIS Group, R-10-53, no eval (ID 822363) (S)	30

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General Nikolaev 4217N 2456E	Apr 52	In April 1952 peasants of General Nikolaev village rebelled against the agricultural cooperatives and refused to work in them. This rebellion was quickly suppressed by the authorities.	CIA/CS, -3 (S)	31
Golemanovo 4356N 2227E	Mar 51	At Golemanovo in March 1951 about 160 people under the leadership of a surveyor named Vekov marched to the cooperative stores and took re-possession of their carts, trucks, and cattle. The militia opened fire, and one woman was wounded.	CIA/SO 73731, -3 (C/US Only)	32
Goritsa 4248N 2723E	Up to May 52	In July 1951 the authorities discovered the existence of a resistance group in the village of Goritsa. The group allegedly had branches in Pomorie (4233N-2739E), Stratsin (4247N-2728E), Mosko (4249N-2740E), Galata (coordinates unknown), Kozichino (4251N-2735E), and Plavovets (4247N-2740E). According to the Bulgarian Communist newspaper, Pivinsko Delo, a number of persons were tried in Coase Delchev in November 1951 on charges of setting fire to a factory.	AWM/A Greece, R-522-52, B-3 (ID 1095782) (S)	33
Coase Delchev 4131N 2343E	Jan 52	At Gramada in March 1951 over 200 people were involved in a raid on the cooperative store. There were casualties among both the militia and the raiders.	CIA/00-4-22485, 22 Apr 52, (C)	34
Gramada 4350N 2240E	Mar 51		CIA/SO 73731, -3 (C/US Only)	35
Gulubets 4246N 2731E	Jul 52	A group of 12 resisters from Gulubets was discovered by the authorities in 1951 and was put on trial in May 1952. The leader, a certain Dimitur Pilev, was not tried, and it was reported that he had been killed after fleeing to the mountains. A certain Radi (1nn) and another man were executed in July 1952 in Burgas prison for belonging to this group; the remainder were sentenced to between 2 and 15 years imprisonment.	CIA/CS, -3 (C/US Only); partially confirmed by State, AmConden Istanbul, 353,8 Dec 52 (ID 1110235)(S)	36

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Gyueshevo 1211N 2229E	Apr-May 51	A branch of an unidentified clandestine organization whose object is the overthrow of the Communist regime and whose net extends throughout the country was located until recently in the village of Gyueshevo. In April 1951 most members of the Gyueshevo unit were denounced and arrested. (See incident listed under Zhelyu Voyvoda)	CIA/80 71364, 6 Sep 51, C-3 (ID 811151) (S/US Only)	37
Ichera 1214N 2627E				
Kableshevo 1214N 2731E	Sep 52	The resistance group formerly led by Yari Magritov has been reconstituted near Atanasovo (see above, incident No. 3). Magritov, who was ambushed and killed near the village of Kableshevo, had for some time been a terror to the Communists in the Burgas area (1230N-2728E).	CIA/80 101938, 21 Jan 53, P-6 (S/US Only)	38
Kamenovo 1233N 2608E	Jun 51	Seventeen persons from the village of Karahaslanar (possibly Kamenovo) have fled into the mountains. Groups of two and three persons from other villages are doing the same thing. From time to time, as food supplies run out, these fugitives attack mills in the surrounding areas. They are often pursued by soldiers and skirmishes between troops and raiders are frequent in the mountainous areas around Kazanlik (1237N-2521E).	CIA/CS, -3 (S)	39
Kapitan Andreevo 1237N 2619E	Apr 52	Source heard that on the night of 27 April 1952 someone posted pictures of King Boris on telephones in the city square. They also stalked elegants, women with 1 May, "Long Live Eisenhower," etc. Source and two other young men were arrested the same night by the border guards and held on suspicion; Source was released after five days of questioning, the other two men were held for 20 days. In January 1953 the three men responsible for the incident were arrested and placed on public trial in Svilengrad (1116N-2612E). They received sentences of 11 years, 15 years, and 8 years.	OARMA Turkey, R-518-54, C-3 (ID 1263104) (S)	40

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Kazanlik 1237N 2521E	1949-Apr 53	Sometime near the end of February and the beginning of March 1952 it was reported that 20 partisans had been captured in the area between Sliven (1240N-2619E) and Kazanlik. (See also incident listed under Romanovo)	CIA/CS, -3 (S)	41
Khadzhitte 1237N 2705E	May-Jul 52	In November 1951 a certain Blazir Gospodinov Stoyanov, a native of Khadzhitte, together with 13 other men from Khadzhitte and three other villages in the Karabot okoliya, were brought to trial on charges of anti-regime activity. Stoyanov was sentenced to death and executed on 3 March 1952; the others were condemned to prison terms of between 5 and 16 years. Two persons who had fled to Turkey were sentenced to death in absentia.	CIA/CS, -3 (C/US Only); OARMA/A Turkey, R-186-52, (ID 1063110) (C/US Only)	42
Khashevo 1156N 2531E	Jun-Jul 51	There are reports of a resistance group near Khashevo which killed 15 Communists in a nearby village during the month of May 1951.	CIA/80 80835, 30 Jan 52, (C/US Only)	43
Kolarovgrad 1316N 2651E	Spring 52	Unknown persons set fire to the collective of Gerecht (a village near Kolarovgrad) in June 1952. A considerable quantity of foodstuff was destroyed.	ARMY Greece, R-633-52, (ID 1104164) (U)	44
Kornitza 1138N 2340E		(See incident listed under Brestitza)		
Kostandents 1231N 2612E	Prior to Aug 51	According to newspaper reports in Ruse (1351N-2557E) a wall-to-wall miller in Kostandents and a friend were arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of giving aid to a resistance group.	CIA/80 75126, 31 Oct 51, -3 (S/US Only)	45
Kotlenska Planina 1251N 2621E	Jun-Jul 51	A resistance group is operating in the Kotlenska Planina, having previously arrived in April and May 1951 from its former area of operation near Sliven (1240N-2619E). The group was forced to change its location because of pursuit by a military detachment.	CIA/80 73191, 2 Oct 51, C-3 (S/US Only)	46

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Kremikovtsi 4247N 2330E	Dec 51	On 22 December 1951 the camp at Kremikovtsi, which is used to accommodate trudoavaks in the uranium mines at Bukhovo (4246N-2331E), was destroyed by fire caused by sabotage.	CIA/80 81383, 20 Feb 52, -6 (ID 883176) (C/US Only)	47
Krestets 4246N 2532E	Jan 52	In early December 1951 there was an accident on the rail line between Blakovci (coordinates unknown) and Krestets which Source was told had been caused by sabotage. A crash occurred between a freight train and a passenger train carrying Communist teachers who had been to a conference. There were 110 or 150 victims.	G2/SSI TRUST/BETTOR, R-117-52, P-3 (ID 879157) (S)	48
Kubrat 4348N 2630E	Jul 51	An attempt was made during the early part of summer 1951 to assassinate the police chief of Kubrat district.	CIA/80 78020, 10 Dec 51, -3 (S/US Only)	49
Kuklen 4202N 2447E 230	Apr-May 51	In April or May 1951 a resistance group of 20 persons was active in the area between Kuklen and Yabrovo (coordinates unknown). On one occasion the partisans went to the convent at Yane Sandanski (Sveti Vrach) (coordinates unknown) to get food. They were betrayed to the police by the head nun and were pursued by a security unit to Yabrovo, where a battle took place. The police suffered three casualties.	CIA/80 76710, 21 Nov 51, -3 (S/US Only); 525th MIS Group, R-25-53 (ID 828227E) (S/US Only)	50
Kula 4353N 2230E	Aug 52	Informant heard that in August 1952 partisan units encountered Bulgarian militia forces in the zone of Kula, Lom (4349N-2312E), and Belogradchik (4348N-2240E). These anti-Communist groups were organized and were living in the frontier area in order to have better chances of finding refuge in Yugoslavia if hard-pressed.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	51
Kula		(See also incident listed under Vidin)		
Kurnalovo 4428N 2313E	Jan 52	In January 1952 a group of dissidents attempted to set fire to the Kurnalovo cooperative depot. All members of the group were arrested.	ARMVA Greece, R-450-52, P-3 (ID 1090342) (S)	52

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Krustendil 4217N 2241E	Jun-Jul 51	A small group of partisans, called "Goryani" under the leadership of a certain Dr. Milachkov is operating in the Krustendil district. Milachkov was formerly interned in a concentration camp but escaped to his native district and now maintains himself with a small following in the hills. According to another Source, Milachkov's son is in Yugoslavia where his father went to see him and then returned secretly to Bulgaria.	CIA/80 77493, C-3 (ID 857489) (S); CIA/00 (S/US Only)	53
Krustendil	Dec 52	In or about October 1951 there was a large fire at the Krustendil railroad station which destroyed about 1,000 wooden cases filled with fruit. The residents of the area believed that the fire was started by partisans in the area who are few in number and rather inactive.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	54
Lezar Stansvo 4300N 2417E	Apr-May 51	In March or April 1951 the peasants of Toros (now Lezar Stansvo) looted the local cooperative food warehouses and reclaimed their animals. Skirmishes with the militia followed, in which one policeman was killed and another arrested.	CIA/80 68187, 30 Aug 51, no eval (S/US Only); 525th MIS Group, R-6-53 (ID 818314) (S)	55
Lesko 4156N 2258E	Sep 51	On 25 September 1951 a group of three persons raided the town of Lesko. They set fire to four houses belonging to the Leading Communists of the town.	CIA/80 77178, 28 Nov 51, C-3 (S/US Only)	56
Levanovo 4129N 2318E	Up to Jun 51	After Chervenkov's declaration on 12 April 1951 that anyone who wished to do so could leave the cooperatives, there was a movement in Levanovo to break away from the system. A delegation of villagers went to Sofia to obtain permission to leave the Levanovo cooperative and later, when nothing came of their visit, staged a strike which involved 300 of the 400 workers in the cooperative and lasted from 13 May to 2 June. On the latter date the authorities intervened and forced the villagers to return to work.	ARMVA Greece, R-412-51, C-2 (ID 826879) (S); 525th MIS Group, R-6-53 (ID 818314) (S)	57
Lezhnitesa 4137N 2340E		(See incident listed under Premitisa)		

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Iron 1319N 2312E		(See incidents listed under Kula)		
Loyvan 1252N 2105E	Jun-Jul 51	A small resistance group is operating in the hills around Loyvan and Etropols (1250N-2359E). Although most of the men in the group are not natives of the area, a few local peasants supply them with food. A small military detachment has recently arrived in Teteven (1255N-2110E) with orders to wipe out this resistance group.	CIA/50 73191, 2 Oct 51, C-3 (S/US Only)	58
Lovech 1308N 2112E	Prior to Apr 51	Peasants in the Lovech area attacked the kolkhoz warehouses early in 1951 and took back their animals.	CIA/50 70131, 16 Aug 51, -3 (ID 834601) (S/US Only); SO 68729, 23 Apr 51 (ID 785774) (S/US Only)	59
Lovech	Prior to Jun 52	Some 100 members of the 2nd Trudovak Battalion in Lovech were arrested for provoking their guards. According to informant, this charge was invented because the Trudovaks had submitted a written request that work conditions and food be improved.	CIA/50 93310, 7 Aug 52, -6 (S/US Only)	60
Inkovit 1312N 2110E	Apr-May 51	In Manitshevo, a village in the area between Inkovit and Teteven (1255N-2116E), a group of 170 persons signed a petition requesting Premier Cherventov to return the lands taken over by the local kolkhoz. When no reply came the peasants went in a group on 10 April 1951 to pillage the kolkhoz food warehouses and to remove their animals. Police came from Inkovit and Teteven and arrested about 30 persons.	CIA/50 68187, 30 Aug 51, no eval. (S/US Only)	61
Maliko Gradishte 1316N 2559E	1951-1952	In May 1952 the state security office in Khaskovo (1156N-2531E) arrested about 50 men from Maliko Gradishte on charges of conducting espionage for a foreign power. Later four of the arrested men were sentenced to death, and the remainder received prison terms of three to ten years imprisonment.	CIA/CS (S)	62

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Marino Pole 1325N 2321E	Prior to Oct 55	In Marino Pole the peasants tried to oppose collectivization by force (probably in late 1950 or early 1951). The regime thereupon confiscated the land and incorporated it into the collective of Marikostinovo (1326N-2321E). As a result the villagers had to abandon their homes in Marino Pole and seek jobs elsewhere. Three inhabitants of Marino Pole were arrested and sentenced to three years imprisonment on charges of sabotage and agitation against the collectives.	Confidential Source (U)	63
Medeshertsi 1353N 2239E	Mar 51	In early 1951 disturbances broke out in Medeshertsi over the regime's attempt to enforce collectivization.	CIA/50 73731, -3 (C/US Only)	64
Medeshertsi 1338N 2312E		(See incident listed under Sandanski)		
Novo Selo 1315N 2156E	Prior to Jun 51	On 4 May 1951 riots and fighting broke out between members of the collectives and government forces at Nikolaev and Bryastovets (1321N-2137E). The fighting had assumed the proportion of a minor revolt when military forces from Plevan (1325N-2137E) arrived to restore order. Two members of the militia and one civilian were killed. In the arrests which followed 220 farmers were reportedly imprisoned.	CIA/50 76969, 28 Nov 51, -3 (ID 857108) (S)	65
Novo Selo 1251N 2155E	Prior to Jun 51	In May 1951 a group of armed men, number unknown, clashed with the militia between Novo Selo and Vlasovo (coordinates unknown). Two policemen were killed.	-525th MIS Group, R-11-53, no eval. (ID 823960) (S)	66
Novo Selo 1310N 2216E	Mar 51	A farmer who seized back his own livestock was arrested by a local official. The farmer stabbed the official and was shot by the militia.	CIA/00 (C/US Only)	67
Oreshnik 1204N 2623E	Not listed	In April 1951 signs reading "Death to the Communists" appeared on the walls of Oreshnik.	USARMA Ankara, AAC 141, 17 Jul 53 (DAIN 288869) C-3 (S)	68

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Otets Paisievo 1227N 2154E	Apr 52	In April 1952 the peasants of Otets Paisievo village rebelled against the agricultural cooperative and refused to work in it. This rebellion was quickly suppressed by the authorities.	CIA/CS (S)	69
Pasardzhik 1211N 2420E	Nov 51	On about 8 November 1951 the people of Pasardzhik suddenly attacked the local militia and soldiers. The reasons for this attack are not known.	CIA/CS 77554, 3 Dec 51, -3 (ID 857568) (S)	70
Peshtera 1202N 2416E	Apr 51	A revolt against the collectivization policy of the Bulgarian government recently occurred in the Peshtera area, southwest of Plovdiv. The peasants of three villages in the area demanded permission to withdraw from the collectives; when this request was refused, they took matters into their own hands, removed all the livestock and agricultural implements which they had contributed to the collectives; and barricaded themselves in their villages. After three days a truce was arranged with the local authorities.	CIA/CS 64516, 25 Jun 51, -3 (ID 817121) (S/US Only)	71
Petrich 1212N 2313E	Apr-May 51	On 24 April 1951 anti-Communist slogans appeared on the walls and blackboards of the Gotselchev gymnasium school in Petrich.	CIA/CS 68187, 30 Aug 51, no eval (S/US Only)	72
Petrich	Jan 52	According to the Bulgarian Communist newspaper Pirinsko Delo, a number of persons were tried in Petrich in November 1951 on charges of setting fire to a factory.	CIA/CS 00-4-22485, 22 Apr 52, (C)	73
Petrich	Early Sep 52	The commander of the Petrich militia was killed in early September 1952 by a few armed persons who entered from Yugoslavia. A certain number of the militia were also wounded. The wounded policemen and the body of the militia commander were taken by these armed persons into Yugoslavia.	AmvA Greece, R-678-52, E-3 (ID 1131365) (S); R-6-53, (ID 1138706) (S)	74
Petrich	Mar 51	(See also incident listed under Elshnitsa)		75
Pirdop 1212N 2411E	Mar 51	Source, a Bulgarian escapee, heard that in March 1951, an armed group destroyed secret warehouses which were located near a railroad tunnel in the vicinity of Pirdop.	CIA (ID 895033) R-3 (S/US Only) 1525th MIS Group, R-6-53 (ID 818311) (S)	76

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Pirdop Pirin 1232N 2334E	1951	(See also incident listed under Galata) According to two Sources, armed resistance groups were active in the mountains near Pirin in the spring of 1951. According to one Source, a military platoon sent to fight the partisans joined them instead. According to the other Source, the partisan group numbered about 50 men, of whom about 28 surrendered to the authorities because of lack of food and equipment. The police, in their effort to rid the mountains of the partisans who did not surrender, ordered the cattle breeders in the mountain areas to vacate with their animals.	525th MIS Group, R-11, 53, no eval (ID 823980) (S/US Only)	76
Pirin	Oct 51	In July 1951 partisans attacked a large dairy in Pirin.	02/CS1 TRUST/RETFOR, R-176-52, C-6 (ID 881686) (C)	77
Pleven 1232N 2437E	Dec 51	On 10 December 1951 guerrillas are reported to have destroyed a 1/2 km. section of the Pleven-Stalin (1312N-2755E) railroad line.	AmvA Greece, R-203-52, P-2 (ID 883868) (S)	78
Pleven	Prior to Jun 52	In Pleven, where the 6th Trudovak Battalion has its headquarters, the commanding officer of the battalion was attacked and seriously wounded by his men when he ignored their protests about bad food and ill treatment. Some 35 Trudovaks who were considered responsible for this incident were reportedly executed.	CIA/CS 93310, 7 Aug 52, -6 (S/US Only)	79
Plovdiv 1208N 2445E	Jun-Jul 51	In the period 27 June-10 July 1951 the Communist radio reported that a group of "spies, plotters, and traitors" had been unmasked at Plovdiv. These persons were described as "Trotskyites" who sought to revive the party of Nikola Petkov.	FRUS, 27 Jun-10 Jul 51 (C)	80
Plovdiv	Oct 51	In 1952 the police discovered a wireless transmitter in a church in Plovdiv. The priest of this church was executed.	AmvA Greece, R-102-55, C-3 (ID 1276598) (S)	81
Pomorie 1233N 2739E	Mar 52	In March 1952 the salt ponds at Pomorie were flooded. In the ensuing investigation, 80 laborers were arrested.	USARMA Athens, NR-MID 194, 18 Jul 53 (DAILY 288770)	82

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Popovitsa 1208N 2501E	Apr 52	In April 1952 peasants of Popovitsa village rebelled against the agricultural cooperative and refused to work in it. This rebellion was quickly suppressed by the authorities.	CIA/OS (S)	83
Popovo 1321N 2613E	1952	According to Source, of whose bona fides there is some doubt, slogans slandering the Communist authorities appeared in the summer of 1952 on the walls of some villages near the town of Popovo. Immediately the militia came, wiped off the slogans, and arrested several opponents of the regime. The militia told the peasants that if such slogans appeared again, all the peasants in the villages concerned would be held responsible.	CIA/OS (C)	84
Prekolnitsa 1216N 2229E	Apr-May 51	Political arrests continue to be made in the villages of Prekolnitsa and Nanetsi (1217N-2230E). To date, approximately 90 villagers and workers have been arrested.	CIA/OS 71364, 6 Sep 51, C-3 (ID 841154) (S/OS only)	85
Purvenets 1204N 2440E	May 51	On 23 May 1951 a skirmish took place between the militia and a resistance group approximately three kms. northwest of Ferdinandovo (now Purvenets). The resistance group had reportedly been waiting to ambush a certain T. Jordevski, who betrayed anti-Communist. Although surrounded by the militia, the resistance group allegedly suffered no casualties but killed six militia men.	CIA/OS 84822, 1 Apr 52, P-3 (ID 1050219) (S); similar reports in CIA/OS 76700x (S/OS only) and SO 71779 (S/OS only)	86
Rakovitsa 1316N 2228E	Mar 51	In early 1951 popular disturbances broke out in Rakovitsa over the regime's enforcement of collectivization.	CIA/OS 73731, -3 (C/OS only)	87
Nanetsi 1217N 2230E		(See incident listed under Prekolnitsa)		
Ravno 1312N 2627E	Not listed	Source, a Bulgarian escapee, states that an independent group of seven partisans of the village of Ravno, Kubrat district, operates in the districts of Kubrat and Silistra. In October 1951 it assassinated 17 Communists in the village of Altavur (1350N-2717E), Silistra District, and three Communists in Kolarovgrad (1316N-2654E).	State, AmConDen Istanbul, 145, 21 Mar 52 (ID 888760) (S)	88

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Razgrad 1315N 2330E	Prior to May 51	Clashes between the farmers and militia have occurred in the Razgrad (probably Razgrad) district over the introduction of collectivization. In April 1951 the members of the Razgrad collective turned down the collective's warehouse.	525th MIS Group, R-5-53, no eval (ID 818311B) (S); CIA/OS 67451, 11 Jul 51 (ID 822989) (C/OS only)	89
Rila Planina Late 1210N 2315E	Jun 51	Organized armed underground units are currently active in the Rila Planina area.	CIA/OS 78592, 16 Jan 52, B-2 (ID 867291) (S)	90
Regosh 1211N 2425E	Apr 52	In April 1952 peasants of Regosh village rebelled against the agricultural cooperative and refused to work in it. This rebellion was quickly suppressed by the authorities.	CIA/OS (S)	91
Rudnik 1237N 2729E	Mar-Jun 52	In 1952 someone placed an explosive charge in the "Purvi Mai" mine at Rudnik (now Rudnik) and blocked the mine. There were many arrests in the area after this incident.	ArmyA Greece, R-151-53, C-3 (ID 1144113) (S)	92
Ruse 1351N 2557E	Jul-Aug 51	In the summer of 1951 leaflets calling for an uprising against Communism were distributed in Ruse, in the outskirts of Khadzhi Dimitrovo (coordinates unknown), and in several other unspecified villages.	CIA/OS 90727, 25 Jun 52, -3 (ID 1059620) (S/OS only)	93
Ruse	Jul 51	Source heard that in July 1951, in the neighborhood of Ruse, a father and son who were members of a local resistance group returned to their village and later found that their house was surrounded by militia. The father was shot and killed while attempting to escape. The son threw two hand grenades, killing the commander of the militia force and two soldiers, but was eventually captured and taken to the prison in Ruse. He later managed to escape in the company of two of his guards thanks to the assistance provided him by several women in the town.	C2/SST TRUST/HETTON, R-151-54, P-5 (ID 1259485) (C)	94
Ruse	Dec 51	Early in December 1951 the Danube passenger steamer Dimitur Blagoev (formerly the "Mae Simon") was set afire by unidentified persons and reduced to a total wreck. Numerous arrests were made in the town in connection with this incident.	CIA/OS 81383, 20 Feb 52, -6 (ID 883176) (C/OS only); (CIA/OS (S) describes this incident as occurring in Sep 52)	95

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Ruse	1951	Informant heard from unidentified sources that bombs were found in 1951 in the Wela Pistova textile factory and also in the headquarters of the Ruse Communist Party. The bombs were disassembled without causing damage. During 1951 the bust of Georgi Dimitrov in the central park of Ruse was smashed by unknown persons.	CIA/OS (C)	96
Ruse	1952	Source learned from his brother, an apprentice at the Dimitrov Machine Factory in Ruse, that an attempt was made by unidentified persons to blow up the plant on the evening of 8 September 1952. The plant produced numerous types of agricultural machine equipment. According to Source's brother, factory personnel or guards had discovered a series of charges consisting of lead wires to which detonating charges had been attached. Rumors among the employees claimed that the only device needed to set off the charges was a blasting machine which was not found in the plant.	CIA/OS (S)	97
Ruse		(See also incident listed under Chervena Voda.)		
Sandanski 4134N 2317E	Prior to Apr 53	In October 1952 a trial was held in Sandanski of about 10 farmers from Mikundin (coordinates unknown), a farmer from Sandanski, and a farmer from Mikrovo (4133N-2312E). These persons were accused of having connections with diversionists sent in from Yugoslavia and were sentenced to prison terms of 3 to 10 years.	OSMA Belgrade, R-292-53, F-3 (ID 1173425) (S/SpH)	98
Sapareva Banya 4217N 2316E	Nov 51	In November 1951 the Bulgarian security police arrested a Yugoslav major and five Bulgarian partisans at Sapareva Banya. This village is located in the northern foothills of the Rila Planina within an area which has been closed for several months to both Bulgarians and foreigners ostensibly because of "foot and mouth disease."	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	99
Selise 4211N 2532E	Up to May 52	In August 1951 guerrillas stole one million leva from the Skatse (probably Selise) "Forest Guard" paymaster. The paymaster later said that he had known that there was such a guerrilla group in the area.	ARMVA Greece, R-451-52, F-3 (ID 1090334) (S)	100

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Sevlievo 4302N 2506E		(See incident listed under Troyan)		
Shitipko 4323N 2731E	Prior to Sep 51	Source, a Bulgarian refugee, belonged to a group of 13 partisans which was active in Shitipko prior to his escape from Bulgaria in September 1951.	CIA/OS 83959, 13 Mar 52, no eval (ID 884971) (C)	101
Skutare 4211N 2451E	Prior to Aug 51	In April 1951 the farmers of the collective in Skutare attacked the local police and Communists with clubs. Several persons were killed or wounded, and the collective was dissolved.	ARMVA Greece, R-458-51, F-5 (ID 834330) (S)	102
Slivak 4306N 2445E	Prior to Oct 52	On 2 September 1952 a large fire broke out in the village of Slivak. The Jaromni magazin (people's store), the house where the village soviet holds its meetings, and a number of other houses in the village were burned. Sabotage is presumed.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	103
Sliven 4240N 2619E	1950-1955	Source, a Bulgarian refugee, was told by friends that in 1950 a resistance group of farmers in the Sliven district began clashes with the local militia after its existence was discovered.	USFA, Austria, R-1356-55, F-0 (ID 1288202) (C)	104
Sliven	Jun-Jul 51	In April 1951 partisans attacked the Sliven prison and freed a number of prisoners. A trial was later held in the city of several Communist officials who were accused of having furnished arms and assistance to the partisans. The trial was conducted by a military tribunal, and all the accused were found guilty and shot.	CIA/OS 78544, 16 Jan 52, C-3 (S/US Only)	105
Sliven	Prior to May 51	A guerrilla-type resistance group of 500 men clashed with government troops in the Sliven area of the Stara Planina and successfully blew up a freight train near Sliven. The train was loaded with ammunition which allegedly originated in the USSR and was on its way from Burgas to Sofia.	CIA/OS 83310, 5 Mar 52, F-5 (S/US Only)	106

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Sliven	1949-1951	Source, a Bulgarian refugee, declared that in 1949 four former members of the BNAU formed a resistance committee in Sliven. They established contact with almost all villages in Sliven district and formed "Resistance Sub-Committees." In June 1949 the committee was enlarged but fell into internal dissensions, with the result that the names of the members were divulged to the authorities. The committee members then fled into the mountains where they were joined by some peasants from nearby villages. In all they numbered about 85 men and were armed. In May 1951 the partisans were surrounded by Army units; only 17 escaped, the remainder were killed or taken prisoner.	State, AmCon Turkey, 126, 19 Feb 52 (S)	107
Sliven	1953-1956	Source, a former 2nd Lt. in the border guard along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier, heard that in August 1951 some anti-Communists in the Sliven and Yambol (4229M-2630E) area, under the leadership of a former mayor, left their homes and went into the Zadrinitsa woods with primitive armament. NVR (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and militia troops besieged them and, after a fight, many of their leaders, including women as well as men, were arrested and secretly tried in Stara Zagora (4225M-2538E). Source heard that more resistance bands were formed in the area in 1952 and 1953, one under a priest who later escaped to Yugoslavia.	CIA/OS (C)	108
Sliven	Apr 52	On 28 April 1952 two members of an underground organization composed of former members of an outlawed political party were arrested in an attempt to destroy an underground oil storage depot three kms. outside Sliven.	AIR A Turkey, IR-568-52, no eval (AF 505599) (S); OAKM/A Turkey, R-291-52, R-2 (S)	109
Sliven		(See also incident listed under Kazanlik)		
Sofia 4243N 2320E	Jun-Jul 51	Source heard that during May 1951 an army was blown up in Sofia, allegedly by members of the Narodna Zashchita (National Defense) group.	CIA/80 80835, 30 Jan 52 (G/US Only) (AIR Wringer, 51-7501-E, R-O (C)	110

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Sofia	Jun 52	In June 1952 there was an explosion at the Georgi Dimitrov textile factory in Sofia. Investigations into possible sabotage were held, and four persons were condemned to death.	USARMA Athens, NR-MID 194, 18 Jul 53 (DAIN 288770) R-1 (S)	111
Sofia	Early Jun 52	In June 1952 there was an instance of arson at the "Pirkit" parquet factory in Sofia. Almost the entire factory was destroyed, and many arrests were made.	CIA/80 (S/US Only)	112
Sofia	Mar-Oct 51	During the summer of 1951 the shoe factory "9 September" in Sofia was destroyed by fire. Ten factory officials and some of the workers were arrested. Sabotage is presumed.	G2/681 TRUST/BEWOR, R-73-52, no eval (S); ARMYA Greece, R-700-51, C-3 (ID 861997) (S)	113
Sofia	Jul 55	Sabotage frequently occurs at the "Petko Napetov" paper factory in Ivanovo, a suburb of Sofia. One of the most famous cases of sabotage took place in 1952. According to a contract with the "Petko Napetov" factory, workers at the "Napetov" factory were supposed to collect waste paper, clean it, and send it in large bales to the "Napetov" factory. One day, pretending to examine the waste paper, they stuck a dead dog into one of the bales. When the bales arrived at the "Napetov" factory, they were thrown into a large boiler of acid without being examined. One of the workers who was tending the boilers told Source that he noticed the dead dog but did not pull it out. This mass of dissolved paper from the boiler, together with the bones of the dead dog which had not dissolved, was run through a very delicate machine which was thereby badly damaged. Although the authorities held an investigation into the incident, the perpetrators were not discovered.	Confidential Source (U)	114
Sofia	1952-1954	Source heard that at some unspecified period (probably 1952 or earlier) a Serbian and three Bulgarians were caught while trying to blow up the Dimitrov rubber tire factory in Sofia. The Serbian was executed and the three Bulgarians were sentenced to life imprisonment.	ARMYA Greece, R-101-55, C-3 (ID 1277585) (S)	115
Stalin 4312N -2755E	Prior to Sep 51	In April and May 1951 the militia arrested about 80 persons in the Stalin area for alleged connections with clandestine organizations.	CIA/80 83959, 13 Mar 52, -3 (ID 881971) (G/US Only)	116

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Stalin	Jul-Aug 51	On or about 10 August 1951 an organized group of young people threw fire bombs at shops along the main streets of Stalin.	CIA/80 90727, 25 Jun 52, -3 (ID 1059020) (S/US Only)	117
Stanké Dimitrov 1216N 2307E	May 51	Farmers in Stanké Dimitrov held open demonstrations against the government during the Orthodox Easter holidays. The discontent of the peasants is now more evident and is openly expressed.	02/OSI TRUST/RECTOR, R-363-51, C-3 (ID 828179) (S)	118
Stanké Dimitrov 1216N 2307E	Aug-Dec 51	Mimeographed leaflets without any title were dropped in the streets of Stanké Dimitrov in August and December 1951. They read as follows: "Down with the Red Curtain. How long will the Soviet Union absorb our wealth? Hurrah for the free democracies." Anti-regime slogans are occasionally daubed on the walls of the city.	AMPA Greece, R-103-52, D-4 (ID 1062710) (S)	119
Stara Zagora 4225N 2538E	Jul 52	Clashes occurred on 3 July 1952 between the militia and peasantry on three state farms. Casualties include 16 peasants and 7 militia killed and 80 of both categories wounded.	CIA/80 104915, 21 Jan 53, F-6 (S/US Only)	120
Staropatisa 4350N 2230E	Mar 51	In early 1951 disturbances broke out in Staropatisa over the regime's attempt to enforce collectivization.	CIA/80 73731, -3 (C/US Only) 121	121
Staropatisa Autumn 51		In the fall of 1951 four members of the Agrarian party from the village of Staropatisa were sentenced to death on charges of espionage and failure to turn in the proper harvest quota. Ten other peasants of Staropatisa were sentenced to life imprisonment.	CIA/80 101507, 13 Jan 53, C-3 (S)	122
Tchachka 4337N 2559E	1951	On 10 June 1951 an underground group in the village of Tchachka, consisting of about 10 persons, was liquidated by the police.	State, MacDonen Istanbul, 54, 24 Jul 51, no eval (ID 830712) (S)	123

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Teteven 4255N 2416E	Mar 51	On 22 and 23 March 1951 a group of peasants in the village of Teteven staged a revolt in opposition to the government's collectivization program. Source was not certain as to how the revolt started nor as to the number of persons involved since his information came from "general talk" in Lovech (4308N-2412E). From what he heard, the peasants were armed with rifles and pistols smuggled in from Yugoslavia, and the uprising was so serious that the 33rd Infantry Regiment from Strishov (4337N-2520E) had to be summoned in order to quell it. In the ensuing melee, some 27 soldiers were wounded, and over 100 peasants were killed or wounded.	0A/Attache Turkey, R-70-51, F-6 (ID 764481) (S); CIA/80 66673, 13 Aug 51 (ID 832908) (S)	124
Teteven 4255N 2416E	Prior to Sep 51	(See also incidents listed under Galata and Inkovit) In the period April-May 1951 approximately 130 persons were arrested in the Tolbukhin area on charges of belonging to clandestine organizations. One of these organizations was composed of a group directed by a civilian who, with two officers and six soldiers of the 16th Infantry Regiment, planned to blow up the regimental depot adjoining the Tolbukhin barracks. The military were supposed to supply the other members of the group with arms.	CIA/80 83959, 13 Mar 52, -3 (ID 884971) (C/US Only)	125
Tolbukhin 4331N 2750E	Prior to Sep 51	Source belonged to a resistance group based at Tolbukhin. In 1951 he distributed anti-Communist posters among the villagers of Boyana (4326N-2729E), Bogdanovo (4331N-2708E), Radievo (coordinates unknown), and Iendi Makhalie (coordinates unknown) which appealed to the peasants to stop working for the Communists. These posters were typewritten and bore the "Goryardin" stamp. Source also recruited discontented elements for membership in an organization which would aid partisans.	CIA/80 83959, 13 Mar 52, -3 (ID 884971) (C/US Only)	126
Topolchane 4239N 2626E	Jun 51	In June 1951 a band of approximately 80 armed "bandits" reportedly engaged in a pitched battle with the militia in their attempt to raid a cooperative flour mill in Topolchane.	USARMA Ankara, AAC 44, 17 Jul 53, C-3 (DAIN 288869) (S)	127

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Topolovgrad 4205N 2620E	Prior to Apr-Aug 51	It is currently rumored among the inhabitants of Topolovgrad that anti-Communist groups are actively operating in the mountains areas surrounding the city. An unidentified regiment was sent to quell resistance activities in the Topolovgrad mountains on 24 April 1951. Reportedly only one company of this regiment ever returned to Svilengrad (4406N-2612E); the remainder allegedly deserted and joined the resistance groups.	CIA/SO 76323, 17 Nov 51, (ID 855177) (S/US Only)	128
Topolovo Approx. 4311N 2727E	Prior to Sep 51	Between April and May 1951 the militia arrested about 15 persons in Topolovo, a village in the area of Provadiya, in connection with membership in clandestine organizations.	CIA/SO 83959, 13 Mar 52, -3 (ID 864971) (C/US Only)	129
Troyan 4253N 2443E	Prior to Sep 51	Allegedly an anti-Communist group blew up two bridges on the Troyan-Sevlievo (4302N-2506E) road in the summer of 1951.	CIA/SO 78788, 18 Jan 52, -3 (ID 867313) (S/US Only)	130
Turnovo 4305N 2539E	Prior to Apr 51	Forty students of the Turnovo Teaching Academy were arrested by the militia in April 1951 for distributing leaflets which opposed the regime. The leader of the students, a teacher in the academy, was among those arrested.	CIA/SO 70131, 16 Aug 51, -3 (ID 834801) (S/US Only)	131
Tutranak 4403N 2637E	Jul-Aug 51	In July 1951 white flags bearing the inscription "Eject the Russians from Bulgaria" were raised at various places in Tutranak and neighboring villages.	CIA/SO 90727, 25 Jun 52, -3 (ID 1059020) (S/US Only)	132
Vetovo 4342N 2616E	Not Listed	A partisan group of 10 men known as the "Vetovska" group has been organized under the leadership of Georgi Utov of the village of Vetovo. It operates as an independent group in the Base and Kurbet districts and has had several skirmishes with the militia.	State, AmConden Istanbul, 485, 21 Mar 52 (ID 888760) (S)	133
Vurechin 4306N 2426E		(See incident listed under Galata)		

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Vidin 4400N 2553E	Mar 51	On 22 March 1951 riots against collectivization occurred simultaneously in Vidin and Kula (4533N-2230E). Two cooperative stores were burnt in Kula.	CIA/SO 73731, -3 (C/US Only)	134
Vidin	Late Jul 51	At a recent trial in Vidin six men were sentenced to death, including the district director of the food supply, on charges of having sabotaged the collection of grain. Another ten persons were sentenced to life imprisonment on the same charges.	CIA/SO 76512, 16 Jan 52, C-3 (S/US Only)	135
Vidin	Mar 52	A peasant revolt in the vicinity of Vidin is reported to have been crushed with such brutality by internal security troops that some 200 peasants defected to Yugoslavia.	USARMA Ankara, AAC 446, 17 Jul 53, C-3 (DIAIN 288869) (S)	136
Voyntsa 4357N 2442E	Mar 51	In early 1951 popular disturbances broke out in Voyntsa over the regime's attempt to enforce collectivization.	CIA/SO 73731, -3 (C/US Only)	137
Vratsa 4313N 2333E	1952	In February 1952 partisans caused a serious wreck on the Vratsa-Sofia railroad line in which many persons were killed.	Arma Rome, B-450-52, B-2 (ID 1097367) (S)	138
Yablanitsa 4302N 2406E	Prior to Jun 53	In 1951 or 1950 there were open uprisings of peasants in the Yablanitsa region which were reported even by the Communist press. The Communist Party sent special propagandists to calm the peasants.	CIA/OS-X-44850, -3 (C)	139
Yambol 4229N 2630E		(See incident listed under Sliven)		
Zagrad 4353N 2657E	Oct 54	In August 1951 a milling machine in a factory at Zagrad was put out of commission for ten days after someone put rods into the gears. After this incident, a 24-hour guard was posted over all machinery.	Arma Greece, R-103-55, C-3 (ID 1276897) (S)	140

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Zaraovo 4326N 2616E	Late 1951	In the autumn of 1951 Source heard that a guerilla group of 30-40 men from the Popovo (4321N-2613E) area was operating in the vicinity of Zaraovo. In late 1951 it was said that this group had been exterminated.	ArmYA Greece, R-510-52, D-3 (S)	141
Zhelezn Vovoda 4235N 2629E	Apr-Jun 51	Early in April 1951 a band of 60 armed guerillas, drawn from the villagers of Silven district and particularly from Zhelyu Vovoda, staged an uprising in Ichera (4246N-2627E). This rebellion was suppressed by government troops on 24 May 1951. Fifty-two guerillas were captured while the remaining eight escaped. The head of the guerilla group was Georgi Penkavski who had spent a year in Yugoslavia before returning to Bulgaria. Also among the guerillas were two trudovaks.	CIA/SO 74844, 31 Oct 51, -3 (S/US Only)	142
Zhilintsi 4215N 2238E	Apr-May 51	Eleven peasants from Zhilintsi recently fled into the mountains because of the harsh measures employed by the officials of that village. The 11 men are believed to have joined a clandestine organization known as Bodna Grupa (Battle Group) which maintains liaison with townspeople in the Rilaka Mountain area. Following the flight of the 11 men, the authorities in Zhilintsi arrested 30 residents of the village and held them for questioning.	CIA/SO 71364, 6 Sep 51, C-3 (ID 81454) (S/US Only)	143
Zlatosel 4225N 2501E	Apr 52	In April 1952 the peasants of Zlatosel village rebelled against the agricultural cooperative and refused to work in it. This rebellion was quickly suppressed by the authorities.	CIA/CS (S)	144

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Aytos 4242N 2715	Summer 1953	Two armed anti-Communists appeared in the area of Aytos and Petersko (probably Peshtersko (4254N-2720E)) in June 1953 and clashed with the police. They killed two or three policemen before being killed themselves.	ArmYA Greece, R-301-54, C-5 (ID 1231888) (C)	145
Bairam Dere 4257N 2704E	Summer 1953	Anti-Communist groups are active in the mountain area of Balaban Dere (probably Bairam Dere).	ArmYA Greece, R-301-54, C-5 (ID 1231888) (C)	146
Batak 4157N 2413E	To Sep 55	In August 1955 guerillas in the Batak-Peshtera (4202N-2416E) area abducted two children of leading local Communists, killed them, and then severed the hands and limbs from the children's bodies. Both children were about 15 years old. Source heard of this incident from his uncle who heard some Communists talking about it. It was said that army and militia units would be sent in search of the guerillas.	ArmYA Greece, R-5-56, R-6 (ID 2001826) (S)	147
Batak		(See also incident listed under Debrushtitsa)		
Botevgrad 4254N 2348E	May 54	On 11 April 1954 a fight occurred between the militia and the inhabitants of Konarevich, a village in the vicinity of Botevgrad. The fight started because the villagers refused to hand over three members of the Agrarian Party who belonged to the resistance movement. While these three men escaped to the mountains, the militia opened fire on the villagers. They wounded six persons, one of whom died soon afterwards.	CIA/00-4-1963, 15 Jul 54, no eval (S/US Only)	148
Bregovo 4410N 2339E	Mar 53	In a statement of 26 March 1953 the Bulgarian Communist newspaper, Rabotnichesko Delo, called for nationwide vigilance against subversive attempts. It gave as an example the "enemies of the people" who were mixing sand with cattle fodder in a mill on the collective farm at Bregovo.	State, AmbConden Istanbul, 1 Apr 53 (DAIN 252911) (S) Same report avers recent refugees report no subversive activity	149

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Breznik 1211N 2255E	Apr 54	Three officers and two NCO's of the 31st Infantry stationed at the Vitos (probably Vitosha) army center in Sofia were arrested on 4 March 1954. They are accused of belonging to a reactionary organization with its center at Breznik, northwest of Sofia. Two other officers were arrested the next day. The Vitosha and Breznik localities have since been isolated, and it is reported that an arms depot belonging to the clandestine organization has been found, containing 32 German rifles, 21 grenades, eight Bulgarian "Magnum" pistols, and ammunition. Five other persons, not in the military service, have also been arrested.	CIA/00-H-1590, 7 Jun 54, no eval (S/US Only)	150
Breznik 1210N 2310E	Prior to Apr 54	Source, a young carpenter from Breznitsa, once was inspired by a Radio Free Europe broadcast to give some expression to his antagonism for the Communist yoke. On 15 August 1953, at a time when Source was about 18 years old, he and three of his friends got some gunpowder from four bullets supplied by one of his friends who worked in the local munitions plant. With this powder they made homemade bombs and at night set off two of them near the barracks and another near the Slivnitska Beka River. The explosions caused an uproar in the village which was immediately blocked off by border guards. Two perfectly innocent persons were arrested. Early the next morning a Major Petkov, accompanied by many State Security agents, arrived from Smilti (1153N-2308E). They could discover nothing and about noon the blockade of the village was lifted. Sometime later, through the work of spies assigned to watch Source and his friends, the authorities succeeded in learning who the culprits were; in fact, the guilty parties themselves had helped the spies by boasting how they had pulled the wool over the Communists' eyes and created panic among them. This became the principal reason for Source's escape from Bulgaria.	Confidential Source (U)	151
Burgas 4230N 2738E	Apr 53	On 13 April 1953 a military installation and some grain silos in Burgas caught on fire. A very large quantity of grain destined for export was destroyed. Sabotage is presumed.	CIA/OS (S)	152

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Burgas 4230N 2738E	Mar 54	Anti-Communist partisan activities have been reported in the province of Burgas. Still more repressive measures are being employed in this region. The reason for this is that there are a good many Soviet officials in this province and any resistance puts the local Bulgarian Communist leaders in a very bad light.	CIA/00-H-1531, 3 May 54, no eval (S/US Only)	153
Cham Koriya 4216N 2336E	1953-1956	Source, a former junior sergeant in the Bulgarian Army, once saw a slogan posted on a wall in Cham Koriya denouncing the spring sowing plans. On 15 August 1953 he saw anti-Communist leaflets in the city which had been dropped the previous night from an airplane.	CIA/OS (C)	154
Debrushtitsa 4206N 2415E	Sep 54	In the month of September 1954, an unknown group of saboteurs caused considerable damage to the hydroelectric complex under construction in the Rhodope Mountains near Debrushtitsa and Batak (4157N-2413E). By opening the main dike of a small dam in the vicinity, the saboteurs flooded a tunnel and caused the death of 11 employees and the washing away of a considerable amount of equipment, machinery, and other material.	ARMIA Rome, R-23-55, C-3 (ID 1269137) (S/SPH NOFORN)	155
Dalhoid 4228N 2545E	Apr 54	A certain Col. Mihal Dusev (probably commanding the 8th Bulgarian Infantry) killed himself with a revolver on the night of 3 April 1954 at his home in Delhoid when members of the political-military police arrived to search his house. Five other officers of the 8th Infantry were arrested, and incriminating documents were found in their houses. The arrests and searches seem to have been caused by a movement directed against the Communist element in the army.	CIA/00-H-1750, 22 Jun 54, no eval (C/US Only)	156
Dimitrovgrad 4201N 2535E	Not listed	In late 1952 or early 1953 the electrical generating plant or the chemical fertilizer plant at Dimitrovgrad was largely destroyed by fire and explosion. Sabotage is presumed.	ARMYHASTY, Bucharest, 26 Jun 53 (DIN 282497) (S)	157
Dimitrovgrad 4201N 2535E	Jun 53	Numerous acts of sabotage occur at the factories in Dimitrovgrad despite the vigilance of the Communists. On several occasions the electric cables were cut.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	158

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Dimitrovo 4236N 2302E	Prior to May 56	The young workers at Dimitrovo are rebellious and there are frequent clashes between them and the militia, especially over Western novelties such as narrow trousers and modern music of which the youth are quite fond. On one occasion in 1955 the chief of the police forbade a restaurant orchestra to continue with the playing of modern Western dance music, whereupon he was soundly beaten by a group of young workers. One of the workers, a certain Gandhi, was arrested and put in prison.	Confidential Source (U)	159
Dospat 4239N 2410E	Jan-Feb 55	Source, a former master sergeant in the Bulgarian frontier troops, stated that leaflets attacking the cooperative system were found in the Dospat area in January or February 1955. The intelligence service conducted investigations and searches of the villagers who were under suspicion, but as of May 1955 nothing had been discovered. Some of the enlisted men in the local frontier troop detachment who found the leaflets kept them and did not turn them in to their officers.	ARMY Greece, R-437-55, F-6 (ID 1296530) (S)	160
Elena 4256N 2553E	May 54	On 3 May 1954 Bulgarian nationalists blew up the gasoline depot near Elena, a town located only 45 kms. from the permanent supply center for motorized army units.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	161
Elisevna 4305N 2330E	Jun 53	In the last week of June 1953 heavy damage was caused to the copper mines of Elisevna by sabotage. The administration buildings were burned down and much of the machinery destroyed. The mine is now closed entirely.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	162
Gabrovo 4252N 2519E	1950-1951	In August 1951 Source and 12 other men in the shoe section of the military clothing factory in Gabrovo formed a passive resistance group. Their aim was to sabotage the quality of production since it was impossible to sabotage the quantity inasmuch as daily work quotas had to be filled. During the summer of 1953 the number of shoe rejects became so great that Source felt there would be an investigation and his group would be discovered. In order to avoid possible arrest and imprisonment, he decided to flee the country.	QARMA Turkey, R-54-54, C-3 (ID 1198705) (S)	163

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Gabrovo 4252N 2519E	Sep 53	According to rumors in Gabrovo, a group of partisans was active in the Kodaha-Balkan Mountains near Gabrovo in September 1953. According to unofficial reports, militia forces in Gabrovo and an army unit from Sevlievo (4302N-2506E) were sent to search for the partisans. Source's father, who deals in firewood brought from the Kodaha-Balkan Mountains, told him that during the interrogation of some ethnic Greek cattleman living in the area, two boxes of chocolate and a parachute were found. All the cattleman were arrested, but no weapons were found.	CIA/OS (C)	164
Gabrovo 4252N 2519E	May 54	Typewritten leaflets have been clandestinely distributed in the important manufacturing town of Gabrovo. These leaflets are entirely devoted to attacks on the regime and are secretly distributed in Gabrovo and neighboring villages. The police have resorted to repressive measures and on 8 May 1954 arrested four persons who were then sent to Turnovo (4305N-2539E).	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	165
Ikhtiman 4226N 2349E	May 54	On 12 April 1954 a bomb burst in the middle of a Communist youth meeting at Potochaki, a village northeast of Ikhtiman. Two persons were killed and nine wounded. Two persons were arrested for complicity in the explosion and were sent to Ikhtiman for trial.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	166
Kara Bunar 4216N 2410E	May 54	Either disaffection exists within the Bulgarian Army itself or else resistance units are working close to army installations. On the night of 30 April-1 May 1954, a big depot belonging to the III Corps blew up at Kara Bunar. The explosion took place in the early hours of the morning, and fire destroyed most of the depot. Eight guards and some other persons have been arrested for sabotage.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	167
Karlovo 4239N 2448E	Prior to May 53	There is a guerrilla group in the mountains near Karlovo. Members of the group receive assistance from residents of Karlovo and the vicinity, as well as from former army officers in Floridiv (4208N-2445E). On 6 March 1953 the hiding place of the guerrillas was discovered by the militia and had to be abandoned; the guerrillas, however, returned to the Karlovo region in April 1953.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	168

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Karlovo	May 51	Nationalists from the Karlovo region have recently been arrested on charges of holding secret meetings. Documents discovered by the Communists show that the accused persons were arranging for sabotage of the delivery of agricultural products to the state. At least five persons and their relatives have been arrested; more arrests are to follow.	CIA/DO-H-1899, 20 Jul 54, no eval (S/US Only)	169
Kazanlik 1237N 2521E	Jun 53	In late June 1953 the large explosives plant at Kazanlik was closed down for a few days as the result of food riots. Militia reinforcements were brought into the area. The aircraft factory at Kazanlik was sabotaged at the same time.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	170
Kharmanli 1156N 2555E	Apr 51	On 3 March 1951 the local villagers set fire to a wheat elevator at Tuguth, a village northeast of Kharmanli.	CIA/DO-H-1679, no eval (S)	171
Khaskovo 1150N 2531E	1953	As a result of unemployment in the tobacco industry in Khaskovo, workers in the 1 May 1953 parade carried signs reading "We want work." When the government intervened against the workers, a riot ensued in which two workers were killed and many wounded.	CIA/OS (S)	172
Khaskovo	Feb 56	Source, a 21-year old Bulgarian escapee from Khaskovo, stated that during February and March 1954 approximately 6 or 7 students from his high school and several others from another high school were arrested by the militia because they had organized an illegal group against the Communists. The chief organizer of the group was sentenced to 10 years in prison and deprived of the right to continue his education. The group had distributed 1,000 leaflets in Khaskovo and had acquired an old gun and a hand grenade.	CIA/OS (S)	173
Kozarsko 1203N 2125E	1955	Partisans are active in the Kozarsko area.	CIA/DO (S/US Only)	174

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Kolarovgrad 1310N 2651E	Nov 53	In early August 1953 fire burst out in the attic of the barracks of the 7th Infantry Regiment at Kolarovgrad. The fire was brought under control before it had spread very far. There followed a discreet inquiry. Political officers of the regiment could learn only that the fire was incendiary and was set by "enemies of the people." Several persons who were interrogated, including some Bulgarian officers, were not seen afterwards.	CIA/DO-H-5149, 30 Dec 53, no eval (S/US Only)	175
Koprivlen 1311N 2348E	Apr 53	A short time before the 7th Infantry had been obliged to break off its maneuvers near Preslav (1310N-2649E) and return to barracks because the horses of the regimental artillery and the supply platoon had been killed. The investigation of this incident was carried on with utmost secrecy and no arrests were made until after the above-mentioned fire broke out.	Army's Greece, R-364-53, P-3 (ID 1179885) (S)	176
Kostinbrod 1249N 2341E	Jun 53	In mid-June 1953 the Gilroy Chemical Plant at Kostinbrod was damaged by fire and a heavy explosion. Workers inside murdered two members of the factory police while large crowds of townspeople demonstrated outside.	CIA/OS (S/US Only)	177
Kozlochy 1347N 2341E	Sep 51	According to Source, a 21-year old electrician from Kozlochy, there were many followers and supporters of Communism in his village immediately after the Communist advent to power. The number of really true Communists is now decreasing, and some of those who at one time embraced Communist ideology are today among its fiercest enemies. The disappointment of the population as the result of the prevailing misery and poverty has repeatedly been expressed in a series of acts of sabotage and anti-Communist demonstrations. For example, on 1 May and 9 September 1953 which were both Communist holidays, many leaflets were distributed in the Kozlochy locality and large-size posters bearing the slogan "Death to Communism" appeared on walls.	Confidential Sources (U)	178

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Kozloduy (ct'd.)		On 10 September 1953 Source himself was detained in one of the police offices and beaten in a barbarous manner because of the part he took in putting up the posters. Source himself was released, but two of his friends were sent to a special youth internment camp in Sredna Gora. When they returned to the village after three months, they no longer dared to greet their old friends.		
Krestets 4216N 2532E	Up to Jun 53	In the month of May 1954, after more posters and leaflets had appeared, the Communists arrested Marin Dinchev, the former President of the Provincial Administrative Committee of Agricultural Youth, because he was implicated in the preparation of the pamphlets and posters. Dinchev was at first sentenced to death but the sentence was later commuted to 20 years imprisonment.	ARMVA Greece, R-482-53, F-3 (ID 1184927) (S/US & UK only)	179
Kyustendil 4217N 2211E	Nov 53	A group of men belonging to the 73rd Infantry Regiment stationed at Kyustendil have been shot on orders of the political commissars for attempted escape to Yugoslavia. This is the first time that the political commissars of the Bulgarian army have decreed the execution of arrested individuals in peacetime without trial and without authorization from the Ministry of War.	CIA/CS (S/US only)	180
Machalata 4327N 2415E	Feb 53	In February 1953 the stables of the Machalata collective were set on fire by anti-Communists and 25 animals were destroyed.	ARMVA Greece, R-529-53, F-2 (ID 1185768) (S/SpH)	181
Michurin 4210N 2751E	Apr 53	Two Bulgarian refugees report that on 14 April 1953 an explosion occurred in the ammunition dumps at Michurin, causing the destruction of 700,000 rounds of ammunition. Sabotage is presumed.	CIA/CS (S). Refugee Source exploited in OMRMA Turkey, R-309-54, (ID 1258272) (S) places the date of the explosion in December 1953.	182

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Nest 4141N 2531E		(See Incident Listed under Perperek)		
Nova Zagora 4229N 2601E	Early 1953	In early 1953, shortly after a similar incident at Yambol (Incident No. 172), a fire broke out in the large flour mill at Nova Zagora. The mill is situated very close to the railroad station at the end of the town and the flames at one time endangered the railroad yards. An attempt was reportedly made to set fire to the fuel storage tanks near the mill by the presumed saboteurs.	CIA/CSDB (S/US only)	183
Oryakhovo 4314N 2350E	Apr 54	On the night of 23 March 1954 there was an explosion in a benzine storage depot at Krupovo (probably Oryakhovo) near the Danube River. Three workmen were arrested and tortured until they confessed. The explosion was the work of a band which had done a great deal of other damage in the vicinity, such as burning a wheat depot and blowing up a carload of merchandise which contained ordnance property.	CIA/CSDB (S/US only) no eval (S)	184
Pazardzhik 4211N 2420E	Oct 54	About an hour prior to the sabotage incidents at Debrushtitsa (4306N-2416E) and Plovdiv (4208N-2415E), a factory at Pazardzhik was set afire.	CIA/CSDB (S/US only)	185
Perperek 4141N 2533E	Aug 53	Source learned from the grandfather of a friend that there was a partisan group of about 40 persons in the mountains around the village of Kerezi (location unknown), Nest, and Perperek. Source states that this mountainous area east of the Kaskovo-Kurdzhali rail line is very suitable for a group of this sort because it offers good cover and is extremely difficult for pursuers, as it is covered by dense forest and has rocky and precipitous places in which one man could stop an entire company of soldiers. No details as to the group's activities or countermeasures against it were available to Source.	CIA/CS (C)	186

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Peshtera 4202N 2411E	May 53	In early May 1953 Source heard that in the last days of April 1953 handwritten leaflets had appeared on the walls of Peshtera village with the following slogans: "Down with the Communists," "Death to the Communists," "Long live the Americans." The militia was summoned, but Source does not know whether any arrests were made.	CIA/CS (C)	187
Peshtera		(See also incident listed under Batak)		
Peshtersko 4251N 2720E	1953-1954	In the summer of 1953 two guerrillas entered Peshtersko and asked a villager for food, for which they paid. The villager reported them to the police, and a police and Army unit were moved to the place indicated by the villager. A skirmish ensued and the two guerrillas were killed; an EM was also killed, and two EM plus the police commander were wounded. An automatic pistol, radio set, and 30,000 levas were found with the guerrillas. It was rumored among the villagers of Peshtersko that one of the guerrillas was from that village, that he had escaped from Bulgaria, and that he had been dropped by parachute by the Americans. Source heard of this incident from the son of the Community Council of Buen (4248N-2717E) and also from the villagers of Peshtersko.	ARMY Greece, R-301-54, C-3 (ID 1231888) (S)	188
Peshtersko		(See also incident listed under Aylos)		
Perushitsa 4203N 2433E	May 53	In May 1953 posters appeared on walls in Perushitsa bearing the slogans "Death to Communism" and "Long live America."	USARMA Athens, NE: MID 194, Jul 53 (DAIN 288770)(S)	189
Pleven 4325N 2437E	Jun 53	On 11 June 1953 a soap factory at Pleven was burned down and destroyed by rioting workers who had not been paid their salaries.	CIA/CS (S/US Only)	190

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Plodiv 4200N 2411E	1953	In early 1953 almost all of Bulgaria's tobacco was shipped to the USSR without prior processing. This caused much unemployment in the tobacco industry. In the 1 May 1953 parade in Plodiv, workers carried signs saying "We want work." On 10 May a member of the cabinet and a former tobacco worker, Yugov, intervened to put an end to the dispute. The workers protested his intervention and in the ensuing riots one worker was killed, and many were wounded.	CIA/CS (S); ARMYA Greece, R-246-53, R-5 (ID 1175366) (S/Spt)	191
Plodiv	Jun 53	During the second half of June 1953 there were a number of anti-government demonstrations in Plodiv. These were staged by workers who were unemployed because of the suspension of work at a number of plants as a consequence of the lack of raw materials. At the Vasil Kolarov plant one of the directors was assaulted on 23 June 1953, and was so badly beaten that he was left in critical condition; his car was overturned and destroyed. The director's life was saved only by the arrival of the militia which had to be called in because of the ineffectiveness of the factory police. Simultaneous outbreaks occurred all over Plodiv okliya in June 1953 because of prevailing unemployment.	CIA/CS (S/US Only)	192
Plodiv	Sep-Oct 54	According to one report, grain which farmers were required to donate to the state was temporarily stored in the buildings previously constructed as part of the Plodiv fair. Despite strict guarding of the pavilion area, fire broke out in the temporary warehouses on the night of 21-22 September 1954, and caused the destruction of large quantities of grain destined for the USSR. The fire is attributed to sabotage. According to another report, supply of electric current was interrupted in Plodiv about the same time as the result of sabotage.	OARMA, Rome, R-64-55, C-3 (ID 1270656)(S/US Only); CIA/CSDB (S/US Only); ARMYA Greece, R-102-55 (ID 1276898) (S/US Only)	193
Plodiv	May 54	Arrests have been made recently at Plodiv of three persons accused of distributing anti-regime leaflets. One of the arrested persons claims that he belongs to a foreign propaganda service.	CIA/CO-H-1899, 20 Jul 54, no eval (S/US Only)	194

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Popovitsa 4203N 2501E	May 54	Capt. Feodor Veliakov, a Soviet Army officer on duty in Bulgaria, was found dead on 24 or 25 April 1954 at Papazkoy (probably Papazli, now Popovitsa). His body was discovered in a field with seven knife wounds in it. There have been a great many arrests but so far the perpetrators of the murder have not been discovered.	CIA/00-H-1582, 12 Jul 54, no eval (S)	195
Ravnogor 4457N 2422E	Up to May 53	Source stated that several cases have occurred recently where owners of carts and cattle have deliberately not registered ownership or numbers to the authorities. Several instances have occurred in Source's own village of Ravnogor in which anti-Communist slogans appeared on the walls.	ARMY/Greece, R-388-53, C-5 (ID 1181861) (S/SPH)	196
Ruse 4351N 2557E	Apr 53	A ship in the Ruse shipyards was set afire in April 1953 by anti-Communist workmen.	USARMA Athens, NR:MTD 194, 18 Jul 53 (DAIN 288770) (S)	197
Ruse	Apr 54	In April 1954 a group of 30 or 40 people under the direction of a woman known as Slatka Berneva from Silistra (4407N-2716E) were arrested in Ruse for anti-Communist activities. According to another report, some 70 persons were arrested in Silistra on the same charges. At the time of arrest the group was said to possess one or two American radios and about 20 American submachine guns.	CIA/CS (S); ARMY/Greece R-411-54, (S)	198
Sestrimo 4213N 2356E	Prior to Nov 54	During the first half of November 1954 a freight train loaded with tanks, artillery, and other military equipment was derailed near Sestrimo and Solu-Dervent (location unknown). The engine and cars fell over the precipice of a defile through which the Maritsa River flows. This accident was the work of the Bulgarian resistance movement. (See incident listed under Ruse)	CIA/00 (S); ARMY/Greece, R-2-55 (ID 1269870) (S)	199
Silistra 4407N 2716E				

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Slatina 4315N 2401E	1954	According to Source, a 32-year old Bulgarian from Drabishna (4130N-2610E), there is no organized resistance movement. During 1953, however, a group of young people wrote anti-Communist slogans on many walls in the village of Slatina. The slogans read "Death to Communism." The boys who put up the slogans were arrested, but because of their youth no one was sentenced.	CIA/CS (S)	200
Sliven 4240N 2619E	Nov 54	According to an official Italian service, a group of anti-Communist partisans located in the mountains near Sliven engaged in battle with police units during November 1954. The police units had been sent to fight the partisans. A violent encounter left both sides, particularly the partisans, with heavy losses. The partisans who survived fled into the mountains after the battle.	CIA/CS (S/US Only)	201
Sofia 4243N 2320E	Prior to Apr 55	Source, who lived in Sofia until April 1955, states that early in January 1954 he read a printed propaganda leaflet of unknown origin which had been given to his father by a friend. The leaflet contained a top secret order of the Bulgarian Air Force, warning against aircraft defections to the West, and concluded by warning the officers and men of the Air Force that the regime contemplated stringent measures against them.	ARMY/Greece, R-434-55, F-6 (ID 1297747) (S/SPH)	202
Sofia	May 54	Between 15 April and May 1954 there were 1400 arrests in the vicinity of Sofia. The arrests took place in Petrich, Vertikal, Dragolevci, Miravina, Zelenitsa, Karamnovitsi, Norosilitsa, Kadmititsa. Militia forces were sent in and army detachments also arrived.	CIA/00-H-1863, 15 Jul 54, no eval (S/US Only)	203
Sofia	Jan 53	Several workers were arrested recently at the "Tso Malev" textile factory in Sofia on charges of sabotage. Similar arrests were made in the "Vozroshilov" factory. Towards the middle of January 1953 some 20 students and two professors were arrested at the "Khristo Botev" technical school and accused of resistance activities.	CIA/CS (S/US Only)	204

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Sofia	Prior to Jun 53	Source believed, just as everybody else in Sofia, that there were secret resistance groups in the country, but because of great difficulties the activities of these groups were well hidden. Average citizens knew hardly anything about the activities of these groups, but they were convinced that they existed.	CIA/OS (C)	205
		It was rumored that the militia did not succeed in eliminating the resistance groups. A proof of this was the fact that political trials of "spies and saboteurs" were frequently announced. There was sabotage of railroads, and the populace was convinced that sabotage was not accidental but a result of resistance activity. Whenever there was a railroad accident, it always involved freight trains; there were also acts of sabotage in military depots.		
		In the spring of 1953, when an explosion occurred at the military depot near Sofia, everyone heard of it. A friend of Source who was coming from Ruse to Sofia by train said that his train had to make a long detour because the regular line could not be used because of the explosion.		
Sofia	Aug 55	Sabotage is frequent at the Sofia resin factory. The working conditions are so unpleasant that the greater part of the personnel is composed of those who cannot find work elsewhere--i.e. anti-Communists. This explains why sabotage occurs at least once or twice a year at the factory, and sometimes when one investigation by the authorities into a case of sabotage is underway, another case occurs. One of the major acts of sabotage took place in 1953 when 2,000,000 meters of pipe were ruined because of incorrect coating with resin.	Confidential Source (U)	206
Sofia	Jun 55	Acts of sabotage are frequent at the "Voroshilov" electrical factory in Sofia. The lack of good materials and efficient machinery provides a cover for the activities of anti-Communist elements.	Confidential Source (U)	207

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Sofia	Prior to Oct 54	A repatriated Greek PW claims that on 24 September 1954, as the result of sabotage, a major fire broke out at the "Georgi Dimitroff" textile factory in Sofia. A large part of the factory was destroyed, and more than 300 workers were left unemployed as a result.	Confidential Source (U)	208
		The Radio Free Europe evaluator, commenting on this report, notes that the Bulgarian press never publishes any information on major disasters, whether fires, air crashes, or of any other description. This was the first report of the "Georgi Dimitroff" fire.		
Sofia	May 56	A 52-year old Bulgarian emigre on his way to Venezuela told Radio Free Europe officers in Trieste that he had seen and read anti-Communist leaflets distributed in Sofia and the provinces during the summer of 1955. He was of the opinion that these leaflets emanated from an underground resistance group which probably was not far from governmental circles, since it had made use of typewriters, mimeographs, and presses in preparing the leaflets. The leaflets which Source saw had three main subjects: (1) appeals for economic sabotage; (2) appeals for boycotting of party organizations and programs; and (3) appeal for national consciousness and mobilization of all national forces in resistance to the regime.	Confidential Source (U)	209
		Source alleged in confirmation of his statements that a political trial was held at Sofia in March 1956 in which 11 persons were charged with distributing anti-regime leaflets for an underground group. Many of the leaflets were exhibited by the prosecution. Both prosecutor and defense maintained that the young people who distributed the leaflets were "victims of Western propaganda."		
		Source commented that the leaflets serve the purpose of reminding Bulgarian Communists of the presence of an "invisible enemy" among them who keeps good watch. According to a statement made privately by his wife, a staunch Communist who had been a member of the Popular Tribunal in Sofia is still receiving anonymous letters reminding him of what he has done and what he has to expect.		

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Sofia	Until May 56	Source was told by a Communist friend that during the February 1956 elections anti-Communist slogans and cartoons appeared on walls in the "Zakharova Fabrika" industrial area of Sofia. The slogans were very hostile to Vukto Chervenkov and the Communist rule. The neighborhood was surrounded, and the slogans and cartoons were removed from the walls. Source had also heard of such cartoons and slogans in other parts of Bulgaria.	Confidential Source (U)	210
Sofia	Jan 19-Sep 54	In May-June 1954 a group of 10 anti-Communist youngsters attempted blowing up the newly-built office of the Prime Minister and the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party by means of a bomb. One day before the scheduled execution of their plan, the youngsters were arrested. Presumably they had been betrayed by a member of their group. All friends of these youngsters were arrested, although they had no connection with the plot. Source heard of this case from a friend who knew the youngsters.	ALTR Wringer, 51B-D-11527-J, 211 C-3 (C)	
Sofia	Oct 54	In October 1954 while Source, a German national formerly associated with an East Berlin folk dance group, was traveling in Bulgaria, he twice heard mention of partisan activity in the mountains north of Sofia. On the first occasion, while on a train traveling between Ruse (4351N-2557E) and Sofia, a German-speaking Bulgarian railroad employee mentioned the guerilla warfare which had taken place in the mountains north of Sofia during World War II and in areas through which the train was then passing. The Bulgarian remarked that partisans were still active in the area but refused to elaborate further. A few days later, when the folk dance group visited a model collective farm some 40 kms. north of Sofia, Source and a few other members of the group learned from the Bulgarian who was in charge of the tour that every resident of the village in which the model collective was located had to be off the streets	513 MI Group; USAREURIC, RV-475-56, F-6 (ID 2023415) (C)	212

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Stalin	Jun 53	In June 1953 an embezzlement was discovered at the "Purvi Mui" textile factory in Stalin which employs 500 workers. After this discovery and also because of the low wages, disturbances broke out at the factory and slogans such as "We prefer Fascist slavery to your liberty" appeared on the factory walls. The disturbances were put down by a strong force of militia which arrested approximately 200 workers, most of whom were exiled or imprisoned.	ATWVA Greece, R-556-53, P-3 (ID 1187147) (S); R-618-53 (ID 1180062) (S)	213
Stryama	May 53	On 1 May 1953, shortly before a visiting delegation of Chinese, Soviets, Hungarians, Rumanians, and others was expected at the Stryama livestock collective, a fire broke out in the main barn which caused the destruction of all the buildings and pigs. The fire broke out at 0100 hours, immediately after the changing of the guard. Sabotage is presumed.	CIA/CS (S/SpH); ATWVA Greece, R-388-51, (ID 1181881) (S/SpH)	214
Svishtov	1954	According to Source, a 32-year old Bulgarian from Drabishma (4130N-2610E), students in the commercial school in Svishtov were often reported to write anti-Communist slogans.	CIA/CS (S)	215
Trevna	To Oct 54	Source learned from a friend who was a native of Burgas (4230N-2728E) that once, in March 1954, a train on which the friend was working as assistant engineer was stopped near Trevna by seven or eight armed persons. These persons searched the train but departed without removing any persons or goods. Source's friend did not know the meaning of this search, but the train crew remarked that these persons were guerillas.	ATWVA Greece, R-490-55, P-3 (ID 1299202) (S)	216

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Troyan 1255N 2443E	Mar 54	Armed forces were sent into the Troyan area towards the end of February 1954 in order to clean up what remained of an armed resistance group. The group had previously devoted its efforts to sabotage and to inciting villagers to resist tax officials.	CIA/00-H-1531, 3 May 54, no eval (S/US Only)	217
Turnovo 1305N 2539E	Apr 54	A labor union at Ilvanda, a village near Turnovo, organized a meeting to protest the new system of arrest without charges. This meeting was held on Sunday, 28 March 1954. The militia intervened, with the result that there was a clash in which four workers were killed and twelve wounded. One militiaman was killed and six were wounded. The 16th Battalion of the 11th Division had to be summoned to restore order. Some 35 workers were arrested and taken to Turnovo.	CIA/00-H-1711, 14 Jun 54, no eval (S/US Only)	218
Yambol 1229N 2630E	Mar 53	According to Source, a graduate of Burgas technical school, the "Khadihi Petrov" flour mill on the western outskirts of Yambol was completely destroyed by fire on 7-8 March 1953. Informant's brother, who was in Yambol at the time, stated that the telephone wires had been cut so that the fire brigade arrived too late to save the mill. Among peasants in the Yambol area it was rumored that the fire had either been set by anti-Communist mill workers to prevent shipment of flour to the USSR or had been set by "agents" assisted by "foreigners." All mill workers were arrested after the fire, but informant does not know whether the perpetrators were found.	CIA/CS (C/US Only): ATWVA Greece, R-388-53 (ID 1161881) (S/SpH)	219

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Dimitrograd 1201N 2535E	1956-1957	A Western news agency (name unspecified) in a release issued in the closing weeks of 1956 quoted the Communist newspaper of Dimitrograd to the effect that the townspeople had "gathered in the street shouting nonsense they had picked up from Western radio stations."	CIA/TDCS (S/US Only)	220
Dimitrovo 1236N 2302E	Prior to May 56	At the beginning of 1956 the "Kamenina" ceramics factory at Dimitrovo was set on fire. Five workers suspected of incendiaryism were condemned to death.	Confidential Source (U)	221
Khamanli 1156N 2555E	Mar 56	During the night of 7 or 8 March 1956 a fire broke out in cotton-goods factory of Khamanli, one of the most important of its kind in Bulgaria. The fire completely destroyed the warehouses of the plant and spread to several other nearby factories. Total damage caused by the fire reportedly amounted to several million leva.	CIA/CS (S/US Only)	222
Kyustendil 1217N 2241E	Current	The police arrested 15 people in connection with the fire but subsequently released them with the exception of two workers in the plant and two other suspects whom they continued to question. According to rumors in the area the police discovered an empty kerosene can believed to have been discarded by the culprits after they had spread the kerosene throughout the building. Partisan groups are allegedly operating in the Kyustendil, Ruyen, and Gablove stockpiles areas. The groups reportedly harass and occasionally murder Communist functionaries. One group allegedly also blew up the waterworks near Garianom (unidentified).	CIA/CS (S)	223

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Location	Date of Information	Description	Source	Number
Pleven 4225N 2437E	1956-1957	According to an experienced Western observer who traveled widely in Bulgaria up to the end of 1956, 40 students were arrested in Pleven on charges of conspiracy against the regime. The arrests occurred in the closing weeks of 1956.	CLA/TDCS (S/US Only)	224
Plovdiv 4208N 2445E	Nov 56	A number of students were arrested at Plovdiv on 8 November 1956 on charges of attempting to organize a demonstration.	CLA/TDCS (S/US Only)	225
Sofia 4243N 2320E	Jan 57	The Sofia correspondent of a Warsaw newspaper reports that at least 300 students in Sofia and other cities had been ousted or marked for ouster from school because of anti-proletarian attitudes and "hostile utterances against the Communist regime."	New York Times, 5 Jan 57 (U)CIA/TDCS (S/US Only)	226
Sofia	Nov 56	On 2 November 1956, a number of agricultural students were arrested in Sofia during the course of a semi-riot.	State, Rome, Telegram 9393, 14 Nov 56; no eval (C)	227
Sofia	1956-1957	According to an experienced Western observer who traveled widely in Bulgaria up to the end of 1956, a security police officer was murdered on a street in Sofia by two Bulgarian students on 25 December 1956.	CLA/TDCS (S/US Only)	228

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